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Srdačno,

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Glavni i odgovorni urednik

ESSAYS

RECASTING THE NATION: IDENTITY AND THE STATE IN CROATIA 1990-2000

Steven Aračić-Del Corso

Abstract: The collapse of Communism was followed by an upsurge in nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe and the new post-communist governments which came into power made use of pre-communist historical-national narratives to legitimize themselves. In the case of the newly independent Republic of Croatia the nationalist HDZ, after coming to power in the country's first democratic elections in 1990, immediately undertook an effort to articulate their own vision of the Croatian nation and to reject the common Yugoslav immediate past. Particular national myths, such as the *Antemurale Christianitatis* (Ramparts of Christendom), were used to assert an essentially Western character for the Croats in contrast to an orientalized, Balkan 'other' and the more 'Eastern' Serbs in particular. This study examines how this identity was promoted through an officially supported nationalist historical narrative. It explores how this narrative could succeed and resonate with Croats' understanding of their own historical and cultural identity, and where this narrative alternately contradicted and sought to downplay other elements of Croatian history which did not fit neatly into it. It also discusses how this identity was manifested politically, within the former Yugoslavia during the wars of the 1990's, as well as how this discourse of Western Croatian identity was received by some in the West itself.

The creation of new states or regimes has often been accompanied by the production of new historical and national narratives. Whether it was in an authoritarian regime like the Soviet Union or in a democratizing one like Spain Post-Franco, historical narratives have been reinterpreted or invented outright in accordance with the new order's ideological values. This is especially true in the cases of the independent states that arose out of the former Yugoslavia. In these cases, not only were the previous political and economic orders replaced, but a redefinition of what the nation was thought to consist of also occurred. Nationalists in Croatia, of which the most prominent was President Franjo Tuđman, constructed a new narrative of national identity in order to create for the Croatian nation a homogenized self-image which stood in positive contrast

to the other nations of the former Yugoslavia, particularly the Serbs. Furthermore, as all the nations of the Balkans are fixated on how outsiders perceive them, this image or identity had to be projected outwards, beyond the fragments of Yugoslavia as well. A West European identity, which denigrated other supposedly non-Western ex-Yugoslav nationalities, was asserted for the Croatian nation.

Narrower conceptions of national identity were promoted at the expense of the old Yugoslav identity. Through the official endorsement of new or revived historical narratives and national mythologies, former co-nationals became re-identified in the new states as foreigners; other narratives, symbols, and notions which contradicted these new definitions were deliberately suppressed. The new limits placed on the boundaries of the nation enabled the state to identify outsiders and supposed traitors, and helped to make possible the brutal ethnic warfare which characterized the collapse of Yugoslavia. Also important, cultural, historical, and religious affiliations were emphasized in a highly selective manner in the new state-endorsed identities, which would be used to seek sympathy abroad from other countries with whom, it was claimed, a more authentic common historical and cultural relationship existed.

Croatia, under the government of the communist general- turned- historian Dr. Franjo Tuđman, is a demonstration of how old official mythologies in post-communist states can be replaced by new ones. The socialist myth *Bratstvo i Jedinstvo* (Brotherhood and Unity), the notion that the peoples of Yugoslavia should naturally be united and that their prosperity depended on that unity, would be replaced by the more exclusive notion of an ethnically-based Croatian nation-state. This new delineation relegated other Yugoslavs to the status of aliens despite the recent history of common Yugoslav statehood shared by each of them. In particular, the Orthodox Serbs would become ‘the other’ against which Croatian nationality would be defined. The extremist wing of Tuđman's nationalist political party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), sought to place blame on the Serbs, collectively, for the outbreak of war in 1991 by associating them with the expansionist policies of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the extremists within the nationalist Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Croatia. Consequently, the Croatian Serbs, despite their centuries-long presence in Croatia, found themselves reduced by their ethnicity to the status of enemy.¹

This process of portrayal, however, was not limited only to the Serbs. Croats too found themselves the victims of ethno-nationalist reductionism. The Croatian writer

¹ V.P. Gagnon Jr., *The Myth of Ethnic War*, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2004), 147

Slavenka Drakulić described this phenomenon in a chapter of her book *Balkan Express* fittingly entitled ‘Overcome by Nationality,’ in which she wrote:

Along with millions of other Croats, I was pinned to the wall of nationhood – not only by outside pressure from Serbia and the Federal Army but by national homogenization within Croatia itself. That is what the war is doing to us, reducing us to one dimension: the Nation.²

The pressure exerted on the common Yugoslav political identity by war and the policies of competing nationalists would make this idea an unsustainable one. Within the context of the war, most would come to accept homogenization within the ethnic nation; however, others, including Drakulić, tried to resist the tendency towards national reductionism and, at best, found themselves labelled with the pejorative term ‘Yugonostalgic.’ At worst, they were accused of treason by those who had adopted the narrow national identities enthusiastically.

It is not sufficient to argue that the nationalist authorities simply hoisted new ethnically exclusive national identities on their communities. Certainly, the shadow of Milošević’s centralizing and Greater Serbian policies made the destruction of the common Yugoslav identity easier in Croatia. However, in order to be as successful as they were in replacing the old mythology, the new mythology of the ethnic nation, consolidated in the 1990’s, could not have sprung from nowhere. Instead, it must have resonated with already existing notions of Croatian history and identity.

One of these notions was inadvertently introduced by the Slovenian poet Aleš Debeljak in his 1994 essay ‘Twilight of the Idols: Recollections of a Lost Yugoslavia.’ In that essay, the author asks the reader ‘who now remembers Vukovar?’³ Specifically, he is asking the reader to remember what that multi-ethnic Croatian town on the Danube, itself a microcosm of the multi-cultural Yugoslav state, had been before it was destroyed the Yugoslav People’s Army and its supporting Serbian paramilitaries. Although Debeljak displays a great deal of sentimentality for the old Yugoslavia in his essay (something he was subsequently criticized for in his native Slovenia), nevertheless a certain degree of a tendency which the literary theorist Edward Said would recognize as ‘Orientalist’ can be detected. Some of these attitudes are conveyed in his description of Vukovar: ‘a city on

² Slavenka Drakulić, *The Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War*, (Harper Collins, New York, 1993), 51

³ Aleš Debeljak, *Twilight of the Idols: Recollections of a Lost Yugoslavia*, (White Pine Press, New York, 1994), pp. 23

the border between Croatia and Serbia. A city with its baroque palaces, impoverished aristocracy, and *Sachertorten* [which] represented one of the easternmost outposts of Central European culture.⁴ For Debeljak, Vukovar was not just a town on the border between Croatia and Serbia. It was also on the frontier between one Europe and another, between Western or Central Europe and the Balkans. It is clear that the poet looks on the former with affection, contrasting it utterly (and not without reason) against the barbarity and violence of what he dubs ‘a Serbian *Drang nach Westen*’⁵ that originated from the eastern bank of the Danube.

The tendency within Croatia to view their country as a frontier of Western civilization is most insistently represented in one influential national myth in particular, the *Antemurale Christianitatis* or ‘Ramparts of Christendom.’ The *Antemurale Christianitatis* was an epithet first applied to Croatia in 1519 by Pope Leo X, at a time when Croatia was a battleground between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. In modern Croatia, it has been used in order to assert an entirely Catholic and ‘Western’ cultural identity, to be usefully contrasted with the country’s more ‘Eastern’ neighbors of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the myth, Croatia was a frontier bastion of the West which fought for centuries in defense of Catholic Europe against invaders from the East, be they Asiatic, Islamic, or Communist; thus, Croatia, it is argued, necessarily deserves equality among the other Western nations for that service. This myth has strongly shaped how Croatians see their historic role in Europe and affected the nation’s external relations, both with the European Union and its Balkan neighbors. This idea, and the notion that Croatia is an integral part of the West, became a key plank in the national narrative Franjo Tuđman put forward.

According to Edward Said, ‘Orientalism’ is the process by which the West identifies itself as the ‘civilized world’; by constructing the Orient as the exotic and essentially barbaric ‘Other,’ the contrasting image against which the Occident defines itself. This value has remained historically constant despite the shifting territorial definition of “the Orient” in the Western imagination.⁶

In her book *Imagining the Balkans*, historian Maria Todorova describes the process by which the Balkans, with its associations of backwardness and violence, became constructed in the European imagination as the ‘Other within Europe.’ As the only part

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid, pp. 26

⁶ Milica Bakić-Hayden, ‘Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia.’ *Slavic Review*, vol. 54, No. 4 (Winter, 1995), pp. 1

of the continent which was ruled and colonized into modern times by an ‘Oriental’ power, the Islamic Ottoman Empire, the nations of the peninsula have had to continually reassert and defend their claims to a European identity. In doing so, these countries have frequently sought to contrast themselves against other, supposedly less ‘European,’ neighbors—as a result, a hierarchy of orientalisms was created within the Balkan ‘Other.’ Orthodox Christian Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks would contrast themselves against predominantly Muslim, and hence necessarily less ‘European,’ Bosniaks and Albanians, while the latter would in turn distinguish themselves against ‘the ultimate Orientals,’ gypsies, and non-Europeans.⁷ This appropriation of Orientalist discourse by those who had themselves been its victims, what Milica Bakic-Hayden refers to as ‘nesting orientalisms,’ led subsequently to the production of gradations of ‘Easternness’ within the Balkans. All of the nationalities of the former Yugoslavia produced ‘nesting orientalisms’ during the 1990s, not least of all being Croatia, which made use of the fact that it was never conquered by the Ottomans to assert a regional cultural superiority.

Directly related to that is an important aspect of ‘nesting orientalism’ which Bakić-Hayden describes as a tendency towards a ‘primevalization’ of national identity. The nation’s authentic identity is seen as residing in an idealized past which is nonetheless imagined as being simultaneous with the present.⁸ The histories of the nations of the former Yugoslavia are no longer presented in linear terms. Instead, they all look back to a period before the common state, whether it be to the period just prior to Yugoslavia’s establishment (when Croatia and Slovenia were part of the Habsburg Empire and Serbia was an independent kingdom), or to more distant medieval, and even antique, pasts. Consequently, the recent common history within the socialist state was judged to be inauthentic and subsequently rejected in the new national narratives.

Croatia’s participation in Central Europe through the dynastic legacy of the Habsburgs provided the basis for Croatian claims for the possession of an essentially West European cultural and historical identity and, in the process, negated the historical influence of the ‘non-European’ Ottoman Empire which ruled over much of Croatia for some one-hundred fifty years.⁹ This interpretation of history, which divided a Western Croatia from its Eastern adversaries, became internalized in how Croatians came to imagine their nation’s place in history.

⁷ Ibid, pp. 4

⁸ Ibid, pp. 5

⁹ Jeff Harder, ‘Imagining the Croatian nation,’ *East European Quarterly*, 22 Dec, 2004, pp. 1

Throughout the Balkan Peninsula there have been many wars. The Avars from Asia settled here and were stopped in Croatia. The next series of wars were part of an anti-Turkish movement in Central Europe. Croatia was under the tutelage of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and thus had always remained the bulwark of Western culture... Historically Croats defended Western [European] civilization and culture.¹⁰

Historicist statements like the preceding one, made by a former mayor of the Jastrebarsko municipality, drew on various episodes of Croatian history in order to construct the narrative of Croatia as the shield of the West. Another similar statement, made by a Croatian lawyer, exhibits the tendencies of ‘nesting orientalism’:

The Croatian people are very cultured. The culture of our people is tied to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Vienna, Prague, Budapest, and Zagreb. These were the four centers of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Therefore, our culture is tied to the West [Europe]. We are Catholics and have always leaned towards the West... We are completely from the Western Culture. This is a big difference between us and the Serbs who were always oriented toward the East. They were in contact with the East, they fought against the Turks, and they are from a totally different culture. We fought against the Turks too, but they stayed in Serbia much longer.¹¹

The relationship to the Austro-Hungarian Empire is brought to the fore and portrayed as a time when Croatia was in contact with the authentic, and essentially Western, sources of its culture. That Croatia was kept territorially divided and treated often in a semi-colonial manner by the centers of that empire in Vienna and Budapest is glossed over completely.

Any influence from the East is portrayed in exclusively negative terms:

Throughout history, Croatian territory was under the domination of Western Europe. From the West came culture. Serbia was under the domination of the Turks – the East. There was no culture that came from the East, only the concept of how to impale people.¹²

The Serbs, owing to their considerably longer history of Ottoman rule as well as their Orthodox Christianity, are reduced to being essential ‘Easterners’ and necessarily posited in opposition to a completely Western Croatian nation.

¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 1-2

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 2

¹² Ibid.

It was the tradition of Catholicism in Croatia, in contrast to Serbian Orthodoxy, which served to both reaffirm the country's connectedness to Western Europe as well as to underline the differences between itself and its former co-nationals in Yugoslavia. Through its religion, Catholic Croatia was linked to the wider Catholic Western Europe, one which had come to define itself by modern, progressive, and democratic values.¹³ Croatian Catholicism also served to distinguish the nation from the rest of the predominantly Orthodox Christian and Islamic Balkan, contributing to the tendency to deny that Croatia actually had anything to do with the Balkans at all.

As a consequence, an innovative geographical definition was officially promoted which described the country as 'Central European and Mediterranean.' The use of the first term, 'Central Europe,' is of particular importance from a post-colonial perspective. The origins of the idea of Central Europe lie in the Wilhemite German notion of *Mitteleuropa* (literally Middle Europe), and had originally carried within it a notion of German cultural dominance in the region. However, in the 1980's the idea was re-imagined by Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian intellectuals such as Milan Kundera, Czesław Miłosz, and Mihály Vajda, as one aimed at asserting a Western identity. This identity served to differentiate those countries from the Soviet Union, of which they were still satellites, and to break free of the monolithic category of Eastern Europe and its pejorative associations, which had taken hold in the West as a consequence of the Cold War.¹⁴ The region's southern borders, however, were always vaguely defined. Nevertheless, because the new myth of Central Europe still depended on the historical legacy of Catholic German Habsburg rule, both Slovenia and Croatia could reasonably lay claim to membership.¹⁵ The new attachment to ideas like 'Central Europe' gave the Croatian state a convenient self-category to use in order to assert its Western identity. Despite that cultural trends that were seen as defining Central European identity had impacted Serbia through its intelligentsia in Vojvodina (the northern part of modern Serbia which had been under Habsburg rule), the nation never became closely associated with the concept. Some of the major reasons for this were due to the nature of Serbia's own national historical narrative and that the core of the modern Serbian state emerged in those regions which had been under Ottoman rule, but another was undoubtedly that nation's Orthodox Christian profile.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Maria Todorova *Imagining the Balkans*, (New York, Oxford, 1997), pp. 148

¹⁵ Ibid.

One of the major factors behind Croatia's claims to a Central European identity was then undoubtedly its Catholicism, and it was indeed the Catholic church in Croatia which took the leading role in enunciating the 'Western' orientation of Croatian history and culture in the 1970's and 1980's. The narrative put forward by the Church was consolidated with the celebration of 'The Great Novena,' a nine-year long series of Church commemorations celebrating 1300 years of Croatian Catholicism. The specific events being commemorated often revolved around medieval Croatian princes and kings who had progressively rejected the Greek form of Christianity in favor of the Latin.¹⁶ The result of this process was a convergence between Croatian religious and historical/national identities that culminated in the reinvention of Croatian identity in the 1990's as a completely Catholic and Western one, with one rejecting the influence of Byzantine political, historical, and ecclesiastical traditions.

The political consequences of this new identity were exhibited in a new myth put forward by the Tuđman government, that of 'Croatia's return to the West.' The implication was that, prior to independence, Croatia had been forced to exist in a kind of 'Babylonian captivity in the multiethnic federation dominated by atheistic communists and Orthodox Serbs.'¹⁷ When he promulgated the new Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in 1990, Tuđman mentioned the words 'Europe' and 'European' in his speech as many times as he did 'Croatia' and 'Croatian,' forcefully asserting the nation's Western identity.¹⁸ Similarly, after the war Tuđman would insist on that Western identity in his foreign policy, which officially aimed at NATO entry and European Union accession, despite that both organizations would keep the country at arm's length until after the increasingly authoritarian president died in December 1999.

As the head of the HDZ, President Tuđman was not simply Croatia's head of state, but also the chief ideologue of the new Croatian nationalist movement and the engine behind the construction of the new narrative of Croatian national identity. Tuđman, a historian by training, frequently described Croatia's position in rigidly historicist terms, derived directly from the *Antemurale Christianitatis* myth, as a defensive bulwark of West European civilization. In accordance with his narrative, the differences between Croats and Serbs became identified with the differences between distinct Western European and Eastern Orthodox civilizations while the Muslim Bosniaks

¹⁶ Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), pp. 63-72

¹⁷ Ibid, pp. 187

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 187-188

introduced a third Islamic civilization. The dichotomy at the core of Orientalist discourse meant that Croatia's forceful assertion of a completely Western identity also implied a claim to being a representative of superior civilization in the region. The language of distinct civilizations also carried with it the notion that the existing cultural differences were essential and eternal.¹⁹ This meant that the history of common national life in Yugoslavia, which was only just coming to an end, was relegated to the status of an aberration in history. The new authorities' attitudes towards Serbs were made abundantly clear in the new history textbooks which appeared during the Tuđman presidency; in them, references to Serbs were frequently preceded with adjectives such as 'barbarous,' 'uncivilized,' and 'brutal.'²⁰

However, while he maintained his civilization-based world view, Tuđman would nevertheless contradict himself with regard to the Bosniaks. While he recognized that Islam had made them different in culture from Croats, he nevertheless would refer to traditional Croatian nationalist arguments that asserted that the Bosniaks were fundamentally Croat in nationality. By 1994 Tuđman began to make statements that at once reaffirmed and undermined his cultural determinism. In order to halt the advance of Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States and other Western powers began to pressure Tuđman to reestablish the Muslim-Croat alliance which had been shattered by the open warfare that had broken out between the two communities in Hercegovina and Central Bosnia.

It was at this point that Tuđman stated that '[Muslims] should side with Croats, they should tie themselves to western civilization through ties with Croats, that is the only chance for their survival.'²¹ On the one hand, this statement asserts that despite supposed civilizational differences, the Muslim Bosniaks could, and indeed must, attach themselves to 'Western' civilization. This effectively contradicted the notion that the differences between civilizations were permanent and unbridgeable. On the one hand, this statement is thoroughly saturated with the kind of orientalizing discourse that Tuđman had so thoroughly internalized. The statement exhibits his customary attitude of the inherent superiority of Western culture by arguing that it was at once both desirable and necessary for their survival that the Bosniaks align themselves with Western

¹⁹ Gordana Uzelac, 'Franjo Tuđman's Nationalist Ideology,' *East European Quarterly*, 1 Jan, 1998, pp. 4

²⁰ Alex J. Bellamy, *The formation of Croatian national identity: A centuries-old dream?*, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003), pp. 150

²¹ Gordana Uzelac, 'Franjo Tuđman's Nationalist Ideology,' *East European Quarterly*, 1 Jan, 1998, pp. 13

civilization and that civilization's representatives in Southeastern Europe, the Croats. On the other hand, however, this necessarily contradicts the very notion of the essential difference between Western and Eastern civilization which Tuđman had been continually asserting. This apparent turn around may seem inexplicable, but its precedent can be found in the older formulations of Croatian national ideology, such as that put forward by the 19th century nationalist and liberal Ante Starčević and his Party of Right²², which did not fixate as much on religious identity as Tuđman's ideology and was not necessarily in agreement with it.

This was not the only inconsistency between the narrative advanced by Franjo Tuđman and preexisting notions of Croatian national identity and history. In fact, Tuđman's narrative generally depended on a particularly selective understanding of Croatian history. While those elements and national myths of the past which suited the ideological purposes of the President and the HDZ were concertedly promoted, other aspects of Croatian history which might challenge the new official narrative were deliberately downplayed or ignored.

At the start of any nationalist-oriented Croatian history text, one will almost certainly encounter a chapter on the division of the Roman Empire into Western and Eastern halves and that the territory of modern Croatia is located in the former western half of that empire. The intention is to locate Croatia's Western-orientation as far back in history as possible. However, there are certain problems with this interpretation, not least among them being that Slavic-speaking peoples would not settle in Southeastern Europe for another two centuries. By that time, the Western Roman Empire had already fallen and the territory of modern Croatia was a contested area between the Frankish and Byzantine Empires, which alternated influence on the territory depending on the moment. This emphasizes the fact that the Croatian lands, while situated within the geographic bounds of the Western Roman Empire, were nonetheless situated on a border, which implies direct contact and interaction with the 'Other' from the earliest historical period; this necessarily made the relationship more ambiguous. Historical works by more nationally-inclined scholars do tacitly recognize this fact, even Ivo Perić in *A History of the Croats* where he recognizes that '...soon the West was lost again, while

²² The ideology of Starčević and his Party of Right originally put forward an idea of Croatian nationality which was constituted essentially as a civic community of those who lived in the territory of the Kingdom of Croatia, as he defined it. Thus, everyone residing in the kingdom, regardless of religion or ethnicity, was a member of the Croat political nation. During the Second World War, the Ustaše attempted to appropriate the legacy of Starčević for themselves and used it in order to justify their belief that the Muslim Bosniaks were actually ethnically Croat.

the Eastern Empire entered a phase of consolidation... The former Roman province of Dalmatia found itself within the Byzantine sphere.²³

The more important theme displaying orientalizing tendencies which one encounters in the nationalist historiography is, however, that of the aforementioned *Antemurale Christianitatis* myth. The narrative which one will typically encounter includes the normal factual background about the Ottoman wars in Europe and how Pope Leo X gave the epithet to Croatia. However, certain more historically spurious accounts of the myth are also frequently encountered. One of these, not necessarily supported by the historical documentation, has since entered into popular lore. The claim is that the Pope explicitly said to Toma Crnić (Niger), the envoy of Ban Petar Berislavić of Croatia, that the Papacy would never allow Croatia to fall to the Turks because she is the *scudum solidissimus et antemurale christianitatis* (the strongest shield and ramparts of Christendom).²⁴ Despite the lack of documentation for this story, it is presented as a fact in nationalist-oriented histories like Perić's, where it is used without any references.²⁵

Both of these themes made their appearances in the intensely nationalist literature which was put out in the Croatian Diaspora in the wake of the Second World War. One such collection, published in Chicago in 1955 with the telling title of *The Croatian Nation In Its Struggle for Freedom and Independence*, leaves little to doubt as far as the political motivations of its editors are concerned. Seventeen different writers contributed to this publication, among them the infamous Father Krunoslav Draganović, a wartime supporter of the Ustaše and a man greatly involved in the efforts to help escaping Nazis to reach South America, including the leader of Croatia's own wartime quisling fascist government, Ante Pavelić.

One essay that is of particular interest (under a subsection entitled "Impossible Existence of Any Yugoslavia") was written by historian Dr. Vatro Murvar. The essay's title, 'Croatia and the Conflict between East and West,' is self-explanatory. In it, Murvar attempts to demonstrate some kind of continuity connecting the conflicts between the Catholic and Orthodox churches with the Cold War between the communist countries and the liberal democracies which was just beginning. The notion of such a continuity is more than problematic, but it is important in that it demonstrates how the *Antemurale Christianitatis* myth was being re-imagined at the end of the Second World War. While

²³ Ivo Perić, *A History of the Croats*, (Zagreb, 1998), pp. 11

²⁴ Ivo Žanić, 'Simbolični Identitet Hrvatske u Trokutu Raskrižje - Predziđe - Most' *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu* (Institut za istoriju Sarajevo 2003), pp. 165

²⁵ Ivo Perić, *A History of the Croats*, (Zagreb, 1998), pp. 85

the myth was still fundamentally about the assertion of Croatia's Catholic and Western identity, it was also infused with other entirely new characteristics. No longer was the myth focused solely on the defense of Christian Europe from the Ottomans. A new contemporary non-European 'Other' was being imagined in the shadow of Communism. Murvar depicts the Serbs as one of the primary agents of this new 'Other' and sees the Serbian (and Yugoslav) capital of Belgrade, along with Moscow, as one of the two poles from which the communist threat to Western civilization emanated. This is not to say that the whole of Murvar's narrative was carried over into the 1990's. However, much of its general sentiment reappears. In particular, the notion that the socialist Yugoslavia was a kind of Greater Serbia became part of the officially-endorsed national narrative.²⁶

Along with the promotion of particular national myths designed to refashion Croatian identity also came official efforts to encourage 'historical amnesia.' One such method included wide-ranging changes made to primary and secondary school curriculums in the 1990's. These changes to the curriculum were to be expected as school texts were saturated with the ideology of the socialist state. However, the extent to which the HDZ-led government went towards 'de-Yugoslavizing' the Croatian literature and history curriculums was characteristically excessive. The attempt was made to purge the Croatian literary tradition of all elements which were not considered sufficiently national. New textbooks did not include a single work from Serbian literature, even excluding the Nobel laureate Ivo Andrić who had Croatian origins.²⁷

Among the most glaring absences were those writers who took part in the 19th century Illyrian movement, the first modern national movement of the Croats which was also at once a Pan-Slavist cultural movement. The leader of that movement, Ljudevit Gaj, had written the popular patriotic song '*Još Hrvatska nije propala* (Croatia has not yet fallen)' and played the key role in standardizing the modern Croatian literary language; yet even he was dubbed to be ideologically inappropriate because of his support of South Slavic solidarity. He was subsequently dropped from the curriculum completely.²⁸ A similar fate befell the work of Croatian Yugoslavist Josip Juraj Strossmayer, one of the key figures of 19th century Croatian history, while the writings of the 17th century anti-Habsburg conspirators, Petar Zrinski and Fran Krsto Frankopan, were included, although it was presumably less for their talents as writers than for the esteem paid to them in the

²⁶ Alex J. Bellamy, *The formation of Croatian national identity: A centuries-old dream?*, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003), pp. 151

²⁷ Ibid, pp. 152

²⁸ Ibid.

nationalist historiography.²⁹ Of twentieth century writers, only two were included. Among them was the famous and thoroughly communist Miroslav Krleža, but the texts to be taught were chosen very carefully so as to portray the correct ideological image.³⁰ The result was that many of the most renowned Croatian writers were deliberately neglected because their ideas could potentially be used to challenge the Tuđmanist narrative.

Similar revisionist methods were applied to the history curriculum. The Illyrian movement was only briefly addressed in textbooks and when the movement was discussed, it was described together with the Yugoslavist movement in terms like ‘illusionist.’³¹ Nationalist historians upheld the line that the two Yugoslavias were somehow ‘Greater Serb’ traps for the Croats.³² Pointing out the leading roles of celebrated Croat intellectual and political personalities in the development of Yugoslavist ideology must have appeared as too great of a contradiction to be easily explained away, so instead it was simply ignored. Such attacks on the Croatian literary and historical traditions threatened to leave both vastly poorer. Furthermore, these attacks on the school curriculum were paralleled with more infamous attempts at purging the Croatian literary language of words and forms which were argued to have entered the Croatian language under the influence of the Serbian standard. While the Croatian literary language had long followed a purist tradition, linguistic purism was carried to extremes during the years of the war and included attacks on words and features which had long been attested to in the Croatian standard.

Nonetheless, the promotion of an orientalizing national mythology and the suppression of those elements of Croatian history and culture which might contradict it served to exclude the Serbs from the national community. Episodes such as the role played by the Orthodox garrisons of the Military Frontier in Ban Josip Jelačić’s Croatian army during the 1848 war with Hungary were frequently downplayed as they would inevitably highlight a far more complex relationship between Croats and Serbs than the adversarial narrative advanced by the HDZ right-wing. Despite their centuries-old presence in Croatia, the Serbs were nevertheless portrayed by the HDZ as a foreign body in the country.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid, pp. 151

³² Ibid.

During his speech on the ‘Freedom Train,’ which commemorated the recapture of the city of Knin and the ultimate collapse of the rebel Serbian Krajina para-state, President Tuđman made reference to the status of the city of Knin, before it became what he described as a center of ‘Četnik anti-Croatianism,’ as the historical capital of the medieval Kingdom of Croatia.³³ In that speech, he made specific reference to the fact that Knin had been the seat of King Dmitar Zvonimir, a particularly important figure in Croatian national mythology who, according to legend, cursed the Croats to nine-hundred years of foreign rule after a rebellion of the nobility against his policies that favored the Roman Church. In this way, the Serbian presence in Knin was conceived of as a foreign element and an obstacle that needed to be overcome if the Croatian nation was to be redeemed.

With the end of the war in 1995, it seemed Franjo Tuđman had succeeded in firmly consolidating the country as a Croatian nation-state. The ‘nesting orientalisms’ deployed by the nationalists had greatly helped along the process of dividing Croats from the other ex-Yugoslav peoples. It made sense, considering the discourse of the new Croatian national narrative discussed above, that they would look for new relationships in the West, among Catholics, and in Central Europe. Selective as it was, the nationalists’ interpretation of Croatian identity did manage to resonate with some in Western Europe and North America. A 1995 New York Times editorial accepted the Tuđmanist formulation of Croatian identity without any apparent doubts, writing: ‘Washington’s best hope is to appeal to predominantly Roman Catholic Croatia’s longstanding desire to extricate itself from Balkan conflicts and associate itself more closely to the West.’³⁴ This was not a little ironic from a historical perspective, as Todorova points out, considering that some of the most gruesome crimes of World War II and during the 1990’s were committed in the name of that very Roman Catholic Church which now was considered to provide the basis for Croatia’s Western identity. Even political figures as far removed from the conflict as United States conservative politician Pat Buchanan would comment in ways that reflected elements of this nationalist discourse (owed probably to his Catholicism). When he made a statement in favor of intervention in Croatia, the arguments Buchanan used could have been taken verbatim from texts by any HDZ official of the 1990’s:

³³ ‘Franjo Tuđman’s ‘Freedom Train’ Speech in Knin,’ British Broadcasting Corporation, 1995

³⁴ Maria Todorova *Imagining the Balkans*, (New York, Oxford, 1997), pp. 158

Croatia is not some faraway desert emirate, it is a 'piece of the continent, a part of the main,' a Western republic that belonged to the Habsburg empire and was for centuries the first line of defense of Christian Europe. For their ceaseless resistance to the Ottoman Turks, Croatia was proclaimed by Pope Leo X to be the '*Antemurale Christianitatis*,' the bulwark of Christianity.³⁵

On a broader international scale, the return to supposedly more authentic pre-Yugoslav identities seemed to also entail the return to pre-Yugoslav international loyalties. The old socialist mythologies of Brotherhood and Unity seemed completely demolished as a consequence of the inter-ethnic brutality of the war. With the Yugoslav relationship discarded as errant and inauthentic, the nationalists looked to their own narrative in search of historical relationships which were deemed authentic. It became common for the international media to talk again of the traditional solidarity shared among the Serbs with fellow Orthodox Russians and Greeks and the historical ties which Slovenia and Croatia shared with Germany and Austria. As the breakup of the Yugoslav federation got underway, events seemed to support the thesis that the new independent states had simply returned to older, arguably more natural, international sympathies and alignments. Austria and Germany had been the most active in pushing for the recognition of Croatian independence and the Vatican was among the first states to recognize it. Appreciation of this support materialized in some strange ways, such as the infamous political-schlager *Danke Deutschland*, the appearance of monuments, and the renaming of streets in many Croatian towns in honor of the German and Austrian foreign ministers, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Alois Mock. The case of German and Austrian affinity may have been due in some degree to Habsburg and other historical legacies associated with the idea of Central Europe. Catholic identity also played its part with regard to the sympathy from the Vatican and possibly also in German politics owing to the strong support for recognition and calls for measures against Serbia made by the conservative Christian Democrats, who campaign together on the federal level with the Catholic Christian Socialists in Bavaria.³⁶

Within Serbia, there has been an effort to ascribe German and Austrian support for Croatia to a renewal of a German drive to the Adriatic that was left unfinished from the Second World War. This argument effectively tries to conflate contemporary events

³⁵ David From, 'Unpatriotic Conservatives: A war against America,' *National Review*, 7 April, 2003, pp. 7

³⁶ Wolfgang F. Schloer, 'Germany and the Breakup of Yugoslavia,' from Thomas, Friman, *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, Ethnicity, and Nationalism*, (Garland Publishing Inc., New York, 1996), pp. 324

in the former Yugoslavia with the intentions of Nazi Germany. It also, however, completely ignores the tremendous changes that had taken place in Germany since 1945 and presented more of a caricature of German politics than a reality. Indeed, in the political culture of contemporary Germany, the very term ‘national interest’ is looked upon with suspicion.³⁷ Similarly, German diplomacy has been overwhelming characterized by support for multilateral diplomatic approaches and the integration, not disintegration, of Europe. The claim that the newly reunited Germany was simply bent on picking up where 1945 left off is unsubstantiated.

What seems to have been the case, according to Wolfgang Schloer, is that the German public was particularly receptive to the Croatian cause because of the effect their own recent political experiences had had on their interpretation of events in the former Yugoslavia. Many Germans perceived Croatia’s independence from Yugoslavia as analogous to the collapse of the Soviet bloc which made German reunification (a process that was still ongoing while Croatia was moving towards independence) possible. Similarly, the large numbers of Croat *gastarbeiters* in Germany and the familiarity that many in Germany and Austria had with Croatia as a holiday destination also must have played a significant role as images of Serb artillery shelling the Adriatic port of Dubrovnik were shown to television audiences world-wide.³⁸ As both Britain and France had shown a marked lack of enthusiasm for German reunification, the ambivalence of those countries towards taking a stand in support of Slovenian and Croatian independence was seen in Germany as further evidence of the fundamental unwillingness of those states to accept the end of the Cold War-era status quo.³⁹ German support then seems to have been informed by considerations closer to home and more recent in memory. Common history and culture, the bedrocks of the new Croatian national narrative, likely had much less to do with it than has often been assumed.

Within Austria, personal familiarity with Croatia as well as the common legacy of the Habsburg Empire may have informed Croat sympathies in Austria. Indeed, to this day Austria is also among the strongest proponents of Croatia’s entry into the European Union despite otherwise being skeptical of its further enlargement. In Germany, the situation was similar although informed to a greater extent by its Cold War experiences. Segments of society in France, Britain, and the United States may have been sympathetic to Croatia’s Catholic and Western orientation, but these feelings never impacted state

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 319

³⁸ Ibid, pp. 318

³⁹ Ibid, pp. 326

policy.⁴⁰ Indeed, in the French and British cases, the attitude of the state was never particularly well disposed towards Croatian independence despite Croatia's professed Western and democratic affiliations.

The nationalist narrative of Croatian identity which was consolidated in the 1990's ultimately succeeded for a number of reasons. Not least of those reasons was that Croatia's links with West European history and culture, through its Catholicism and Habsburg relationship, were not fabrications. The nationalists manipulated these elements and placed them in an orientalist framework in order to suit their particular ends, but they did not invent them outright. The simultaneous rise of other aggressive nationalisms, and the resulting years of ethnic war, brought to an end the idea of 'Yugoslav' as a significant community identity across the length of territory which had once been called Yugoslavia. However, the independent Croatia's Western identity was based on a largely historicist platform. It was argued that Croatia was a Western country on account of its experiences from a century ago or more. Those values of democracy, individual freedom, and human rights (which define Western Europe today) were never honestly embraced by Franjo Tuđman. It would not be until 2000, when the nationalist HDZ was voted out of government, that Croatia would take its first real steps towards a true renewal of its links to Western Europe.

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⁴⁰ Ibid

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ANTIHRISTI XXI STOLEĆA

Kratik prikaz najznačajnijih dostignuća kritike religije na početku novog veka

Srdjan Jovanović

Abstract: It seems that a long period of time has passed since Friedrich Nietzsche wrote his 'Antichrist'. Yet at the very beginning of the new century, we have five scholars who have decided to grasp the huge problem known as criticism of religion – Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and Michel Onfray. It is the aim of this essay to present their work, their *modus operandi*, as well as to present the most important moments of a completely new wave of criticism of religion. What is characteristic for criticism of religion at the beginning of the new century seems to be a newfound ferocity, an enthusiasm combined with fact and scientific research, a call for the stop of respecting religion, as well as the sheer quantity of authors, who, even though having received threats of death and torture, do not stop with active education of the ignorant.

Ničeov 'Antihrist' (F. Nietzsche, *Der Antichrist*), bukvar za svakoga ko želi kritikovati hrišćanstvo sa bilo koje strane, u svoje je vreme (pre stoleće i pò) napravio kaos. Franc Overbek (Franz Overbeck) i Hajnrih Kezelic (Heinrich Köselitz), inicijelni izdavači, odlučili su se da odlože publikovanje dela što je više moguće, iz prostog razloga *sadržaja*. Ipak, 'Antihrist' je ugledao svetlost dana, i od tog vremena pa sve do danas ne prestaje da utiče na kritičare religije. Hrišćanstvo je bilo napadano sa različitih strana i iz različitih uglova i pre 'Antihrista', kao i sama religija uopšte (od Lukrecija naovamo), no niko nije krenuo u tako brutalan, destruktivan napad jedne od najraširenijih svetskih religija kao Fridrih Niče. Niko nije napao hrišćanstvo tako strastveno, tako žestoko, a ipak tako precizno. Eseji Bertranda Rasela (Bertrand Russell) o religiji su možda jedini primer kvalitetne kritike religije visokog nivoa u dvadesetom veku, mada pisani stilom potpuno drugačijem od Ničeovog.

'Antihrist' je, čini se, bio početak onoga što možemo nazvati *modernom kritikom religije*. Napisan još prividno davne 1888, jedino je Rasel bio tu da napravi ikakav kontinuitet kritike religije, sve do dvadesetprvog stoleća. Danas, na samom začetku novog veka, čovečanstvo konačno ima nekoga ko će nastaviti sa započetim; a ono što je čak i važnije od prostog *nastavljanja* – kritika religije će na početku dvehiljaditih biti i *poboljšana*, odvedena na viši nivo. Nivo o kome govorim je nivo *nauke* i *faktografije*.

Autori o kojima je reč su prvenstveno Ričard Dokins (Richard Dawkins) i Danijel Denet (Daniel Dennett) – pisci i naučnici koji imaju odista moderan, naučni pristup; kao i Sem Haris (Sam Harris) i Kristofer Hičens (Christopher Hitchens), čiji pristup, pored francuskog filozofa Mišela Onfrea (Michel Onfray) naginje više ka filozofiji.

Jedna od najvažnijih instanci (ako ne i najvažnija) u razvoju moderne kritike religije, one koja je bazirana na nauci i naučnim činjenicama, je objašnjenje stare zabluda da nauka 'ne može' da objasni religiju, čak i da 'ne bi trebalo ni da pokušava'. Takva jedna zabluda efektivno je razorena u Denetovom radu *'Breaking the spell'*. Denet, filozof nauke, trenutni direktor Centra za kognitivne studije i profesor filozofije na Tafts Univerzitetu, objašnjava kako je religija '(...) ljudski fenomen sačinjen od događaja, organizama, objekata, struktura i šema koji se moraju povinovati svim zakonima fizike i biologije i, stoga, ne uključuje čuda⁴¹.' Daleko od opskurnih, metafizičkih i teoloških maštanja Rudolfa Ota (Rudolph Otto) i njegove *mysteriae tremendum*, daleko od bilo kojeg neuspešnog, mističkog i u suštini laičkog, *nenaučnog* pokušaja definisanja religije na bilo koji način, Denetov pristup je suštinski *naučan*, to je pristup koji *objašnjava*. Tokom proteklih milenija, bilo je normalno konsultovati teologiju za pitanja koja se tiču religije. No, kako je to već Rasel objasnio u svojoj 'Istoriji Zapadne Filozofije', '(...) teologija ustanovljava lažnu veru da imamo znanje tamo gde, u stvari, imamo neznanje⁴² (...)'. Danas je Dokins taj koji otvoreno naziva teologiju 'praznom⁴³', a Denet taj koji postavlja temelje za naučni pristup religiji. Iako izgleda sramotno da je ljudskom rodu bilo potrebno nekoliko milenija da shvati da religija ne može biti konsultovana o pitanjima religije isto koliko se od psihijatrijskog pacijenta koji boluje od psihoze i deluzija ne može tražiti da te deluzije i psihoze sâm razume i objasni kako valja, danas, u XXI stoleću, tu je Denet koji objašnjava. Nauka je ta koja je donela sve beneficije ljudskoj rasi od kada je sveta i veka, *tá raison d'etre* nauke je upravo da *objašnjava* – zato je i prvi osećaj po čitanju Denetovog dela *olakšanje*. Dok je Dokins zasigurno zalazio u isti problem, Denet je tom problemu posvetio celu knjigu, dajući tako kvalitetni teorijski bazis kritici religije.

⁴¹ '(...) a human phenomenon composed of events, organisms, objects, structures, patterns and the like that obey[s] all the laws of physics and biology, and hence do[es] not involve miracles.' Iz: Dennett, Daniel Clement. 2006. *Breaking the spell: religion as a natural phenomenon*. New York: Viking

⁴² 'Theology, on the other hand, induces a dogmatic belief that we have knowledge where in fact we have ignorance (...)'. Iz: Russell, Bertrand. 1972. *A history of western philosophy*. New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster.

⁴³ Dawkins, Richard, 'The Emptiness of Theology', Free Inquiry, v18 n2 p6, u: http://www.simonyi.ox.ac.uk/dawkins/WorldOfDawkins-archive/Dawkins/Work/Articles/emptiness_of_theology.shtml

U međuvremenu, Dokinsova *'The God Delusion'* je postala svetski bestseller. Ričard Dokins, jedan od najpoznatijih biologa današnjice, šef Katedre za javno shvatanje nauke na Oksfordu i potpredsednik Britanskog udruženja humanista ne teoretiše preterano, on piše laiku, svakodnevnom čoveku, ne naučniku, onjašnjavajući natenane zašto je vera u natprirodna biće opasna i načine na koji ta iracionalna vera utiče na nas. Dokins piše lucidno, na način niti preterano kompleksan niti suviše simplifikovan, idući korak po korak kroz mrežu zabluda koju je religija isplela oko čoveka svakodnevice. Ono što je, pak, odista važno, je da on ipak objašnjava sa jednog racionalnog, naučnog stanovišta. On razjašnjava kako je religija, u stvari, *nuspojava*, greška u evoluciji čoveka, uz pomoće slikovite metafore sa svicima. Kao što i svici lete ka svetlosti i plamenu, vođeni sopstvenim mehanizmima navođenja prema svetlu, na taj način dočekujući sopstveni kraj, tako i ljudski um ume da se 'izgubi' tokom svog razvoja na taj način što će postati religioznim. Sa jednog u potpunosti naučnog, biološkog stanovišta, Dokins objašnjava kako jedan čisto darvinski mehanizam postoji u ljudskome umu – *dečiji* um, tačnije, je napravljen tako da sa lakoćom prihvata *bilo šta* što mu se predstavi, od krajnje korisnih informacija kao što su 'ne skači sa litice' ili 'ne prelazi ulicu kada je crveno svetlo' do raznoraznih iracionalnih nonsensa. Život jeste kratak, i zato je dečiji um biološki predisponiran ka tome da može da prihvati što više bilo kakvih informacija kako bi se budući odrastao čovek lakše snašao u životu; bazirano na totalnoj 'otvorenosti uma', dečiji mozak će prihvatiti čak i metafizičke i teološke nonsense. Dokins Religiju predstavlja kao 'virus uma' koji inficira čoveka dok je još dete, dok mu je um ranjiv i podložan 'infekciji' iracionalnosti, objavljujući da tek jedna osoba od dvanaest uspe da razbije okove religije koji su joj nametnuti tokom detinjstva. Još je više elemenata religije koji ukazuju na to da je ona samo nuspojava – ona je nuspojava i ljubavi na isti način kao i nuspojava otvorenosti dečijeg uma. Dokins objašnjava kako se dešava da religiozni subjekt 'prenese' osećaj ljubavi koji bi mogao imati prema stvarnoj, postojećoj osobi, biva transferovan na mitološko, nepostojeće biće.

Malopre navedena briga o deci je jedna od najvažnijih instanci Dokinsovog dela. Dokins je prvi koji otvoreno govori protiv toga da deca budu označena religijom svojih roditelja. Danas je sasvim normalno pričati o 'muslimanskom detetu' ili o 'hrišćanskom detetu', no Dokins nalazi da je *groteskno* usađivati religijske poglede roditelja deci. Dete, naravno, nije u stanju da razume ni kompleksna razmišljanja nauke, a kamoli takva praznoverja kao što su teološka i metafizička, koja niko ni ne može da razume jer izgleda da nemaju nikakvog značenja, po Dokinsu i Raselu. I sâm Martin Luter je u svoje vreme

rekao kako bi hrišćani trebalo da *napuste razum u potpunosti...* Ako dete nikad ne biva označeno kao 'marksista' ili 'torijevac', 'ateista' ili 'sekularni humanista', kako može biti označeno kao 'musliman' ili 'hrišćanin'?

Dokins nastavlja sa davanjem objašnjenja na istu temu. Relativno je često, naprimer, pogrešno argumentovano kako je Ajnštajn (Einstein) bio religiozan. Slična je situacija sa Stivenom Hokingom (Stephen Hawking) danas. Dokins to objašnava nazivajući Ajnštajna 'duboko religioznim nevernikom' (*a deeply religious nonbeliever*), razjašnjavajući kako Ajnštajn nikada nije verovao u ličnog boga (čak je i javno izjavio kako ne veruje, da bi potom bio i kritikovan od strane religioznih), koristeći termin 'religija' u najširem, metaforičkom smislu divljenja prema prirodi.

Agrumentujući žestoko protiv samog koncepta teologije, Dokins navodi susret sa jednim teologom iz Kembridža (Cambridge), predstavljajući teološke koncepcije kristalno čisto:

Pretpostavljajući da je teolog iz Kembridža standardni hrišćanin, najverovatnije je verovao u nešto od sledećeg:

- U vreme predaka, čoveka je rodila nevina majka bez ikakvog biološkog oca.
- Isti čovek bez oca je pozvao čoveka po imenu Lazar, koji je bio mrtav toliko vremena da je do tada počeo da smrdi, i Lazar je uto oživeo.
- Čovek bez oca se lično vratio u život posle tri dana smrti.
- Četrdeset dana kasnije, čovek bez oca se popeo na vrh brda i nestao ka nebesima.
- Ako mrmljaš misli za sebe u svojoj glavi, čovek bez oca, kao i njegov otac (koji je u isto vreme on sâm), čuće tvoje misli i možda će delati na osnovu njih. U isto vreme, on je sposoban da čuje misli bilo koga drugoga na svetu.
- Ukoliko uradiš nešto loše, ili nešto dobro, isti taj čovek bez oca to sve vidi, iako niko drugi to ne vidi. Možeš biti nagrađen ili kažnjen na osnovu toga, po svojoj smrti.
- Nevina majka čoveka bez oca nikada nije umrla, no se uzdigla ka nebu.
- Hleb i vino, ukoliko su blagosiljani od strane sveštenika (koji mora imati testise), "postaju" telo i krv čoveka bez oca⁴⁴.

⁴⁴ 'Assuming that the Cambridge theologian was a mainstream Christian, he probably believed some combination of the following:

- In the time of the ancestors, a man was born to a virgin mother with no biological father being involved.
- The same fatherless man called out to a friend called Lazarus, who had been dead long enough to stink, and Lazarus promptly came back to life.
- The fatherless man himself came alive after being dead and buried three days.
- Forty days later, the fatherless man went up to the top of a hill and then disappeared bodily into the sky.

Moguće je argumentovati kako Dokins, u gore navedenom paragrafu, ismeva teologiju i teologe. Ipak, pitanje koje treba postaviti je – da li je moguće ismevati nešto što je već samo po sebi besmisleno?

Temelj Dokinsove kulturološke i logičke analize religije je sadržana u konceptu 'mema', konceptu koji je razradio još u svojim ranijim radovima na polju biologije. Ponekad nazivane 'kulturološkim varijantama', meme su nešto poput 'kulturoloških gena' koji se prenose kroz generacije. Na taj način, Dokins objašnjava 'memetički skup' religije:

Najzad imamo sve što nam je potrebno da se okrenemo ka memetičkoj teoriji religije. Neke religijske ideje, kao i neki geni, možda neće preživeti zbog apsolutne zasluge. Ove meme preživele bi u svakom skupu mema, bez obzira na druge meme koje ih okružuju. (Moram da ponovim jednu stvar od životne važnosti – da "zasluga" ovde znači samo "preživeti" u skupu. Ona ne sadrži nikakav dodatni vrednosni sud). Neke religijske ideje preživljavaju zato što su kompatibilne sa drugim memama kojih već ima u dovoljnom broju u skupu mema – gde su kao delovi memapleksa. Sledi delimičan spisak religijskih mema koje možda poseduju sposobnost da prežive u skupu mema, bilo zbog apsolutne 'zasluge' bilo zbog kompatibilnosti sa postojećim memapleksom.

- Preživećeš svoju sopstvenu smrt.
- Ako umreš kao mučenik, otićićeš u posebno divan deo raja gde će ti na raspolaganju stajati 72 device (pomisli samo na nesrećne device).
- Jeretike, bogohulnike i otpadnike treba ubiti (ili na neki način kazniti kao, na primer, ostrakizmom od strane njihovih porodica).
- Verovanje u Boga je najveća vrlina. Ako osetiš da ti verovanje slabi, potruđi se da ga povratiš teškim radom i moli Boga da pomogne tvom neverovanju. (U mom osvrtnu na Paskalovu opkladu pomenuo sam neobičnu hipotezu da jedina stvar koju Bog od nas očekuje jeste vera. U to vreme, to sam smatrao samo kao nešto neobično. Sada imamo i objašnjenje za to.)
- Vera (verovanje u nešto bez dokaza) je vrlina. Što se više vaše verovanje udaljava od dokaza, to je vaša vrlina veća. Virtuozni vernici, oni koji uspevaju da veruju u nešto zaista nastrano, nešto što je nedokazano i nedokazivo, što se kosi s razumom i za šta nema nikakvih dokaza, dobijaju vrlo visoke nagrade.

-
- If you murmur thoughts privately in your head, the fatherless man, and his 'father' (who is also himself) will hear your thoughts and may act upon them. He is simultaneously able to hear the thoughts of everybody else in the world.
 - If you do something bad, or something good, the same fatherless man sees all, even if nobody else does. You may be rewarded or punished accordingly, including after your death.
 - The fatherless man's virgin mother never died but 'ascended' bodily into heaven.
 - Bread and wine, if blessed by a priest (who must have testicles), 'become' the body and blood of the fatherless man.' Iz: Dawkins, Richard. *The God delusion*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 2006.

- Svičkao i oni koji nisu vernici, moraju ih poštovati, moraju im iskazivati više automatskog, bespogovornog poštovanja nego što se iskazuje drugim vrstama verovanja.
- Ima nekih uvrnutih stvari (kao što je Trojstvo, transupstancijacija, inkarnacija) koje nisu planirane da budu shvaćene. Nemojte ni pokušavati da neku od njih shvatite zato što takav pokušaj može da ih uništi. Naučite da stičete ispunjenje tako što ćete ih zvati tajnama.
- Lepa muzika, umetnost i religijski tekstovi su sami po sebi samoobnavljajući primeri religijskih ideja⁴⁵.

Sem Haris, američki pisac, sa druge strane, obraća se direktno hrišćanima, pogotovu hrišćanima u Americi, u svom kratkom, ali razornom, delu '*Letter to a Christian Nation*'. Ta kratka knjiga je direktan odgovor Harisovim kritičarima, tačnije, svima onima koji su mu pisali nakon publikovanja '*The End of Faith*'; većina te korespondencije je, kao što bismo očekivali, puna mržnje i zlobe prema autoru. Haris nije želeo da ćuti, te je odgovorio. Odgovorio je na mnoga različita pitanja, idući kroz sve važne momente hrišćanske vere; disecirao je deset zapovesti jednu po jednu, zajedno sa sveprisutnom zabludom da 'ukoliko ne veruješ u Boga, nemoralan si.'

⁴⁵ 'We are finally equipped to turn to the memetic theory of religion. Some religious ideas, like some genes, might survive because of absolute merit. These memes would survive in any meme pool, regardless of the other memes that surround them. (I must repeat the vitally important point that 'merit' in this sense means only 'ability to survive in the pool'. It carries no value judgement apart from that.) Some religious ideas survive because they are compatible with other memes that are already numerous in the meme pool - as part of a memplex. The following is a partial list of religious memes that might plausibly have survival value in the meme pool, either because of absolute 'merit' or because of compatibility with an existing memplex:

- You will survive your own death.
 - If you die a martyr, you will go to an especially wonderful part of paradise where you will enjoy seventy-two virgins (spare a thought for the unfortunate virgins).
 - Heretics, blasphemers and apostates should be killed (or otherwise punished, for example by ostracism from their families).
 - Belief in God is a supreme virtue. If you find your belief wavering, work hard at restoring it, and beg God to help your unbelief. (In my discussion of Pascal's Wager I mentioned the odd assumption that the one thing God really wants of us is belief. At the time I treated it as an oddity. Now we have an explanation for it.)
 - Faith (belief without evidence) is a virtue. The more your beliefs defy the evidence, the more virtuous you are. Virtuoso believers who can manage to believe something really weird, unsupported and insupportable, in the teeth of evidence and reason, are especially highly rewarded.
 - Everybody, even those who do not hold religious beliefs, must respect them with a higher level of automatic and unquestioned respect than that accorded to other kinds of belief (we met this in Chapter 1).
 - There are some weird things (such as the Trinity, transubstantiation, incarnation) that we are not *meant* to understand. Don't even *try* to understand one of these, for the attempt might destroy it. Learn how to gain fulfilment in calling it a *mystery*.
 - Beautiful music, art and scriptures are themselves selfreplicating tokens of religious ideas.'
- Citirano iz: Dawkins, Richard.. *The God delusion*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 2006

Ukoliko si u pravu kada tvdiš da religiozna vera predstavlja jedinu osnovu za moralnost, onda bi ateisti bili manje moralni od vernika. U stvari, trebalo bi da budu u potpunosti nemoralni. No jesu li? Da li članovi ateističke zajednice u SAD čine više od svog udela u nasilju? Da li članovi Nacionalne Akademija Nauka, od kojih 93 procenta poriču ideju Boga, lažu i krađu bez ustručavanja?⁴⁶

Haris otkriva činjenicu da čak prve četiri od čuvenih 'deset zapovesti' nemaju nikakve veze sa moralnošću. On napada Bibliju, otkrivajući njen bes i mržnju, pokazujući čitatelju strofu po strofu u kojoj Biblija poziva vernike na silovanje, ubistvo, kako podržava ropstvo i mnogo drugih grotesknih radnji. U vezi sa Harisovim obraćanjem konkretno američkom narodu, on takođe objašnjava još jednu zabludu koja je tipična samo za Sjedinjene Američke Države – da su 'zasnovane na hrišćanskoj veri', kao i da su 'oci američke nacije' bili duboko religiozni.

Haris nadalje napada hrišćansko protivljenje abortusu, kontracepciji i sl. Veoma otvoreno, on kaže kako je '(...) problem što hrišćane kao vi ne interesuje preterano trudnoća među tinejdžerkama i širenje bolesti. Tačnije, ne interesuje vas patnja koja je uzrokovana seksom, vi se plašite samog seksa.⁴⁷ Njegov napad na sve one koje podržavaju protivljenje abortusu je još suroviji, jer napada i sam koncept 'duše' na osnovu koga hrišćani ne žele da 'ubijaju' majušnu kolekciju ćelija u majčinoj materici, misleći da zigot ima 'dušu' (sic!). U svom maniru britke ironije, Haris na jednom mestu čak i kreće od pretpostavke da 'duša' postoji:

No hajde da pretpostavimo, na moment, da svaki ljudski embrion, tri dana star, ima dušu zbog koje bi smo se sa tačke gledišta morala morali zabrinuti. Embrioni u ovom stadiju ponekad bivaju razdvojeni, postajući odvojene osobe (blizanci). Da li je ovo slučaj jedne duše koja se cepa na dvoje? Dva embriona ponekad bivaju združena u jednu individuu, što se naziva *bimera*. Ti, ili neko koga znaš, možda je nastao ovim putem. Nema

⁴⁶ 'If you are right to believe that religious faith offers the only real basis for morality, then atheists should be less moral than believers. In fact, they should be utterly immoral. Are they? Do members of atheist organizations in the United States commit more than their fair share of violent crimes? Do the members of the National Academy of Sciences, 93 percent of whom reject the idea of God, lie and cheat and steal with abandon?' Citirano iz: Harris, Sam.. *Letter to a Christian nation*. New York: Knopf. 2006

⁴⁷ 'The problem is that Christians like yourself are not principally concerned about teen pregnancy and the spread of disease. That is, you are not worried about the suffering caused by sex; you are worried about sex.' *Ibid*.

sumnje da se teolozi već muče da objasne šta se dešava sa ljudskom dušom viška koja u tom slučaju nastaje⁴⁸.

Upornost Crkve u zabranjivanju upotrebe prezervativa je takođe pomenuta u Harisovom radu: 'Ukoliko možete poverovati, Vatikan se protivi korišćenju kondoma čak i u slučaju u kome je to radi prevencije prenošenja zaraze HIV jednog partnera drugom.' Da, teško je poverovati, no situacija je takva kakva jeste; Haris nije taj koji će da krije činjenice. U maniru Kristofera Hičensa (o kome ću kasnije), on napada i samu Agnes Bojanđiu (*Agnes Gonxha Bojaxhiu*, poznatija pod klerikalnim pseudonimom 'Majka Tereza'), koja je u govoru povodom dobijanja Nobelove Nagrade rekla kako je

[n]ajveći uništitelj mira abortus...Mnogo je ljudi veoma zabrinuto zbog dece u Indiji, zajedno sa decom u Africi gde popriličan broj njih umire, možda zbog loše ishrane, gladi i tako dalje, ali milioni umiru namerno zbog majčine volje. I to je ono što je najveći uništitelj mira danas. Jer ako majka može da ubije sopstveno dete – šta sprečava da ja ubijem tebe ili ti mene – nema ničeg između⁴⁹.

Nemamo potrebe ni ulaziti u razmišljanje o tome na osnovu čega je dotična osoba uopšte dobila Nobelovu nagradu ili koji su kriterijumi za dobijanje iste – o tome se može napisati odeliti esej. Rezonovanju Agnes Bojanšu, pak, Haris se usprotstavlja racionalnim argumentima:

Kao dijagnoza svetskih problema, ovi komentari su fantastično pogrešno usmereni. Kao moralna izjava takođe nisu bolji. Saosećanje Majke Tereze je veoma loše kalibrisano ukoliko je ubijanje fetusa u prvom trimestru više zabrinjava nego sva ostala patnja koju je videla na svetu⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ 'But let us assume, for the moment, that every three-day-old human embryo has a soul worthy of our moral concern. Embryos at this stage occasionally split, becoming separate people (identical twins). Is this a case of one soul splitting into two? Two embryos sometimes fuse into a single individual, called a chimera. You or someone you know may have developed in this way. No doubt theologians are struggling even now to determine what becomes of the extra human soul in such a case.' *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ 'The greatest destroyer of peace is abortion.... Many people are very, very concerned with the children in India, with the children in Africa where quite a number die, maybe of malnutrition, of hunger and so on, but millions are dying deliberately by the will of the mother. And this is what is the greatest destroyer of peace today. Because if a mother can kill her own child—what is left for me to kill you and you kill me—there is nothing between.' *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ 'As a diagnosis of the world's problems, these remarks are astonishingly misguided. As a statement of morality they are no better. Mother Teresa's compassion was very badly calibrated if the killing of first-trimester fetuses disturbed her more than all the other suffering she witnessed on this earth.' *Ibid.*

U svojoj knjizi 'The End of Faith', Haris opisuje dan u životu bombaša samoubice (poslednji dan), pozivajući na prestanak poštovanja koju religija dobija i na koje smo svi, u suštini, primorani. On opisuje religiju kao entitet koji 'omogućava inače normalnim ljudskim bićima da beru plodove ludila i da ih smatraju svetim.' Pod utiskom 9-11 napada, Haris naziva islam 'kultom smrti'. Natali Endžier (Natalie Angier), pisac, naučni novinar i dobitnica Pulicerove Nagrade, objašnjava kako Haris

[p]redstavlja glavne religijske sisteme kao što su judaizam, hrišćanstvo i islam kao forme ludosti koja je socijalno zabranjena, budući da su im osnovne postavke i rituali iracionalni, arhaični i, što je važno kada se dođe do preživljavanja čovečanstva na duge staze, uzajamno nekompatibilni⁵¹.

Endžierovoj su izgleda najdraži Harisovi napadi na takozvane 'umereno-religiozne' (*religious moderates*), gde ponajviše napada takozvanu 'religijsku toleranciju' koju takvi propovedaju:

Haris je rezervisao specijalan gnev za umereno religiozne, one koji su 'prividno krenuli putem podvižništva pluralizma, tvrdeći da su sve religije validne', koji 'umišljaju da će put mira biti izgrađen kada svako od nas nauči da poštuje neopravdana verovanja drugih.' Umereno religiozni, on objašnjava, su oni koji uništavaju svaki trud da se kritikuje religijski literalizam. Propovedajući toleranciju, oni postaju netoleranti prema bilo kakvoj racionalnoj diskusiji o religiji i izdaju 'kako veru, tako i razum'.⁵²

Kristofer Hičens, četvrti u mom kvintetu antihrista modernog doba, besumnje je najsrđitiji od svijū. U ničeovskom duhu, Hičensove reči su otrov i jed, kontrolisani gnev. On neće 'okrenuti drugi obraz'. Nema mekoće, nema nežnosti. Samo gola, brutalna, hladna istina u njegovom delu '*God is not Great*'. Sâm naziv knjige nam daje uvid u Hičensov *modus operandi*. Otvoreno, surovo, brutalno, on ide direktno ka poenti. Bog, prosto, nije velik. U njegovo ime se ubija, siluje, ruši i demolira. *On* nije velik. Niti je

⁵¹ 'Sam Harris presents major religious systems like Judaism, Christianity and Islam as forms of socially sanctioned lunacy, their fundamental tenets and rituals irrational, archaic and, important when it comes to matters of humanity's long-term survival, mutually incompatible.' Iz: Angier, Natalie. 2004. *Against toleration*. *The New York Times* online.

⁵² 'Harris reserves particular ire for religious moderates, those who "have taken the apparent high road of pluralism, asserting the equal validity of all faiths" and who "imagine that the path to peace will be paved once each of us has learned to respect the unjustified beliefs of others." Religious moderates, he argues, are the ones who thwart all efforts to criticize religious literalism. By preaching tolerance, they become intolerant of any rational discussion of religion and "betray faith and reason equally". Citirano iz: Angier, Natalie. 2004. *Against toleration*. *The New York Times* online at <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE7D9113EF936A3575AC0A9629C8B63>

religija. ‘Religija truje sve’, ponavlja Hičens. Čovek koji je proputovao svet, išao tuda i svuda, Hičens je specijalno dobar u predstavljanju specifičnih instanci u kojima se religija pokazuje kao jedna od najnegativnijih instanci u napretku ljudske rase, od Bagdada preko Balkana pa do Nju Jorka i 11. septembra. Bog niti je velik, niti je stvorio čoveka, shvata Hičens i obrazlaže. Naprotiv, čovek je stvorio Boga, i sve bogove, kao i sâmu religiju.

Hičensov metod brutalne istine prožima celu knjigu. Jedno od poglavlja se prosto zove ‘Religija ubija’. Tu je i glava ‘Metafizičke tvrdnje religije su lažne’. A potom i ‘Novi Zavet je više zao od Starog’, kao i ‘Kuran je pozajmljen od kako hrišćanskih tako i jevrejskih mitova’. Hičens ne šteti, on je brutalan i nemilosrdan.

Ono što svakako privlači pažnju je Hičensov pristup sveprisutnom pitanju religije i morala. Dok je relativno tipičan pristup moderne kritike religije prosto objašnjenje da postoji više vrsta morala (tradicionalistički, religijski, utilitaristički itd.) i da je religijski moral samo jedan tip morala među mnogim, Hičens čak naziva religiju *nemoralnom*, *kontra-moralnom*:

Uistinu je više načina na koje je religija ne samo bez morala, ali i nemoralna (kontra-moralna). A te greške i krivice se ne mogu naći u postupcima njenih pripadnika (koji ponekad mogu biti primerni), nego u njenim originalnim principima. Oni uključuju:

- pravljenje lažne slike sveta nevinima i lakovernima
- doktrina žrtve u krvi
- doktrina iskupljenja
- doktrina večne nagrade i/ili kazne
- nametanje nemogućih zadataka i ciljeva⁵³

No ovaj pisac se ni tu ne zaustavlja. Hičens, u svom maniru ‘što na umu, to na drumu’, na brutalan način predstavlja surovu realnost i drugih aspekata religije, kao što je surov postupak amputacije dela penisa u novorođenčeta, znanom i kao obrezivanje (sunećenje, cirkumcizija):

⁵³ ‘There are, indeed, several ways in which religion is not just amoral, but positively immoral. And these faults and crimes are not to be found in the behavior of its adherents (which can sometimes be exemplary) but in its original precepts. These include:

- Presenting a false picture of the world to the innocent and the credulous
- The doctrine of blood sacrifice
- The doctrine of atonement
- The doctrine of eternal reward and/or punishment
- The imposition of impossible tasks and rules.’

Citirano iz: Hitchens, Christopher. *God is not great: how religion poisons everything*. New York: Twelve. 2007.

Predstavljam jedno hipotetičko pitanje. Kao čovek od svojih pedeset sedam godina, nađen sam kako sisam penis bebe dečaka. Tražim od vas da zamislite sopstveni bes i gađenje. Ah, ali ja uveliko imam objašnjenje. Ja sam *mohel*: akreditovani odstranjivač prepucijuma. Svoj autoritet dobijam od prastarog teksta, koji mi naređuje da uzmem penis bebe dečaka u svoju ruku, odsečem prepucijum, i svršim akciju uzimajući njegov penis u svoja usta, isisavajući prepucijum u usta, potom ga ispljuvajući zajedno sa punim ustima krvi i pljuvačke⁵⁴.

Slikovito i surovo – Hičens je u svom elementu uspešno predstavio obrezivanje kao ono što jeste – primitivna, krvava i surova amputacija jednog dela tela mladog deteta, osobe neformirane kako psihički tako i fizički, osobe koja će ostati osakaćena celog života bez ikakvog objektivnog razloga.

Francuz Mišel Onfre, poslednji antihrist čiji doprinos kritici religije treba predstaviti, prvenstveno je filozof. Njegova je ‘Ateološka rasprava’ prevedena na desetine jezika i prodana u više od dvesta hiljada primeraka. Doktor filozofije, osnovao je Narodni univerzitet u Kanu; autor je velikog broja filozofskih dela. Njegov stil je, shodno tome, stil filozofije. Njegov cilj u ‘Ateološkoj raspravi’ je da ‘dekonstruiše sva tri monoteizma i uspostavi prevlast ateizma’. Izvanredan poznavalac kako islama i hrišćanstva, tako i judaizma, on čitaocu predstavlja manje poznate autore, ateiste, pokušavajući da predstavi ateizam kao jedinu racionalnu opciju. On objašnjava nastanak i širenje religija, kritikujući religijske rituale i praksu sva tri monoteizma. Prisetimo i njegovo izvanredno poznavanje faktografije sviju monoteizama. Filozof poznaje hrišćanstvo isto koliko i judaizam i islam. Posebno mu je mrzak Pavle iz Tarsa (znan većini kao ‘Sveti Pavle’), čovek koji je sopstvenim naporima širio novi kult znan kao hrišćanstvo, omogućujući mu da preraste u sveprihvaćenu religiju, za koga otkriva da je seksualno insfrustrirano, neurotično nedonošče, kao i da je ‘konstruisao Isusa’, za koga otkriva da je ništa više no fiktivni lik:

U stvari, konstruisanje Isusa potiče od izmišljotine svodive na momente koje je moguće obeležiti u istoriji tokom jednog ili dva veka: kristalisanje histerije jedne epohe kroz figuru koja katalizuje čudesno, okuplja milenarističke proročke i apokaliptičke težnje trenutka u jednom pojmovnom liku po imenu Isus; metodološko a nikako istorijsko postojanje ove fikcije; širenje i propagiranje ove priče od strane Pavla iz

⁵⁴ ‘I pose a hypothetical question. As a man of some fifty-seven years of age, I am discovered sucking the penis of a baby boy. I ask you to picture your own outrage and revulsion. Ah, but I have my explanation all ready. I am a mohel: an appointed circumciser and foreskin remover. My authority comes from an ancient text, which commands me to take a baby boy's penis in my hand, cut around the prepuce, and complete the action by taking his penis in my mouth, sucking off the foreskin, and spitting out the amputated flap along with a mouthful of blood and saliva.’ Iz: Harris, Sam. *Letter to a Christian nation*. New York: Knopf, 2006.

Tarsa koji sebe smatra ovlašćenim od Boga dok se zapravo bavi sopstvenom neurozom; njegova mržnja prema sebi preobraćena u mržnju prema svetu, njegova impotencija, njegova žudnja za osvetom, osveta jednog nedonoščeta – po njegovim sopstvenim rečima – preobraćene u pokretačku snagu jedne individualnosti koja se širi u celom mediteranskom basenu; mazohističko uživanje čoveka koje se raširilo u jednoj od hiljadu tadašnjih sekta: sve to iskrsava kada se koliko-toliko razmisli i kad se u odnosu na religiju odbaci poslušnost ili pokornost da bi se reaktivirao drevni zabranjeni čin: probanje voćke sa drveta saznanja⁵⁵.

Onfre nam pokazuje kako se književno-mitološki lik Isusa iz Nazareta poklapa sa mnogim drugim, starijim mitološkim likovima. Isus niti je prvi koji je ‘rođen od device’, a kamoli prvi koji je ‘činio čuda’... On je, prosto, samo jedan od mnogobrojnih likova, plodova mašte jednog opterećenog doba.

Onfre, nadalje, optužuje monoteizme za njihov fundamentalni prezir prema znanju i nauci, za njihovo okretanje ka iracionalnom i besmislenom, za beg od stvarnosti:

Monoteizmi ne vole inteligenciju, knjige, znanje, nauku. Tome dodaju veliku mržnju uperenu protiv materije i realnog, znači svakog oblika imanentnosti. Slavljenju neznanja, nevinosti, naivnosti, poslušnosti, pokornosti, tri religije Knjige dodaju slično gađenje prema sastavu, oblicima i snagama sveta. Ovaj naš ovozemaljski svet nema pravo građanstva, jer cela zemlja snosi teret prvobitnog greha do sudnjeg dana⁵⁶.

Pored otkivanja prezira monoteizama prema znanju, prema *episteme*, jedan od značajnijih momenata Onfreovog *magnum opusa* je razjašnjavanje kako je ateizam tokom stoleća sistematično prikriivan od strane vodećih autoriteta. U tom duhu, Onfre poziva na svojevrsnu ateističku edukaciju, sa kojom bi se subjekat upoznao sa razvojem ateizma i kritikom religije kroz vekove.

I pored svih specifičnih instanci dela ovih autora, čini se da ipak najvažnije ono što Dokins naziva ‘consciousness raising’, obrazovanje ljudi i širenja nauke i filozofije, nasuprot religiji i praznoverju. Slično tome, veoma je važna instanca u kojoj ovi autori pozivaju na sveopšti prestanak davanja povlašćenog mesta religiji, kao i na sâm prestanak poštovanja religije *per se*. Otpor i mržnju na koji su ovi autori naišli po izdavanju svojih radova je teško opisati. Prećeno im je smrću i najgorim mukama, večnom torturom u

⁵⁵ Onfray, Michel. *Atheist manifesto: the case against Christianity, Judaism, and Islam*. New York: Arcade Pub. 2007.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

raznovrsnim verzijama Pakla⁵⁷. Čak i sâma Harisova knjiga ‘*Letter to a Christian Nation*’ je direktan odgovor na neopisive količine pisama (mržnje) koju je ovaj autor primio po izdavanju ‘*The End of Faith*’. Ipak, antihristi XXI stoleća ostaju nepokolebljivi. Ostaje, za sada, nažalost neobjašnjen *nagli* rast kritike religije (kako i kvantitetu, tako i u kvalitetu) na početku XXI stoleća. Zašto tako naglo, zašto tako *odjednom*? Da li je XXI stoleće konačni početak kraja primitivnog pogleda na svet znanog pod imenom *religija*? Suviše je rano za detaljniju analizu i za odgovor na takvo pitanje, jer čini se da je talas tek počeo. Stoleće je na svom sâmom početku, a kritika religije je već dobila petoricu giganata. Izgleda da i jači napadi tek predstoje. Ostaje samo da čekamo, čitamo, posmatramo, a možda i – ukoliko smo dovoljno hrabri – da im se pridružimo.

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⁵⁷ Dokins je čak u svome radu i naveo par primera pisama koje je dobio. Setimo se da nije zabeležen ateista koji je želeo da *raspori* vernika zbog njegovih ideja, da ga *mučki ubije*, kao i još mnogo brutalnijih, krajnje slikovitih načina smrti koje autori ovih pisama, *religiozni* ljudi, žele protagonistima ovog eseja.

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TAKING CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY SERIOUSLY IN SERBIA

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Abstract: Mainstream approaches and policies to theories of democratic transitions overlook the cultural and historical developments of the country or region under study. Scholars have been calling for cultural preferences to be taken more seriously for decades now, but the current methodologies in social science still predominantly treat culture as more of a theoretical category that is unchanging and unflinching to variations in internal and exogenous stimuli. In this article I argue that rather than moving away from culture, we need to develop more robust models that treat culture as a dynamic variable, subject to adaptability and growth over time and space. First, by taking cultural preferences more seriously we reinforce institutional models by fusing them with both agency and subjectivity. Second, culture can be a critical component in the construction and maintenance of democracy regardless of geographical or historical circumstance. If democracy does not tap into the cultural and historical framework of a society, the greater public will view it as a foreign element. Finally, cultural approaches to democracy help us essentially understand how a society, be it local or national, collectively ‘thinks’ about and understands their relationship to domestic and external events. With regards to Serbia as my empirical case study, as long as a sizable portion of the population continues to feel that further democratization means compromising Serbian values and national security for the interests of the EU, the UN, or the United States, nationalism and populism will continue to obstruct further democratic political development and maturity.

Two large misconceptions of Serbian politics and society continue to prevail among policymakers in the West. One is that exclusionary nationalism is endemic to Serbian culture and society. The other is that Serbs lack traditions of civil society, Western democratic values, and political participation. Both perceptions have been considerably influenced by the ethnic wars that characterized the breakup of Yugoslavia, the apparent support by Serbs for the politics of Slobodan Milošević throughout the 1990s, and the resilience and popularity of so-called ‘ultranationalist’ parties that continuously comprise the largest percentage of the Serbian electorate. However these perceptions are largely the result of incredibly limited understandings of Serbian culture, as well as an unwillingness by Western powers to fully support genuine democratic development in Serbia. In this article, I argue that not only are international assessments of Serbian politics and society faulty, but a genuine lack of appreciation of Serbia’s own democratic past by both foreign policymakers and democratic-oriented politicians in

Belgrade have effectively hindered liberal democracy being pushed aside by more populist political movements that continue to be at odds with democratic consolidation into a larger European community.

How democratic is Serbia today? Since October 2000, almost all vestiges of the authoritarian state apparatus under Slobodan Milošević have been removed. Serb citizens can freely choose their government, engage in public debate, criticize their leaders, and enjoy freedoms of speech and association. Elections are both fair and transparent. Constitutional rules of law are universally recognized and there are no organizations that seek power via circumvention of the rule of law, nor the overthrow of the state and its laws. Serbia has not only one democratic political party, but five: the Democratic Party (DS), the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and the G17 Plus, a group of seventeen organizations and movements collectively organized in one party. Minority communities all have their own recognized political parties. The Serbian Radical Party (SRS), often regarded as ‘far right’, ‘hardline’ and ‘ultranationalist’ in Western media circles, operates under a program of national populism within the confines of constitutional and parliamentary law. There are no authoritarian elements to speak of that are actively seeking to destroy the government, nor are there any significant groups of Milošević loyalists working on regaining power outside legal means. As the most recent parliamentary elections have also shown, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the former party of Slobodan Milošević, has shown signs of distancing itself from the era of the 1990s and recasting itself as a legitimate party of the Left, with signs it may even enter a coalition with pro-Western, pro-EU parties.⁵⁸ Since 2000, multiple parliamentary and presidential elections have been held, and government turnover has been both peaceful and orderly. By the criteria of Robert Dahl, Serbia has met all necessary conditions to be classified as democratic.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ At the time of this article’s publication, the results of the March 11, 2008 parliamentary elections are as follows: the For a European Serbia (*Za Evropsu Srbiju*) led by the Democrats (DS) won 102 seats in the new parliament, followed by the Serb Radical Party (SRS), with 78 seats. The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) – New Serbia (NS) won 30 seats in the Parliament. The Socialist (SPS)-led coalition won 20 seats, while the Liberal Democrats (LDP) won 13 seats. The Bosniak coalition collected won two seats, the Hungarian four seats, and the coalition of the Albanians of the Preševo Valley won one seat in the Parliament. The SPS is currently poised to be the kingmaker in any governing coalition, and is being courted by both DS and SRS representatives. See ‘Prekypljanje ponuda’, *Politika*, May 13, 2008; ‘Svima fali treći’, *Politika*, May 14, 2008; ‘Socijalisti istrčali prvi krug’, *Politika*, May 15, 2008.

⁵⁹ Robert Dahl, *On Democracy*. Yale University Press, 2000; see also Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Yale University Press, 1971.

However, simply citing structural necessities often yields misleading conclusions. Serbia represents a country that has all the institutional and structural features of a functioning democratic state, yet still lacks a functional democratic culture.⁶⁰ Political parties remain largely undefined and undifferentiated from one another. The most visible features of each party are the party leaders, whose actions and decisions primarily shape the party and public support for said party, not the other way around. Government still remains top-heavy in the sense that all decision-making resides in Belgrade, and anything passed at the local levels, must fall under the capital's perennial scrutiny.⁶¹ Corruption is still a major problem in Serbian political circles, and many of the above-mentioned democratic parties have been known to engage in questionable practices ranging from embezzlement to involvement in organized crime.⁶² Certain areas of Serbia such as Belgrade and the northern province of Vojvodina are more Western oriented than less developed areas in central and southern Serbia.⁶³

Most importantly, collective perceptions of democracy, or to be more exact Western democracy, has been significantly affected by the long years of international isolation brought on by economic sanctions, ethnic wars, and the feeling that Serbs have been made to be the guilty party in all regional conflicts since the breakup of Yugoslavia by international observers. Serbia is currently facing two enormous obstacles in achieving full democratic consolidation: the fulfillment of remaining obligations to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the effective loss of its southern province of Kosovo. While showing strong desires to see Serbia within its

⁶⁰ Democratic culture is closely linked with what Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba have termed a 'civic culture', which is defined as 'a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it.' While indices of civic cultures might differ from country to country, the primary theme present in all civic cultures is participation, or more specifically, the willingness of the citizen to participate in the political process. See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, (Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 5. See also the abridged version of *The Civic Culture*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), p. 8.

⁶¹ Obrad Kesić, 'An Airplane with Eighteen Pilots: Serbia after Milošević', *Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society under Milošević and After*, Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjerman Pavlaković, eds. (University of Washington Press, 2005), pp. 95 – 121.

⁶² Maja Miljković and Marko Attila Hoare, 'Crime and the Economy under Milošević and His Successors', *Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society under Milošević and After*, Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjerman Pavlaković, eds. (University of Washington Press, 2005), pp. 192 – 226.

⁶³ While it is incorrect to ascribe fixed voting patterns to each region, Belgrade and Vojvodina have a higher percentage of voting for the Democratic Party (DS) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), while central and southern Serbia have displayed greater support for the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), along with its coalition partner New Serbia (NS) particularly around the region of Čačak, home to Velimir Ilić, leader of NS. The Serbian Radical Party (SRS) enjoys relative strength throughout Serbia, but most significantly in southern Serbia as well as Kosovo. See Републичка изборна комисија <http://www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu/>

administrative borders, EU officials in Brussels have made formal ratification of the recently signed Stabilization and Association Agreement contingent on the arrest and extradition of General Ratko Mladić to The Hague. Mladić continues to remain a popular figure in Serb nationalist circles, and has been sheltered by extensive political and military networks that have kept his whereabouts a secret, even providing him a state pension until recently. Full cooperation with the ICTY has always been sluggish and non-committal, however recent events such as the controversial acquittal of former Kosovo Liberation Army warlord Ramush Haradinaj on all charges has all but halted any further cooperation from Belgrade.⁶⁴

The administrative loss of Kosovo weighs particularly heavy on the Serbian collective psyche, as even among Serbia's committed 'democrats' there appears to be a general sense that Serbia is constantly being punished for crimes committed under a previous regime by external powers functioning as judge, juror, and executioner of Serbia's fate. Public opinion also feels that the international community is being incredibly hypocritical in lending a sympathetic hand to Albanian self-determination, while turning a deaf ear to similar efforts by Serbs. Following the U.S. supported unilateral declaration of independence by the Albanian-led government in Priština on February 17, 2008, massive public rallies were held through Serbia the following week. The already tenuous coalition between Boris Tadić's DS and Vojislav Koštunica's DSS collapsed over disagreements with how to properly respond to Serbia's continued integration into the European Union, the organization that has affectively assumed political and administrative control of the breakaway region. Public opinion overwhelmingly continues to hold that Serbia's future belongs in the EU, but with Kosovo as a fundamental part of its territory.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ During the 2008 presidential campaign, SRS Deputy Chair Tomislav Nikolić declared no further war crimes fugitives would face extradition to the Hague if he were elected president. 'Nikolić: No Hague extraditions', *B92.net*, January 6, 2008 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=06&nav_id=46730. In the wake of Haradinaj's acquittal, every major party has not only publicly decried the ruling, but also commented multiple times on the overall objectivity and credibility of the ICTY.

⁶⁵ According to the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), a Belgrade based polling organization, 'Kosovo has a great specific political weight for citizens of Serbia. Although the great majority would like Serbia to join the European Union (EU) and keep Kosovo, once it comes to the forced choice of "either – or", the relative majority, with the ratio of 4:3 gives an advantage to keeping Kosovo. Kosovo is obviously more urgent, timely defined and "visible" problem than the potential European prospective.' 41 percent of those polled considered Kosovo to be the most important foreign policy issue in Serbia and that keeping Kosovo was more important than joining the EU. 37 percent of the respondents also indicated support for

The current challenge is not whether Serbia will become a democratic state, but whether two new objectives are met. First, in order for Serbia to move from democratic consolidation to mature democracy, a process of ‘de-authoritarianization’ must ensue. By this, I mean that not only must the political apparatus of the Milošević era be dismantled, to which a large extent it is, but also the culture of patrimonialism, suspicion, and exclusionary nationalism needs to be confronted, diffused, and replaced with a democratic civic culture of cooperation, trust, and ethnic co-fraternity. We cannot simply graft a democratic government onto a non-democratically oriented society. Doing so will only facilitate non-democratic elements with the ability to gain greater political legitimacy through democratic channels. Secondly, in order for de-authoritarianization to take place, democratic elements in Serbia need to foster a new collective identity for Serbs that provides alternative historical narratives to the exclusionary, chauvinistic, and antagonistic ones promoted under Milošević, nurtured throughout Yugoslavia’s breakup in the 1990s, and perpetuated today by national populist parties that claim to speak on defending Serbia’s national interest, its cultural heritage, and its collective dignity. If Serbia is to truly become a mature democracy, political elites will need to construct a pro-democratic historical memory that links ethics, values, and other traditional elements of Serbian society with universal principles of democracy. In short as long as a sizable portion of the population continues to feel that further democratization means compromising Serbian values and national security for the interests of the EU, the UN, or the United States, nationalism and populism will continue to obstruct further democratic political development and maturity.

The Need for a Better Understanding of Democracy

Mainstream theories of democratic transitions emphasize the importance of stable, working institutions. Such works have considered strong economic development,⁶⁶

breaking off all relations with countries that recognize Kosovo’s independence, although an equal amount were against such a move. Those in favor of breaking off relations primarily supported the DSS and the SRS. ‘Research of Public Opinion in Serbia, Early Autumn 2007’, Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), conducted by Srećko Mihailović (team leader), Zoran Stojiljković, Djordje Vuković and Miloš Mojsilović, September 2007.

⁶⁶ Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy’, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 53, no. 1 (March 1959), pp. 69 – 105; Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and*

strong civil society,⁶⁷ a bourgeoisie middle class,⁶⁸ and the willingness of political elites to negotiate, or ‘bargain’, a settlement in which contesting groups can solve their disputes through parliamentary procedure.⁶⁹ These models have certainly contributed much to our understanding of states undergoing political and structural transformation, and have yielded important findings on the relationships between political development, economic growth and institutional strength. However, the conditions for democracy and democratic sustainability in the world are neither linear, nor predictable. How is it that democracy seems to work in some countries, but not in others? Why Finland, and not Russia? Why Mongolia, and not Venezuela? Why South Africa, and not Zimbabwe? Why Slovenia, and not Serbia? Why can democracies take root in poor countries like India or Mali, but not in rich countries like Kuwait or Nigeria? How is it that political institutions are transparent in New Zealand, but corrupt in Turkey? How is it that ultranationalist parties Germany receive little to no electoral support, while the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party is the largest party in the Serbian parliament? Why is the standard of living far higher in democratic Hungary than in democratic Romania?

What these mainstream approaches, and subsequently Western policymakers, overlook are the cultural and historical developments of the country or region under study. Throughout most democratic transitions literature, culture is generally assumed to be the specialty of sociologists and anthropologists, not political scientists. Culture is often disregarded as a secondary, or even tertiary, factor to political development.⁷⁰ When culture is considered, it is often highly generalized, lacks specific historical and

Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, (Cambridge University Press, 1991); Stephan Haggard, and Robert Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*, (Princeton University Press, 1995); Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950 – 1990*, (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁶⁷ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, (Princeton University Press, 1993); Sheri Berman, ‘Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, *World Politics*, no. 49, no. 3 (April, 1997), 635 – 655; Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Gerald E. Bevan (Penguin Books, 2003); Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*, (Yale University Press, 2003).

⁶⁸ Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

⁶⁹ Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Barbara Geddes, *Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America*, (University of California Press, 1996); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

⁷⁰ Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, ‘From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism?’ *Slavic Review*, vol. 54, no. 4 (1995), pp.965 – 978.

human agency, and is more often seen as a liability rather than an asset to democratic reform.⁷¹ Scholars have been calling for cultural preferences to be taken more seriously for decades now, but the current methodologies in social science still predominantly treat culture as more of a theoretical category that is unchanging and unflinching to variations in internal and exogenous stimuli. As recent studies have concluded, a general dissatisfaction with ethnographies that present culture as uniform, uncompromising, and determinate have, not surprisingly, led to a general disillusionment of ‘the culture concept’, and a gravitation towards the more academically universal, quantitatively replicable, and less controversial approaches listed above.⁷²

I argue however that rather than moving away from culture, we need to develop more robust models that treat culture as a dynamic variable, subject to adaptability and growth over time and space. First, by taking cultural preferences more seriously we reinforce institutional models by fusing them with both agency and subjectivity. Cultural beliefs, values, and identities, give legitimacy to political and social institutions, which, in the words of Ernest Griffith, give said institutions ‘an emotional content which will make its survival a fighting matter for those who love it.’⁷³ Furthermore, culture constitutes shared meanings that are socially constructed, and that either affirms, or challenges the legitimacy of political institutions, offices, and procedures of a polity. As such, ‘political culture is employed to establish or contest the legitimate parameters of collective identity.’⁷⁴ By considering human agency and historical subjectivity, cultural approaches add qualitative value to structure and explain how groups prioritize their interests, participate in political and social organizations, and shape their degree of deference to

⁷¹ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations, and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1996); Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in Forty-three Societies*, (Princeton University Press, 1997); Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington, eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Lawrence Harrison, *The Central Liberal Truth: How Politics can change a Culture and Save it from Itself* (Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁷² For a thorough discussion of the different approaches to political culture in the fields of sociology, anthropology, and political science, see William H. Sewell, Jr. ‘The Concept(s) of Culture’, in *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*, Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds. (University of California Press), 35 – 61. Sewell, Jr. juxtaposes between the works of Ruth Benedict, who stresses the ‘tight integration of cultures’, and those of Claude Lévy-Strauss, who stresses ‘semiotic coherence of culture as a system of meanings.’ p. 40
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⁷³ Ernest S. Griffith, John Plamenatz, and J. Roland Pennock, ‘Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium’, *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 50, no. 1 (March, 1956), p. 101.

⁷⁴ Myron J. Aronoff, ‘Political Culture’, *Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, (Elsevier Science, Ltd., 2001)

authority, even when such actions seem irrational or counterproductive to the society from the researcher's point of view.⁷⁵

Second, culture can be a critical component in the construction and maintenance of democracy regardless of geographical or historical circumstance. When used and understood properly, culture provides recognizable symbol and meaning to democratic ideals, solidifies diverse segments of society into one collectively democratic narrative of identity, and facilitates a recognizable, and useable, past that makes democracy, particularly in societies that have not had a strong tradition in democratic values, a seemingly continuous process of tradition and stability, rather than a sudden break with the past.⁷⁶ One of the greatest reasons for the fatalities of democratic movements throughout the world is not because of the failure of Western values to successfully find compatibility with local culture, but rather the failure of its political elites to find common ground between universal democratic principles and traditional values and norms of the state. If democracy does not tap into the cultural and historical framework of a society, the greater public will view it as a foreign element. If alternative political forces are powerful enough to challenge the authority and legitimacy of democratic elements, they may gain public support not because the public is particularly anti-democratic, but rather because these movements portray themselves as true defenders of the national interest and the rightful defenders of that society's cultural identity. Movements that seek a complete separation from cultural imperatives, values, and norms, are movements that risk political and social alienation.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ For early theoretical works that focus on the relationship between cultural preferences and value orientation in relation to socio-political activity, see Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, (New York: Basic Books); Geertz *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology*, (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Abner Cohen, *Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society*, (University of California Press, 1974); David I. Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba*, (University of Chicago Press, 1986). For empirical case studies, see Myron Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict*. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Jan Kubik, *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland*, (Penn State Press, 1994).

⁷⁶ My own ongoing research in Serbia has been greatly influenced by previous applications of historical memory to statecraft in other countries and regions. See Anastasia Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia 1870 – 1990*, University of Chicago Press, 1997); Laura Edles, *Symbol and Ritual in the New Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco*, (Cambridge University Press, 1998); Nicolai Petro, *Crafting Democracy: How Novgorod Coped with Rapid Social Change*, (Cornell University Press, 2004); Eric Davis, *Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq*, (University of California Press, 2005).

⁷⁷ A good example of movements in Serbia that have made a conscientious break with the past is the Liberal Democratic Party, led by Čedomir Jovanović. The LDP is the only political party in Serbia willing to recognize the independence of Kosovo, as well as extraditing all remaining

Finally, cultural approaches to democracy help us essentially understand how a society, be it local or national, collectively ‘thinks’ about and understands their relationship to domestic and external events. Why do certain values collectively prevail over others? Why do some political parties succeed where others falter? Essentially, why do people believe, accept, and defend the things they do? While far less tangible to empiricize than the above mentioned institutional models, understanding the collective identity of a group significantly contributes to our greater understanding of how citizens attitudinally ‘believe’ in democracy, its principles, its rules of engagement, and its self-sustaining functions. Governments, regardless of political orientation are to a considerable degree legitimized by public consent. In this regard, without active public support for democratic principles and a collective belief that no other form of government is preferable to democracy, institutions, no matter how versatile, no matter how pervasive, and no matter how interdependent, will not gain full public legitimacy and at best may function amid a general feeling of public apathy and disengagement. Worse, institutions could still be replaced by non-democratic alternatives to government if public discontent and impatience is high enough to support elites and movements offering ‘quick fix’ solutions to potential economic and social malaise.⁷⁸ In short, democracy cannot be properly understood if institutional approaches are not accompanied by a proper understanding of cultural preferences, which legitimize those institutions.

Historical Memory and Democracy

wanted war criminals to the Hague. Its electoral support however hovers around only 5% and has often come under attack, both verbally, as well as physically for its members, for being seen as a fifth column element in Serbia that is financed by international organizations such as George Soros’ Open Friends Society. Other organizations such as Centar za Kulturnu Dekontaminaciju (Center for Cultural Decontamination), have organized projects and seminars and published journals and articles that are in clear favor of democratization, modernization, and European integration, but find more supporters from international academic circles than from ordinary Serbian citizens.

⁷⁸ Guiseppe Di Palma, *Apathy & Participation in Mass Politics*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970)

Historical memory is one of the key mechanisms through which we can come to understand how a society collectively ‘thinks’, and why certain societies seem more receptive to democracy than others.⁷⁹ A critical component in making democracy ‘believable’ and acceptable to a wide social audience is a connection of democratic values and principles with cultural and historical traditions of that society. Here, historical memory is defined as the ‘collective understandings that a specific group shares about events in the past that it perceives to have shaped its current economic, social, cultural, and political status and identity.’⁸⁰ In the plainest sense of the word, historical memory is not so much concerned with *what* is remembered, but *how* it is remembered. What is remembered, what is commemorated, what is prioritized, what is glorified, what is minimized, what is forgotten and what is repressed, provides the filters through which society views itself in relation to the larger world.

Historical memory is a form of selective remembering of past events, both recent as well as distant, that adds qualitative value to what we remember and makes its memory, its importance, and its legacy to present conditions worth defending and preserving. Something that is worth defending and preserving is not adequately considered by direct institutional approaches to democracy, yet it seems almost obvious to the casual observer or everyday man in the street. Not every American knows every article and amendment of the United States Constitution, the complete workings of Congress, has read *The Federalist Papers*, or can recite the words to all three verses of the Star Spangled Banner. Yet nearly every American views the Constitution, the Founding Fathers, the American Flag, and the national anthem as timeless symbols of American democracy, liberty, and freedom. Present politicians in America constantly seek to liken their own activities to those of noteworthy and recognizable predecessors. Men like George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and more recently Ronald Reagan, have become veritable standards of leadership, morality, and courage, by which all presidents should aspire to.⁸¹ Politicians merely have to say that they are ‘defenders of the Constitution’, ‘advocates of a women’s right to choose’, or

⁷⁹ For works on theories and applications of historical memory, see Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, Lewis A Coser, trans. (University of Chicago Press, 1992); Jaques LeGoff, *History and Memory*, (Columbia University Press, 1996); David Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country*, (Cambridge University Press, 1985).

⁸⁰ Davis (2005), p. 4.

⁸¹ See for instance Barry Schwartz, ‘Social Change and Collective Memory: The Democratization of George Washington’, *American Sociological Review*, vol. 56, No. 2 (April, 1991), pp. 221 – 236, and Barry Schwartz, ‘The Reconstruction of Abraham Lincoln’, *Collective Remembering*, David Middleton and Derek Edwards, eds. (London: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 81 – 107.

‘champions of the common folk’ without saying much else, in order to either win support or earn criticism from the voting public. Apparently, something other than mere institutional strength is at work.

What is at work is the fusion of political symbolism with socially accepted historical narratives. Symbols are the tangible artifacts that contribute to the collective identity of a group: flags and emblems; cultural landmarks; language; religion; historical individuals, places, or events; all of these are collectively regarded as ‘symbols’ that provide shared meaning to a group and demarcate it from other groups. When fused with political meaning, symbols are used to shape and direct collective thinking and identity along a particular narrative. These narratives serve as useful applications of social control that, when appropriated by elites and policymakers, provide an interpretive version of that society’s history and its relationship with non-group communities, both past and present.⁸² Collective historical memories are often transmitted through both official channels such as history books, commemorative holidays, public monuments, and even street names, to more popular avenues of information such as television, movies, literature, poems, oral folktales, ‘urban myths’ and group prejudices.

Applied as a form of social control, historical memory directs and shapes the way one lives by ascribing symbolic meaning and importance to certain events in time, key historical figures and dates, and interpretive messages of historical development to explain one’s present situation. This type of remembering links the individual to a larger group where recollections are commonly shared as social memory. When appropriated by elites, historical memory is purposefully blurred between past and present. Official historical accounts describe the past, but keep the events in the past. Historical memory on the other hand, seeks to encompass both past and present within an all-encompassing narrative in which events from the past are not only relevant for the present, but are directly affecting, shaping, and influencing the present. In this regard, events that might have happened decades or even centuries ago, are just as fresh in people’s collective minds as if they occurred last week.

It is particularly in times of social upheaval, where institutional constraints on collective behavior are weak or absent, that efforts in asserting collective identities,

⁸² In addition to Laitin (1986) and Petro (2004), see Lowell Dittmer, ‘Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis’, *World Politics*, vol. 29, no. 4, (July, 1977); Anthony P. Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community* (New York: Routledge, 1985); Ann Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, *American Sociological Review*, vol. 51 (April 1986), pp. 273 – 286; Alison Brysk, ‘Hearts and Minds’: Bringing Symbolic Politics Back In’, *Polity*, vol. 27, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 559 – 585.

values, and beliefs that are otherwise taken for granted during periods of calm are emphasized. When challenged with threats to political, territorial, or even economic stability, a reevaluation of ‘who we are’, ‘what we believe in’, and ‘what we stand for’ becomes necessary in order to extend identifiable cultural values as a guide to the future. Under such conditions, political elites ‘reconcile the present with the past – ideologies of change which respect and evoke the past – by showing that the new is either not really new at all but has its essential roots in the past, or by arguing that the ‘new’ socioeconomic structures will be enhanced by traditional values which they preserve rather than deny.’⁸³ Reemphasizing the past validates present attitudes and actions by affirming their continued adherence to ‘immutable traditions’ and ‘non-negotiable truths’ that are recognizable, familiar, and ‘correct’ by the wider public. Political movements that ‘resonate with cultural narrations, that is, with the stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of one’s cultural heritage,’ are key to linking social mobilization with public policy.⁸⁴

As an institutional device used by elites to selectively shape public perception and preference, elites employ selective forms of historical memory to establish legitimacy for ideas and goals. Therefore, historical memories that root state and society in a particular political orientation are crucial elements in determining whether the government in question will be acceptable to a consuming public. With this understanding, democratic governments will be the most successful in winning the first round of general elections of a transitioning state if they most clearly achieve two objectives. First, if democracy is presented as a home-grown initiative, not as a force that is either externally supported or imposed by outside interest groups such as other states or international organizations. Second, democracy embraces elements of both tradition and modernity. A democratic party that is interested in state development and breaking from the authoritarian mold, but is also interested in that state’s history and culture will find greater resonance with society, than if it is presented as a party of revolutionary change that seeks to break with all forms of the past.⁸⁵

⁸³ Abner Cohen, *The Management of Myths*, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 12. See also Harvey Eckstein, ‘A Culturalist Theory of Political Change,’ *American Political Science Review*, vol. 82, no. 3 (1988), pp. 789 – 804.

⁸⁴ Mayer N. Zald, ‘Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing,’ *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 268

⁸⁵ As stated by Almond and Verba, ‘unless [politics] are connected effectively with the primary structure of community – family, friendship, neighborhood, religious groups, work groups, and the like – there can be no effective flow of individual impulses, needs, demands and preferences

Current socio-political conditions in Serbia necessitate taking cultural preferences seriously when considering democratic development. In what follows is a brief outline of two competing historical memories in Serbia today: the first espouses a distinctive nationalistic narrative that places Serbia, and more importantly Serbs, at odds with their neighbors, heightens suspicion of exogenous forces, and emphasizes an understanding that only collective unity of Serbs through traditional cultural institutions can preserve the state from foreign influence, internal decay, and political fragmentation. This narrative was mainly appropriated by Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s, and has been, by and large, inherited by the Serbian Radical Party, and more recently the Democratic Party of Serbia under Vojislav Koštunica. The second narrative has yet to be both fully appreciated and fully used by Serbia's pro-democratic and pro-European forces, yet it contains alternative understandings of Serbian history that embraces a more European, multi-ethnic, and cosmopolitan outlook. It is this second, alternative, historical memory that I argue is needed to not only further legitimize electoral support for political parties like the Democratic Party and Liberal Democratic Party among others, but also to counter the nationalistic historical memory that continues to permeate among large segments of Serbian society, and which gives the greatest degree of electoral strength and political legitimacy to the Radicals.⁸⁶

Prevailing Historical Memories in Serbia: Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava

When considering Serbia in the last twenty years, historical memory has been both ubiquitous and powerful in the shaping of knowledge, experience, and interactions in politics and practice in daily life. In the chaos of a disintegrating Yugoslav state, a

from the individual and his primary groups into the political system. The overwhelming majority of the members of all political systems live out their lives, discover, develop, and express their feelings and aspirations in the intimate groups of the community...In those societies in which secondary political structures effectively mesh with the intimate primary structures [of community], there is a gradation from 'public' to 'private'; from the full-time professional politician to the intermittently active citizen.' (1963), p. 143

⁸⁶ Much empirical work on Serbia is part of a larger research project currently being conducted for my doctoral thesis 'Resurrecting the Past: Democracy, National Identity, and Historical Memory in Modern Serbia' (expected defense May 2009). The work presented here, particularly the evidence for a pro-democratic historical memory is a work in progress, and is intended to offer suggestions and ideas for additional research by future scholars.

collapsing economy, ethnic tension, war, and international isolation, Serbs found meanings and motives in their actions through national identity, their dependence on family and kin, their renewed faith, however genuine, in the Serbian Orthodox Church, a pride in their own history and historical achievements, and a general understanding that an adherence to these allegedly perceived fixed, stable, and timeless principles would get them through current difficulties. However, this renewed sense of Serbian pride was encapsulated within a framework of exclusionary nationalism. In other words, rather than rediscovering a particular Serbian cultural identity that was part of a larger democratic European framework, Serbian historical memory was used as a buffer to European integration, a barrier to multiethnic co-existence that at the time was unraveling in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and a roadmap for reclaiming what was understood as Serbia's historical entitlement to a great power in the Balkans. Such identities were appropriated by and emphasized, though by no means ideologically embraced, by the government of Slobodan Milošević. Indeed, one of the key strengths Milošević possessed throughout the 1990s that enabled him to both remain in power and marginalize any opposition to his leadership, was the successful use of national symbols and historical sensitivities of Serbian collective memory to identify current conditions of hardship and loss with age-old narratives of Serbian victimhood, sacrifice, and treachery of foreign elements.⁸⁷

Eight years after the fall of the Milošević government in October 2000, the greatest obstacle to continued democratic reform in Serbia today is the ongoing persistence of exclusionary nationalistic historical memory collectively organized around the Serbian Radical Party, currently the largest and strongest party in parliament.⁸⁸ A political party that began as far right movement in 1990 and enjoyed occasional support

⁸⁷ Currently, the best source available in English on Serbian and Croatian public opinion during the 1990s is V.P. Gagnon's *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004. Many of these surveys remain untranslated and unresearched. As a result, earlier observations of Yugoslavia by international journalists and academics were quick to assume that the apparent support for authoritarian regimes in Belgrade and Zagreb reflected a popular shift towards ethnic extremism based on historical grievances and a lack of functionally mature political institutions to shape political development. See also Robert Thomas, *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s*. Columbia University Press, 1999; Edward Mansfield, and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000).

⁸⁸ Full research on the Serbian Radical Party has yet to be conducted, and therefore information gathered is largely derived from news programs, political pamphlets, and newspaper editorials. For a general fitting of the SRS within the larger phenomenon of Radical Right and national populist parties, see Sabrina Ramet, *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

from Milošević's SPS, it is the only political party that has consistently made a centralized and unitary enlarged Serbian state one of its primary objectives. The SRS has been linked to supporting various paramilitary units involved in ethnic conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo throughout the 1990s, either through financial funding, or direct military participation. Its party head, Vojislav Šešelj, is currently in The Hague as an indicted war criminal. The SRS's official webpage even has his current office location at the ICTY!⁸⁹ Its acting president, Tomislav Nikolić, himself a paramilitary volunteer serving in Vukovar in 1992, nearly claimed the Serbian presidential election in 2008 and still stands as one of Serbia's most recognized political figures.⁹⁰ International reaction to the strong popularity of the SRS has been overwhelmingly negative. Organizations such as the European Union and the World Bank have not hid their disdain for what they regard as a political party embodying the continued specter of ultranationalism in Serbia from the 1990s, and have gone so far as to hinge further aid and assistance for Serbia's struggling economy on the political orientation of Belgrade.⁹¹

The SRS largely addresses four emotional issues that tug at the heartstrings of a society scarred and demoralized by fifteen years of warfare and international isolation. The first issue that the SRS plays on is that Serbians no longer have any control over their destinies, including their state's own territorial integrity.⁹² The breakup of

⁸⁹ Званична Интернет презентација Српске радикалне странке, <http://www.srs.org.yu/>

⁹⁰ Final electoral results gave Tadić a victory with 50.5% over Nikolić, who received 47.97%. Center for Free Election and Democracy (CeSID), http://www.cesid.org/eng/rezultati/sr_feb_2008/index.jsp

⁹¹ As recent as early May 2007, Tomislav Nikolić was briefly nominated and appointed Parliament Speaker. Even though his tenure only lasted little over a week, ending with a final agreement on forming a new government, the news of his appointment reverberated throughout Western media as a clear step backwards for Serbia's political development and a return of ultranationalism. The day after Nikolić's appointment, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn called 'the election of an ultra-nationalist as Serbia's parliamentary speaker' a 'worrying sign'. He further added that Serbia was standing at a crossroads where it should chose between 'the return to a nationalist past or an approach toward a European future', and concluded that 'the fragility of democratic development in Serbia is posing risks towards political integration of the Western Balkans towards the EU'. Reuters was quick to report that the Radicals are 'Serbia's strongest party, [and] are heirs to the nationalist mantle of the late Slobodan Milošević, who led the country into four wars'. The Associated Press tagged Nikolić as 'a fierce nationalist known for his anti-Western stands, including demanding that Serbia shelve its EU aspirations and focus on maintaining close ties with Russia and China, and advocating for military intervention in Kosovo if the province becomes independent.' No news agency failed to mention that the SRS's founder, Vojislav Šešelj, is currently in the Hague. Source: B92.net, 'Rehn: Serbia at the Crossroads', May 8, 2007; "Return of Ultranationalism", May 8, 2007.

⁹² Nearly 78% of Serbs polled in 2002 thought that 'many things in my country are decided from the outside'. IntlIDEA (2002). As much as 84 percent of citizens polled in 2007 believe they have no (66 percent) or insignificant influence on politics and its actors (18 percent), even though the same poll revealed that at least a quarter of those interviewed understands what is going on in

Yugoslavia, from Slovenia to Kosovo, has led to a sense of fatalism that the state Serbs are living in, the state they have fought to defend in the twentieth century, has been abandoned and fragmented by disloyal elements and subversive opportunists. Second, the SRS depicts the international community, particularly the Western world, as hypocritically lending a sympathetic ear to the plight of everyone else in the Balkans, but turns a blind eye to Serbia's woes. The overwhelming support for Slovenian, Croatian, and now Montenegrin and Albanian self-determination appears to completely ignore the problems of large Serbian minority communities now living in these independent countries, who are often subjected to harassment and losses in property and economic security.⁹³ What makes this lopsided support worse is that the ethnic groups that receive international sympathy for being victimized by Serbs, are themselves the very ethnic groups that have harassed Serbs. Western support in particular for an independent Croatia and an independent Kosovo have both come on the heels of these groups expelling hundreds of thousands of ethnic Serbs from their ancestral homes, destroying Serbian cultural landmarks, and attempting to erase any visible presence of Serb life in these regions. Yet it is Serbs who are sent to the Hague, while other ethnic communities are invited to the EU.⁹⁴

Third, the perceived indifference to Serbian grievances and injustices feeds into a conception that the West believes the Serbs to be too strong to either control or negotiate with. Therefore the only solution is to divide, conquer, and scatter the people,

politics, and a fifth are aware they should participate in the resolution of social issues. Yet only one in 16 citizens consider him/herself as more or less politically influential (CeSID Public Opinion Survey, September 2007).

⁹³ Headlines in both Serbian and Montenegrin newspapers played up the emphasis of the Albanian 'swing' vote the day after the referendum. The *Press* noted, 'In Montenegro the Albanians have won! 219,683 voted for independence, among whom there were around 25,000 ethnic Albanians and some 40,000 Muslims; the majority of Serbs and Montenegrins voted for SCG [Union of Serbia and Montenegro].' The *Kurir* stated '179 Montenegrins decided the referendum. Independence won in a 'photo-finish' when ethnic Albanians from Ulcinj, Plav and Rozaje [Albanian majority communities] rushed to the polling stations. Northern Montenegro in shock after vote for independence: A night of sadness.' Even American journalists were quick to liken Montenegro's independence as a further loss to the fleeting dream of Greater Serbia, as reported in *Newsday*, 'The hope of the United States, the European Union and the international community at large is that Serbia will accept its modest new status as a landlocked country of under 10 million people, give up its expansionist, nationalist impulses and embrace the West.' Matthew McAllester, 'Serbia Loses Dream of Greatness', *Newsday*, May 23, 2006.

⁹⁴ There is a growing sense in Serbia that the Hague is overtly biased against Serbs. The sudden death of Slobodan Milošević in 2006 after years of his trial continuing, as well as the ongoing trial of Vojislav Šešelj without any foreseeable end has actually rehabilitated many of these individuals as 'martyrs' and 'heroes' of Serbia. Within the SRS, a growing cult of heroism is being constructed around Šešelj as a symbol unlawful Serbian punishment, particularly when juxtaposed with the relatively lenient sentences given to Croats, Bosnians, and Albanians, or the outright acquittal of individuals like Ramush Haradinaj.

as demonstrated by the support for secessionist movements in Yugoslavia and now in Serbia itself with the loss of Kosovo. Fourth and final, this perception that subversive elements want to weaken and divide Serbia is often contrasted with an earlier period when Serbs, as Yugoslavs, were the envy of the socialist world, and could travel anywhere they wished. Now they are reduced to an impoverished, humiliated, and isolated society etching out a meager existence while less-advanced, and less-deserving, countries are being welcomed into the European Union.⁹⁵ In short, the SRS organizes collective frustration and dissatisfaction with current conditions around perceived feelings of helplessness, isolation, humiliation, and international irrelevance that have all been thrown upon the Serbian people by foreign governments, fifth column elements within the state, and opportunistic elites within the Serbian government.

Popular support for the SRS rests on two conditions. The first is that it continues the legacy of Milošević's 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' of the late 1980s.⁹⁶ Such a movement can be characterized as 'apolitical in ideology [and] sees politics as bound up in a single apocalyptic and restorative need.'⁹⁷ A party that claims to cut through the proverbial red tape, fight corruption and reduce economic inequalities, restore pride and eliminate foreign influences, the SRS continues the tradition of a 'movement of rage' that originates 'among provincial elites: men and women filled with hate for the culture of the capital city. And at the same time angered by their exclusion from it.'⁹⁸ The second condition is that the SRS is evolving from a far right fringe party, to a collective 'no' party: 'No' to an independent Kosovo; 'no' to the Hague; 'no' to the European Union;

⁹⁵ Studies on the search for a proverbial 'Golden Age' in one's history, contrasted with present conditions, is well researched in theories of historical memory. In addition to Lowenthal (1985), see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso Press, 1991); Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, (University of Nevada Press, 1991); Eviatar Zerubavel, *Time Maps: Collective History and the Social Shape of the Past*, (University of Chicago Press, 2003); Michael Herzfeld, *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology and the Making of Modern Greece*, (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1986); Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, (Yale University Press, 1997); Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition*, (University of Chicago Press, 1997).

⁹⁶ Thomas (1999) describes such a movement as a 'populist crusade', in which Milošević aimed to forge a link between himself and the population that transcended normal institutional politics, p. 9.

⁹⁷ Donald Macrae, 'Populism as an Ideology', *Populism – Its Meaning and Characteristics*, ed. Ionescu and Gellner. New York: Macmillan, 1969, p. 157.

⁹⁸ Kenneth Jowitt, *The New World Disorder – The Leninist Extinction*, University of California Press, 1992, p. 275; quoted in Thomas (1999), p. 9. SRS brochures distributed on the streets for the recent 2008 parliamentary elections simplified their program and objectives in 10 goals which addressed large public frustration and dissatisfaction with political corruption, corporate greed through privatization, the strong defense of Serbia's territorial integrity over Kosovo, and the perceived injustice of Vojislav Šešelj's imprisonment in the Hague. See *Napred Srbio! Polazne tačke Programa, Srpske radikalne stranke*.

‘no’ to the United States; ‘no’ to what it sees as capitulation after capitulation of the Serbian state, its people, its principles, and its pride, to international demands.

While not actually advocating the revocation of democracy, the SRS nevertheless is wary of adopting any further liberalizing reforms if that essentially means tying Serbia to the reigns of the European and international communities, and reducing the state to the status of what it sees as a ‘vassal’ or a ‘colony’ of the West. It has frequently proclaimed that ‘Serbia is not for sale’, and is against the privatization of many key Serbian industries. By opposing the sale of Serbian firms and businesses to Western buyers, the SRS not only favors the re-nationalization of industries, it also speaks on behalf of local job protection and a reduction in unemployment, which is currently around 30%.⁹⁹ These affirmations of resolve against international stipulations are, given Serbia’s current conditions, one of the reasons why the SRS is one of the few, if not the only, political parties on the populist right in Eastern Europe that commands both a sizable percentage of public support and a large percentage of seats in the national parliament.

By examining the specific processes and conditions in which Serbia must navigate in order to dismantle authoritarian state structures left over from the Milošević era and reintegrate itself into a community of democratic European nations, we may be able to better understand why nearly 40% of society is opposed to certain democratic strategies, and why there is a particular reluctance on behalf of the Serbian government to cooperate on issues ranging from resolving the status of Kosovo, to the handing over of indicted suspects to the International Criminal Courts Tribunal in The Hague. While international observers view continued political and economic stagnation as an ongoing reluctance of Serbian officials to truly reform the post-authoritarian state apparatus, these conclusions are far too simplistic and sweeping in judgment. The democratic coalition that finally succeeded in unseating Milošević inherited a state broken economically by ten years of international sanctions, demoralized by defeat in four wars, damaged by NATO air strikes in 1999, and dominated by SPS remnants in key political, economic, and industrial sectors. These internal problems, added to a list of obligations imposed by the international community on the previous regime, have made democratic transition and consolidation in Serbia an uphill struggle since 2000.

⁹⁹ *Program Srpske Radikalne Stranke*, <http://www.srs.org.yu/onama/program.php>. See also ‘Interview with Tomislav Nikolić’, B92.net, June 14, 2004. It is interesting to note the SRS’s steadfast opposition to the privatization of Serbia’s industries and enterprises even though the SRS, and Nikolić in particular has been incredibly supportive of the ongoing deal for Russian gas giant Gasprom to acquire control of at least 51% of all shares in Serbia’s energy industry.

In Search of Alternative, Pro-European Historical Memories

What then, are the prospects for further democratic development in Serbia? At the time of this writing, Serbia has emerged from another nail-biting election in which the choice in front of the electorate was stark: to choose a coalition of pro-EU parties that seek greater European integration at the risk of compromising internal Serbian interests, namely Kosovo, or a coalition most likely headed by the SRS and supported by the DSS and SPS remnants that refuses to sign any deal with the EU if it means acknowledging the administrative and territorial loss of Kosovo and further deterioration of Serbian national interests. A governing coalition has yet to be formed, and the decision made by the SPS coalition in which government to join may determine Serbia's political future for the next few years. Resentment to the EU and other international powers has certainly increased in the wake of the Albanian-led government's unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo. The effective loss of a region so heavily fused with Serbian historic symbolism as both the proverbial 'cradle' of their civilization and the perennial representation of Serbian international defiance, may very well allow the SRS to effectively gain control of the government for the first time since 2000.

These are the current challenges facing an increasingly beleaguered Serbian political coalition interested in establishing closer integration with Europe. Democratic integration, EU membership, and a definitive compromise over Kosovo are constantly placed in an either/or contrast with national security, territorial integrity, and a defense of national interests. The politician that refuses to recognize Kosovo as an integral and vital part of Serbia's territory signs his own electoral death warrant. The intellectual that embraces 'European' values over the traditional, and familiar, values of Serbia, is heard by a minute percentage of the population, and even then, only in small university circles in Belgrade or Novi Sad. Politicians, policymakers, and international influences are increasingly pushing the electorate into two disjointed camps: the 'pro-European', and the 'pro-Serbian'; identities in which it is understood that ascribing to one means dismissing the other.

More nationalist parties, as well as sectors of the voting public, constantly pressure pro-Western parties such as Boris Tadić's Democratic Party, to adopt similar stances of national identity and territorial integrity. As such, primary objectives such as a formal signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which will start the process of Serbia's EU integration, fulfillment of any outstanding commitments to the ICTY, and further participation in international organizations, are constantly diverted. Other parties such as Čedomir Jovanović's Liberal Democratic Party, have made a conscientious decision to formally break with official Serbian historical narratives collective identity. Not surprising, the LDP earns little more than 5% of the popular vote. In short, many analysts, both in Serbia and elsewhere wonder if the only way for Serbia to establish a truly democratic civil society is to make a painful break with the past. Their outlook remains pessimistic in that Serbs will not give up their collective identity for the sake of unknown European principles.

My ongoing research in Serbia disputes these claims and argues that historical memory, which effectively functioned to legitimize political authority for Milošević and the current Radicals, can also be used to rediscover a genuine democratic culture and history of Serbia. As mentioned above, in order for democracy to grow within a country and be legitimately accepted by its population, democracy must be compatible with local cultural traditions. I have found that Serbia has multiple examples of such historical memories that are not adequately appropriated by pro-democratic elites. Fearful of being seen as the politician that forgets Kosovo, pro-EU leaders like Tadić and others neglect genuine opportunities to examine other aspects of Serbia's rich history. While Kosovo is an integral component to Serbian identity, it is only a part of a large spectrum of histories that have made Serbia and its people what it is today. In fact, one may even argue that while Kosovo is richly ingrained in the minds of nearly every Serb as a critical and non-negotiable component to their collective identity, other aspects, other events, and other time periods have actually been more directly responsible for the creation and growth of the modern Serbian state. In almost every respect, identifying and appropriating these historical memories into a democratically usable past, not only legitimizes Serbia's further democratic development and international integration as something 'home grown' and 'traditionally Serbian', these 'pro-democratic' historical memories can also serve as a strong counterbalance to the 'pro-nationalist' historical memory that has prevailed over Serbian political discourse over the last two decades. In what follows is a brief outline of the alternative historical memories that can be available pro-democratic and pro-Western

elites in Serbia, eager to demonstrate that further democratization can be a home-grown initiative. While key histories have been identified, they are by no means thematically exhausted. A concerted interest in researching these historical elements may be incredibly rewarding for Serbia's new generation of historians and social scientists.

The 'Constitutional' Period of monarchical Serbia (1903 – 1914)

The Kingdom of Serbia between 1903 and 1914 can be considered modern Serbia's 'golden age' of politics and arguably one of its most democratic periods. Its 1903 Constitution established the state as a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy in which all Serbs, regardless of ethnicity or confession were equal before the law. During this period of constitutional monarchy, Serbia's political system enjoyed a vigorous period of expansion of political parties, a deepening of political institutions, and proliferation of free press and fair elections. Finally this period witnessed the territorial expansion of Serbia to include roughly its 2006 borders through two decisive victories in the two Balkan wars.

Politically, Serbia was dominated by two outstanding figures: King Petar I Karadjordjević, and Nikola Pašić. Two aspects of Petar's philosophies stand out: his intense patriotism, and his firm commitment to liberal government, exemplified through his personal translation of John Stuart Mill's essay *On Liberty*. Indeed, Petar was well suited to serve as a mediator between universal principles of liberal democracy and Serbian patriotism. Having received his education in Paris and Geneva, he possessed similar political and social outlooks with those of professional academics and intellectuals. Simultaneously, his experience in Western Europe and his military service in the French Foreign Legion as well as a volunteer fighter in Bosnia in 1875 helped develop a sense of Pan-Serbianism that extended beyond the then-present boundaries of Serbia to include Serbs in Montenegro, the Ottoman Empire, and Austria-Hungary. Petar's sometimes-counterpart and sometimes-rival, Nikola Pašić, was already a seasoned Serbian statesman, having served as both Mayor of Belgrade, and Prime Minister of Serbia for twenty years. Pašić's Radical Party, not to be confused with the present day Serbian Radical Party, was the first systematically organized Serbian political party that

successfully fused the political elitism of Belgrade with traditional themes of ‘folk democracy’ that emphasized fraternity, religious ethics, and populism. While far from being deemed a model democracy by today’s standards, Serbian political developments in the first fifteen years of the twentieth century are considered truly progressive for its time.

It was also during the decade before the outbreak of the First World War that Belgrade definitively transformed itself from a provincial post-Ottoman town, to a regional, cosmopolitan city resembling those of Central Europe. Theaters, the cinema, international cuisine, automobiles, and grand hotels became permanent features of Belgrade. Additionally, educational curriculum advanced from once what was a vocation for the small privileged elite to universal curricula throughout the kingdom. The educational models of German and Italian universities, noted by Sima Lozanić, first rector of the University of Belgrade, would be used to promote national consciousness in unifying the nation, as it had done in the other two countries. With the establishment of Serbia’s own university, new generations of scholars no longer needed to travel to universities in Western and Central Europe, and thus between 1905 and 1914, some of Serbia’s greatest scholars lectured in Belgrade, offering courses on history, geography, literature, philosophy, geology, chemistry, and physics.

Serbian literature also blossomed during this period as dozens of journals, newspapers, literary magazines and other forms of print media proliferated. New literary themes focusing on individualism, modernism, and romanticism blended thematic elements of Serbian epic poetry to create a style of literature unique to the universities and coffeehouses of Belgrade and Novi Sad that was both a part of the cutting-edge literary styles of Western and Central Europe as well as beholden to universal values engrained in Serbian collective identity. Equally important was the advent of truly metropolitan newspapers, such as *Politika*, Serbia’s most widely read, and most widely respected daily up to the present time. While newspapers has proliferated in Serbia as early as the reign of Miloš Obrenović, what made *Politika* so significant was that it was Serbia’s first truly independent newspaper, beholden to no political party, nor ideological orientation. Its editorial sections criticized government activities as well as individual statesmen, and it’s foreign correspondents and wire services provided readers with the

first objective glimpses of international developments that linked Serbia with the wider European continent.¹⁰⁰

The cosmopolitan character of Belgrade since the early twentieth century

By all accounts, Belgrade has always been a cosmopolitan city dating back to the Ottoman era. As already mentioned in the previous section of Serbia's Constitutional Period, Belgrade functioned as the nucleus of Serbian political, economic, social, and cultural development. Yet even during periods of political uncertainty, and even stagnation, Belgrade has continued to function as the true heart of Serbia on all levels of measure. As early as the founding of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918, a variety of immigrants from across the country and Europe added to the growing number of professionals, business class, and intellectuals. Some 30,000 Russian emigrants fleeing the 1917 revolution and civil war significantly contributed to raising the quality of universities and cultural centers of opera, dance, and theater to European levels. Both Hollywood films and actors, such as Charlie Chaplin and Rudy Valentino, dominated the entertainment venues and contributed to an already Serbian character of avant-garde literature, art, poetry, film, and architecture.

Newspapers and publishing houses flourished in interwar Belgrade to such an extent that no one political party could control public opinion. The daily *Vreme*, official newspaper of the Radical Party, and the newly founded *Politika*, became two of the most widely circulated and widely read newspapers in Serbia. Several economic weeklies focused on further economic integration from the perspective of European, French, German, and British businesses rather than Serbian politics. The *Srpski književni glasnik* (Serbian Literary Journal) published more work by the eminent Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža, than appeared in Zagreb. Geca Kon, a prominent Jewish immigrant from Zemun across the Sava River successfully printed cheap editions of translated European works,

¹⁰⁰ Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia: 1804 – 1918*, vol. II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 534 – 611.

and his bookstore what noted as one of the most successful and extensive in Belgrade, if not Yugoslavia, by the 1930s.¹⁰¹

Central to this expanding cosmopolitan atmosphere were the hundreds of cafes, coffeeshops, *kafanas*, and salons, where authors and artists gathered almost nightly.¹⁰² Of the nearly 700 in the city, the Hotel Moskva along the fashionable Terazije was probably the most famous, claiming such famous regulars as the Dalmatian Croat poet Augustin (Tin) Ujević, who spent the better part of the 1920s in the bohemian quarters of Belgrade and became an ardent supporter for the Yugoslav idea over any national or political identity. Sharing this notion was the Vojvodina Serb poet and novelist Miloš Crnjanski. The Serbian playwright Branislav Nušić was another example, whose play *Gospodja Ministarka* (Mrs. Minister) mercilessly satirized the upper political classes of Belgrade. He also organized the volunteer efforts that opened the Cvijeta Zuzorić Pavillion in 1927. Named after a 16th century Dalmatian patron of the arts, it functioned as a free performance center for art exhibits, concerts, and literary evenings to those who could not afford a hall. One of Belgrade's most respected intellectual leaders, theater critic Milan Grol and lawyer/historian Slobodan Jovanović were ready to champion the abandonment of political unitarism in order to preserve a state whose survival they saw more threatened by the Serbian side for centralization than Croat calls for confederation. A recent study on interwar Yugoslavia from an American perspective noted that in Belgrade of the 1920s, one 'is hard pressed to find major Serbian intellectuals or writers who showed a strong preference for a unitary culture, much less one based on the nineteenth century romantic vision of synthesis on Serbian terms.'¹⁰³

Belgrade has continued to function as a cosmopolitan city both during the Communist period, and more importantly during Milošević period. Between the death of Tito and the rise of Milošević, the Serbian Socialist Republic was regarded as one of the most progressive and liberal minded of all Yugoslav republics. Members of Serbia's pre-Milošević party leadership advocated not only the complete independence of the economy from party influence, but also for greater reliance on private enterprise, multiple candidates in state and party elections, free and secret elections in the party, and the adoption of policies and procedures that would lay the foundations of a liberal

¹⁰¹ John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, 2nd edition, (Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp. 145 – 154; Jelena Milojković Djurić, *Tradition and Avant-Garde: Literature and Art in Serbian Culture, 1900 – 1918*, (Columbia University Press, 1988).

¹⁰² Branislav Nušić, *Stari Beograd*, (Belgrade, 1984). See especially pp. 55 – 97

¹⁰³ Andrew Baruch Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia* (Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 82.

democratic political apparatus.¹⁰⁴ After the rise of Slobodan Milošević and the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia, students and opposition parties challenged Milošević's rule no less than three times between 1991 and 2000 in Belgrade. The student protests during the winter of 1996 – 97 were most notable in extracting a number of concessions by Milošević on behalf of pro-democratic parties assuming control of local and municipal posts. Indeed, throughout most of Milošević's rule, Belgrade remained a stronghold of anti-SPS sentiment and functioned as a center for dissident journalism, artwork, literature, and politics.¹⁰⁵

The growth and importance of Serbian cultural and mercantile centers in the Hapsburg Empire from 1690 to 1914.

Contrary to more contemporary statements that the Balkans are a region that was cut off from the Enlightenment and Scientific and Industrial revolutions, Hapsburg Serbian communities in what is now present-day Vojvodina enjoyed exposure to, and development within, the same liberal ways of thinking as Central Europe. Cities like Novi Sad and Sremski Karlovci were major centers of Serbian intellectual, religious, and political thought, and home to many individuals who contributed either to the intellectual or physical manpower of the First Serbian Uprising in 1804. This region functioned as an important trading center between the Ottoman Empire, the Romanian Principalities, the Hapsburg Empire and the Venetian mercantile networks, as also as centers of thinking and learning that was inaccessible to the policies of the Ottoman sultan.

The history of Serbs in Vojvodina remains one of the least researched periods by both Serbian and outside scholars. Even in current daily newspapers, articles focus on developments in Belgrade, Kosovo, and other regions in central Serbia, but rarely mention anything in Novi Sad, Subotica, and other regions of Serbia's northern province.

¹⁰⁴ The call for political reform was largely necessitated by the greater need for economic liberalization. While party reformists may not have been overly interested in constructing a 'democratic narrative' in line with my argument, it is nevertheless important to point out that the initiative for greater political liberalization was visibly present in Serbian political discourse. See Gagnon (61 – 62).

¹⁰⁵ Matthew Collin, *Guerrilla Radio: Rock'n'Roll and Serbia's Underground Resistance*, (New York: Thunder Mouth Press, 2001).

As such, Vojvodina has become neglected as an integral and important component to Serbian collective identity. One of the most promising areas of research is reintegrating Vojvodina's history as a central part of Serbia's general history.¹⁰⁶ From the standpoint of democracy and modern political development, the intellectuals and elites of Novi Sad and Sremski Karlovci have had more a direct influence on the creation of the modern Serbian state than anything from medieval Kosovo, an era that, while important to Serbian cultural identity, provides little tangible contributions to current Serbian politics and society.

One of the most interesting aspects of a study of Serbs in Vojvodina is that it negates the general assumption that Serbs collectively lived as vassals of foreign powers between the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the First Serbian Uprising of 1804. Popular understanding of Serbian history emphasizes the Great Serbian Exodus of 1690, in which 20,000 Serbian families, led by Patriarch Arsenije III, migrated away from their historic homelands around Kosovo to seek refuge across the Danube in the Hapsburg Empire. Yet again, little is mentioned about the fate of these families and the descendents. While ethnic co-existence with Catholic Germans, Hungarians, and Croats was hardly peaceful at times, the Serb communities of Vojvodina provide the critical historic link between Serbia's medieval past and the modern period. By emigrating from Ottoman to Hapsburg regions, Serbs came into contact the expanding culture and commerce of Europe and began to participate in political, economic, social, and cultural enterprises that would have been denied to them by the Porte. Serbian commercial centers developed in Novi Sad, Szent Andrej, Sremski Karlovci, Trieste, Budapest, Timisoara, and Vienna. A new class of Serbian entrepreneurs within the Austrian Empire subsequently acted as commercial and diplomatic intermediaries between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Their accumulated wealth was invested in new churches, schools, publishing houses, and other legacies on both sides of the Danube. It was within this new class of entrepreneurs and intellectuals that Dositej Obradović and Vuk Karadžić emerged to become the political, cultural, and spiritual forefathers of the modern Serbian state.

One of the most important reasons for new research into the history of Serbian communities of Vojvodina is the survival and expansion in powers of the Serbian Orthodox Church. After the Great Serbian Exodus of 1690 in which up to 20,000 Serb families left their ancestral homes in Kosovo, the Hapsburg Empire gave refuge to these

¹⁰⁶ Literature on the history of Vojvodina is virtually non-existent in English. For a general history of the region in Serbian, see Dušan Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini*, 3 vols. (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1990).

families and their cultural institutions north of the Danube. There, the Serbian Orthodox Church established its new spiritual center at Sremski Karlovci, was given institutional autonomy by the Austrian government, and experienced its own cultural flourishing that existed long after the medieval Patriarchate of Peć was abolished by the Ottoman sultanate. The monasteries in Fruška Gora, while overshadowed in importance to the medieval monasteries of Kosovo and Raška, provided ongoing educational training to new generations of Serbs, and formed the nucleus of what would become a center of Serbian. Contrary to popular understandings that the Serbian Church and its people languished under the Ottoman yoke, the Metropolitanate of Sremski Karlovci became the ecclesiastical and cultural center of Serbs in Austria, providing both priests and teachers to Serbian parishes, monasteries and schools on both sides of the Danube. The Serbian Orthodox Church preserved its institutional autonomy, and expanded its dioceses into Hungary, Banat, and Transylvania.

The Serbian Orthodox Church

Contrary to many institutional approaches to democratic transition and modernization literature, religion and religious institutions are not impediments to democratic reform; they can actually serve as one of its fundamental elements.¹⁰⁷ More than any other institution, the Serbian Church has historically served as the main repository of Serbian identity, history, culture, and collective memory, and has functioned oftentimes as the only institution safeguarding these. Needless to say, any political initiative, democratic or otherwise, that neglects to include the Serbian church as a component of its symbolic linkage between current political goals and Serbia culture, does so at its own risk.

Despite the overwhelming importance the Serbian Church plays in preserving the fundamental identities of Serbian collective memory, it may be unconventional to

¹⁰⁷ Huntington (1996), Huntington and Harrison (2001). For sources investigating a positive link between religion and democracy, particularly Orthodox Christianity, see Alfred Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics*, particularly chapter 11, “The World’s Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the ‘Twin Tolerations’”, pp. 213 – 54, in *Arguing Comparative Politics*, Alfred Stepan, ed. (Oxford University Press, 2001); Elizabeth Prodromou, “The Ambivalent Orthodox”, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15, no. 2. April 2004, pp. 62 – 75; Christos Mylonas, *Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Eternal Identity*, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003).

consider an institution that has often served as a force against greater democratization and liberalization. In recent memory, the Church has functioned as one of the main bulwarks for Serbian nationalism, and one of the greatest proponents in extending political authority from Belgrade to Serb-majority regions in Croatia and Bosnia.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, many high-ranking bishops, metropolitans, and archbishops have openly sided with the regimes of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, and Radovan Karadžić in the Bosnian Serb Republic. While the Serbian Church is certainly not a unique case in a religious institution using political organizations to extend and promote its own goals and objectives, the Serbian Church, at least at first glance, can hardly be said to be a major proponent of interfaith dialogue, multiethnic coexistence, and principles of secular thinking that are crucial to liberal democratic values. However, to avoid, or even disregard the Serbian Orthodox Church as reactionary, anti-democratic, or simply irrelevant to democratic growth is incredibly dangerous. The Church is increasingly permeating aspects of social and daily life, and even though many Serbs do not regard themselves as overly religious, and even less are regular churchgoers, the Serbian Orthodox Church is one of the most respected, trusted, and influential institutions in Serbia. Therefore, a search for a relationship between the Church and principles of democracy is both prudent and necessary, especially if forces advocating exclusionary nationalism continue to rely on the Church for historical and symbolic legitimacy.

More than anything else, the Serbian Orthodox Church functions along three paramount axioms. The first is that it provides a sort of ‘moral boundary’ of Serbian values and principles by being a source of ‘non-negotiable truth claims’.¹⁰⁹ In this, the Church has been one of the greatest providers of shared historical references over the centuries and encapsulates a shared sense of community and kinship, bound together through these collective memories. These memories are specifically fixed on geographical territory that in itself functions as symbolic memory through monasteries, cultural manifestations, and various episodes of history marked by Serbian heroes and saints. Secondly, the Serbian Church ‘sacralizes’ Serbian national identity. Through feast days; rites of baptism, marriage, and death; and the unique traditions of the *kersna slava*, or the ritual celebration and veneration of a family’s patron saint, the Serbian Church lends a sense of divinely ordained legitimacy and a heightened sense of belonging to everyday

¹⁰⁸ Sabrina P. Ramet, ‘The Politics of the Serbian Orthodox Church’, *Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society under Milošević and After*, Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković, eds. (University of Washington Press, 2005), pp. 255 – 285; Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav Studies*, (Oxford University Press, 2002).

¹⁰⁹ Mylonas (2003), p. 55

action. Third, the Serbian Orthodox Church, like nearly every Orthodox Church around the world, are the churches of their respective nations, and the myths, teachings, rituals, morals, and ideals being those of their respective nations. Again, while this shying away from universalism may be interpreted as an impediment to universal principles of democracy, this article has emphasized the importance of local culture, local knowledge, and local identities in the crafting of legitimate democracy in any state. With this in mind, the Serbian Orthodox Church can be said to be the most ‘Serbian’ of any institution, and thus a potentially crucial partner in the forging of a particularly Serbian democratic identity.

There are numerous examples within the Church that demonstrate Serbia’s exposure to and compatibility with Western democratic values. The most visible historical example is the Metropolitanate of Sremski Karlovci, already mentioned above.¹¹⁰ Its Metropolitans, and after 1848 Patriarchs, functioned as both ecclesiastical and civil leaders of the Serbs in the Hapsburg Empire, and either directly spearheaded or significantly supported many initiatives that enhanced the socio-political well-being of Serbs. Because they functioned as *de facto* political leaders of the Serbian community, the metropolitans often found themselves at the courts of the Hapsburg emperors almost as much as behind their respective altars. While it would be erroneous to conclude that the Serbian Church in Austria-Hungary enjoyed unfettered religious freedom, particularly since efforts by the local Catholic clergies to absorb them within the Uniate Church continued until the early twentieth century, it is valid to raise the argument that the metropolitans of Karlovci worked to develop working conditions of multi-ethnic co-existence with their German, Hungarian, Croat, and Romanian neighbors. Josif Rajačić, Metropolitan of Karlovci from 1842 to 1861, is credited with supporting the creation of new schools, libraries, and publishing houses throughout Serbian Vojvodina, and presided over the May Assembly of Serbs in 1848 in which the autonomy of Vojvodina was proclaimed. At the Assembly, Rajačić also inaugurated the Croatian army general Josip Jelačić as Ban, or Lord, of Croatia-Slavonia.¹¹¹

In more recent history, high-ranking members of the Serbian Orthodox Church sided with the 1996-97 and 2000 demonstrations against Milošević. Patriarch Pavle openly called for the resignation of Milošević numerous times in the 1990s, and

¹¹⁰ Velimir Ćerimović, *Sremski Karlovci i Dalj: Precolni Centri Karlovačke Mitropolije*, (Belgrade: Štamparija Srpske patriaršije, 2007).

¹¹¹ Nicholas C.J. Pappas, ‘Between Two Empires: Serbian Survival in the Years After Kosovo’, *Serbia’s Historical Heritage*, Alex H. Dragnich, ed., (Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 17 – 38.

personally met with Archbishop Josip Bozanić of Zagreb in 1998, calling for renewed efforts for peaceful co-existence between Serbs and Croats. Other church leaders serve as primary defenders of Serbian interests and needs in Kosovo. Individuals such as the young and charismatic Father Sava Janjić of Dečani monastery in Kosovo advocate reconciliation between Serbs and Albanians. The monks of Dečani have also been credited for sheltering Albanian families fleeing from Serb paramilitary forces during the 1999 crackdown on KLA insurgency.¹¹² Beyond individual activities, there has been a significant rise in popularity of the Church in the last decade. In addition to providing spiritual guidance, the Serbian Orthodox Church has frequently functioned as a refuge for drug addicts, alcoholics, the homeless, and people disillusioned with conditions in a deteriorating state and are looking for a refuge to clean their lives up, as well as seek stability in a Spartan life. A veritable ‘flight to the monasteries’ has produced a significant rise in the number of monks and nuns, but has also produced an considerable amount of lay people who view life within monastic structures to be a firm break from the corruption, hedonism, and disillusionment of life since the breakup of Yugoslavia.

The Way Forward: Charting a Culture of Democracy

Relating democratic consolidation to Serbian cultural identity elicits a series of new issues overlooked by mainstream approaches to democratic transition theory. First, it raises the argument that culture can neither be avoided nor downgraded to an auxiliary position in a period of political transition. Regardless of whether scholars consider the culture of the society under observation conducive to democracy or not, culture is one of the primary filters through which political choices are made and social concerns are voiced, and therefore an unavoidable factor in democratic transition and everyday life. Second, it is more expedient to ask what elements of a society’s culture can facilitate a

¹¹² Father Sava was a frequent blogger during the 1999 NATO campaign against Slobodan Milošević and has given numerous interviews to international and Kosovo Albanian media outlets since then. As a leading spokesman for the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, Father Sava has gone on record to express ‘his regret for [the] violence perpetrated by Serbs against the province’s ethnic Albanian community’ in 1999. While speaking to UN Radio in Priština, he expressed his ‘greatest regret for everything which was done by members of the Serbian people and special forces against Albanian civilians, which is a very serious crime.’ Agence France-Presse, November 9, 1999. Quoted in Ramet (2005), p. 262.

better democratic system than simply analyzing why democracy doesn't 'work' in certain states. Simply identifying the symptoms only answers half the question. Searching for democratically compatible narratives not only moves our research forward, it also leads to a better understanding of why some states or regions enjoy greater degrees of public activity and civic engagement in politics than others. Third, it raises the call to bring additional disciplines into the field of democratic transition theory. Structural models in political science are sorely lacking qualitative information that account for human agency and historical subjectivity. Understanding how democracy can function in a society and be accepted as a part of that society's tradition and culture requires additional research from historical, sociological, and anthropological disciplines.

My alternative model of coupling theories of historical memory with theories of democratic transition and consolidation is not so much an attempt to 'bring culture back in', but to demonstrate that scholars can reach better conclusions of the areas they are researching by understanding why people's attitudes, beliefs, and preferences are conditioned by current crises. Furthermore, by placing an emphasis on democratic growth through regional identities and historical sensitivities, scholars and policymakers may come to a better understanding of how public attitudes and present concerns can be utilized to embrace democratic values of civic cooperation, fraternity, and community activism that functions beyond simple voting patterns.¹¹³ Additionally, a greater emphasis on the culture of a society may help scholars identify certain patterns of democratic transition that may be ineffective, or even counterproductive to the country under study. A greater understanding of culture in a society beyond lowest common denominator indices may also help us understand why populations seem to support one type of political discourse over another, and even more importantly what recommendations and strategies can be forwarded to governments and civic organizations within each state to 'custom tailor' democratic growth. In short, if we are to truly take cultural preferences 'seriously', we must examine the culture of a country or region beyond broad civilizational classifications. We also need to take human agency and historical subjectivity into account, assume that all cultures and societies can at some point

¹¹³ Ongoing work from organizations such as Tempus, an EU sponsored program supporting investment in modernization of higher education and curriculum development, have worked extensively with universities throughout Serbia in providing academic exchange programs, collaborative projects with other European universities, and the preparation for educational standards for Serbia's eventual EU membership. See Stefan Dukiandjiev and Sofija Dukić, *Tempus Programme and Reform of Higher Education in Serbia and Montenegro* (European Commission, 2006). I am personally thankful to Ms. Jelena Branković, Tempus National Coordinator for providing me with this information.

embrace democratic norms, and understand that while there may be a universal theory of democracy, there cannot, and should not, be a universal theory of democratic transition. If taken seriously, cultural approaches to democracy can actually provide more robust explanations of not only how, but also why, states take the paths towards democratization and political development they do, or stray away from them.

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SERBO-CROATO-BOSNO-MONTENEGRIN?

Making order out of chaos

Srdjan Jovanović

The situation regarding the very name of the language formerly known as Serbo-Croatian has, during the last decades, been a source of many a controversy. With the breakup of Yugoslavia and the growing nationalist tendencies in all the states that came into existence, the language has started to be used as a tool for the support of nationalism. Every state tried to name the language after itself; it seems that as many as *four* languages came into existence overnight: Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian and Montenegrin. This essay tries to represent and analyze the chaotic situation that ensued.

Introduction

The language spoken in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, once known and studied under the internationally-accepted name of Serbo-Croatian (or Croato-Serbian), has recently become a source of confusion. Various speakers of the language are calling it by various names: the Croats refer to it as *Croatian*, the Serbs call it *Serbian*, while some linguists insist on *Serbo-Croatian* or *Croato-Serbian*, the name under which the language is presently studied in most universities in the world. A part of the rather diminutive population of Montenegro has started calling it *Montenegrin*, while a minor part of the same population actually refers to it as the *Mother Tongue*. Some people in Bosnia and Herzegovina refer to it as *Bosnian* or even *Bosniak* (*Bosniac*). The International Tribunal for the crimes in former Yugoslavia is probably the first to refer to it as to *BoCroS* or BKS, that is, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian. Some even like to call it *Yugoslavian* or *Novoshtokavian* or even *South-Slavic*. As the literature on the subject is rather unsatisfactory in volume and quality, I felt a more detailed analysis was direly needed.

To make things clear at the very beginning, I am of the opinion that the language should be called as it has been called by linguists during the last century, that is, *Serbo-Croatian* or *Croato-Serbian*. The reason of my choice will become clear during the essay. As in most of the cases (in the works of accomplished slavists), the choice made more often between those two variants is *Serbo-Croatian*, I shall use that designation myself. I would

like to begin by presenting the situation in which the language spoken over most of the territory of former Yugoslavia (with the exception of Slovenia and Macedonia, where Slovenian and Macedonian are spoken, respectively) finds itself today and how it is perceived by native speakers and linguists in Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Serbia. Then I shall continue by analyzing those views. Both from a linguistic, culturological and anthropological point of view, the situation at hand is fascinating to the point of disbelief. I implore the reader to approach the subject with an open mind.

The situation in Serbia

Most of the Serbs nowadays think of themselves as of speakers of *Serbian*. Interestingly, there are still some Serbian linguists who, officially, continue to call the language Serbo-Croatian, while the number of those who are in favor of the idea of a separate Serbian language has increased during the last decades. We shall now see why this is so.

What we need to have in mind is the somewhat poor situation with linguistics in Serbia in general. Several huge areas of linguistics regarding the Serbian variant of the Serbo-Croatian language are simply non-existent, such as syntax. Other areas, such as dialectology and prosody, basically leave much to be desired; most of the linguists in Serbia dealing with these matters are oblivious to the problem. Serbian syntax, thus, is almost entirely reduced to analysis of dependent and independent clauses within a sentence; no efforts are dedicated to the *word order* in Serbian whatsoever (syntax!). The highly revered Serbian grammarian, Mihailo Stevanović, in his *Savremeni srpskohrvatski jezik* (Contemporary Serbo-Croatian Language), dedicates *one whole paragraph* to the word order in Serbian, saying that it is ‘free’, which is simply *incorrect*; word-order in Serbian is not free, though not as restricted as in German or Chinese¹¹⁴. When it comes to

¹¹⁴ Possibly the only real effort to analyze word order, that is, syntax, in Serbo-Croatian, was Mladen Jovanović's work on the syntax of Serbo-Croatian ('Formalizacija i simboličko predstavljanje sintaksičkih odnosa u srpskohrvatskom jeziku kao preduslov za mašinsku obradu', *Komputerska obrada lingvističkih podataka - Zbornik radova, Institut za jezik i književnost, Sarajevo, 1978:155-195*). In this essay, he had analyzed Serbo-Croatian syntax with a pattern similar to the Scandinavian *fältschema* (a table used to present word order in Scandinavian

dialectology, the very disagreements and discrepancies in the status of the language itself (where does a dialect end and a language begin) tell us of how unsuccessful this branch actually is. Serbian prosody, similarly, finds itself in a rather poor state, enforcing upon the speakers of the language the ancient¹¹⁵ accentual system, today almost entirely non-existent¹¹⁶. The noted slavists Thomas Magner and Ladislav Matejka raised the questions about the validity of the official situation of Serbian accentology and prosody already some three decades ago, in a quite extensive study ‘*Word Accent in Modern Serbo-Croatian*’.

Being aware of the situation, we should take the views of official Serbian linguistics with a grain of salt. It is known that officially, the language at hand had been called Serbo-Croatian ever since the Novi Sad Agreement in 1954, at the time when Yugoslavia existed, during the half-a-century long reign of the communist leader, Josip Broz Tito. The main proponents of Serbo-Croatian were Vatroslav Jagić (Croatia), Pavle Ivić and Aleksandar Belić (Serbia). At that time, the ideology that was popular in Yugoslavia was the policy of ‘yugoslavism’ and the communist concept of *bratstvo i jedinstvo* (brotherhood and unity). A single common language did help such an ideology.

In recent decades, with the rise of nationalism in Serbia and the division of Yugoslavia into an ever larger number of independent states, the language became referred to as ‘Serbian’ more and more often (the way the adjective ‘Serbian’ became the most positive way of designating any cultural entity in Serbia). An article from the daily *Politika* from Belgrade (dated July 15th 2006), written by Petar Milosavljević, one of the most active proponents of a separate Serbian language, states that ‘the question of a national language is crucial for every people, as well as for the Serbs.’ To further emphasize the situation in which Serbian linguistics finds itself today, one should take a close look at the articles expressing similar views that came out regularly in the last couple of years. A good example is an article written by Mile Medić in *Politika*, one of the major Serbian newspapers where such texts appear regularly: ‘Jezik jeste jedan, ali srpski,

languages). The results were extremely complicated – as was expected – but the clear conclusion was that word order in Serbo-Croatian was anything but *free*.

¹¹⁵ The situation with Serbian linguistics, also known as serbistics (*srbistika*), is on such a level that some members of the Department of General Linguistics of the Faculty of Philology in Belgrade call the linguists dealing with the Serbian language – *museum guides*, referring to their obstinate insistence on enforcing the language spoken hundreds of years ago. Indeed, Serbian linguistics does have a lot of rather questionable instances. One of my personal favorites is Stevanović’s version of the imperative of the verbs such as ‘preprodati’ – *preprodaji*. This word, simply, does not exist in the language. One needs to have in mind that this is not just a standard discrepancy between the written/prescribed language and the vernacular, the word form *preprodaji* just *does not exist*.

¹¹⁶ The seemingly only Serbian linguist who is aware of the situation in Serbian prosody is Vlado Đukanović.

jeste jedinstven, ali ne i hrvatski, jeste zajednički, ali samo po upotrebi, no nikako ne i po pripadnosti i poreklu¹¹⁷.' The quote, fascinating for a native speaker of the language, is essentially untranslatable; it reminds one of a non-native speaker trying to formulate a complex construction but failing badly (there are other instances like this one). The meaning that was supposed to be conveyed (I presume) is that the Serbian language is unique, while Croatian is not. I can only try to translate it word by word: 'The language is one, but Serbian, it is unique, but not Croatian as well, it is used by both sides, but only by its use, yet by no means by belonging and origin'. I call the reader's attention to the fact that the translation cannot be (and must not be) 'better' than the original, though I am afraid that only those with genuine knowledge of Serbo-Croatian can fully comprehend how nonsensical the sentence above actually is. I even tried to give the original all the benefit of the doubt by trying to make heads or tails out of it, as a native speaker of Serbo-Croatian, but without success. It is extremely important to realize that it is the people such as the author of the sentence above who are the ones representing 'Serbian' as a separate language.

Essentially, the view of the Serbian linguists that the language at hand is *one* has changed only in terms of naming, due to a change in political ideology. While it was once politically correct and officially accepted to call it *Serbo-Croatian*, it is politically correct now to call it *Serbian*, although it is still considered to be one language, but under a different name. According to authors such as Dragoljub Petrović and Petar Milosavljević, 'Croatian, Bosniak and Montenegrin represent *versions of the Serbian language* [my italics, S. JJ]'. The 'Serbian language' is now presented as the *prime language*, an 'over-dialectal' variant. The reasons, once again, are entirely political, fueled by nationalism. If we take a look at the decision of the European Parliament to accept Bosniak as a separate language, we shall see as well that this is viewed by Petrović (and many others) as something that 'leads to the dismemberment of the Serbian language, and consequentially, to the dismemberment of the Serbian people¹¹⁸.' Note that he does not claim that the separation of the 'Bosniak' language is not backed up by linguistic facts; his prime concern is the 'dismemberment of the Serbian people'.

In 2006, fourteen Serbian philologists and writers created a manifesto entitled the 'Word about the Serbian Language' (*Slovo¹¹⁹ o sprskom jeziku*), with the goal that

¹¹⁷ Mile Medić, 'Naši i njihovi jezici', *Politika*, 22 July 2006.

¹¹⁸ Dragoljub Petrović, 'Rasparčavanje jezika' in *Politika*, December 2nd 2006.

¹¹⁹ The word *slovo* in Serbo-Croatian means 'letter' (as a grapheme, not a form of correspondence). In most of the other Slavic languages, such as Russian or Czech, *slovo* still

(...) Serbs should get rid of Štrossmajer's (Croatian) idea of yugoslavianism and of [Vatroslav] Jagić's idea of Serbo-croatistics; that they should go back to their slavistic and serbistic roots, first of all, to the opinions of the main representative of serbistics, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić. According to this philological orientation, Serbs are objectively, as are other peoples of Europe, defined by their language and, like other peoples of Europe, Serbs are a people with multiple religions. According to those opinions, the Serbian language and the Serbian people cannot be disassembled by the whim of others, as other peoples of Europe do not disassemble on the basis of religion and region¹²⁰.

The paragraph above, taken from an article in *Politika* written by Milosavljević, begs for a detailed deconstruction. First of all, if something is *in accordance with an orientation*, it is by definition *subjective*, not objective. Secondly, the peoples of Europe are *not* defined by their language (lest Austrians, as a German-speaking people, cease to exist). Furthermore, what somebody's religion has to do with language remains unknown. Overall, there is no trace of linguistics in the quote above. Milosavljević wrote the article as a response to the decisions made by the Board for the Standardization of the Serbian Language (*Odbor za standardizaciju srpskog jezika*), which had officially accepted 'Croatian' and 'Bosnian' as languages separate from Serbian. As already noted, Milosavljević's concerns are by no means linguistic in origin, as he is only afraid for the 'disassembling of Serbs' and the 'Serbian language'.

Thus, in present day Serbia, there are three 'schools of thought' about the language spoken in the country, namely:

- 1) that the language in question is *Serbo-Croatian*; this is the least popular option supported by the smallest number of linguists;
- 2) that the language is *Serbian*, with the *separate existence from Bosnian and Croatian*. Note that this differs from option number three, which insists
- 3) that the *Serbian* language is a separate language as well, but classifying Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin as *versions* of the Serbian language. According to this 'school of thought', Serbian is the prime language, 'above' all others.

means what it had meant in Old Slavic – 'word'. Thus, those who are trying to prove that the Serbian language is the one-above-all are often using archaic and/or Russian words, in accordance to their general nationalistic orientation in which tradition plays an immense role, as well as a strong feeling of closeness with Russia.

¹²⁰ Petar Milosavljević, 'Lojalnost Dejtonskom Sporazumu' in *Politika*, November 11th 2006.

The emergence of the notion of the Montenegrin language

A rather recent event in the linguistic timeframe, the emergence of the so-called Montenegrin language, has roused some controversy. Approximately one fifth of the citizens of Montenegro are nowadays declaring themselves as speakers of Montenegrin (the population of Montenegro is around 700,000 people). Several academicians from Podgorica have actually come forth with an agenda of making Montenegrin official, with Vojislav Nikčević as one of the most active proponents of the idea of the ‘Montenegrin’ language. The reasons are primarily politic in origin; Miodrag Vuković, a member of the Democrat Party of Socialists (a Montenegrin political party), stated that the Constitution of Montenegro should be written in ‘Montenegrin’:

A member of the Democrat Party of Socialists, Miodrag Vuković, said yesterday that in the Constitution of the independent republic of Montenegro, instead of the current Serbian, the Montenegrin language should stand as official. Vuković added that the Constitution should enable all national communities to use their own language. The introduction of Montenegrin as an official language has recently been initiated by the vice-president of the Parliament, Dragan Kujović, as well. *The question of language is political, and it is defined not according to the peoples, but according to the state* [my italics, S.J.]¹²¹.

Vuković and Kujović, as politicians, are entitled to mouthing political statements. The Parliament of Montenegro, also, can declare the language spoken in Montenegro a different language, but will this make the language different? Giving a language a different name does not make it different. Whether a language spoken by different linguistic communities is one and the same depends on the language(s), not on a political edict. If a language were to be named after the state, what would become of Belgium, Austria, Switzerland?

The basis on which these people claim that Montenegrin is a separate language is their belief that Montenegrin possesses several distinct phonemes, separating the language from Serbo-Croatian. The alleged phonemes are as follows:

¹²¹ V. Radenović, ‘Brišu srpski iz ustava’, *Politika*, 30 June 2006.

/ç/, as pronounced in *sjutra* (tomorrow), where the /s/ and /j/, spoken together quickly, form the sound /ç/, as the Polish ‘ś’ or the Russian ‘щ’, the former of which is essentially the same graph proposed to be used in Montenegrin.

/ǰ/, as it is in loanwords such as *brondža*, occurs as well with the quick pronunciation of /d/, followed by /z/.

/ʒ/ - the joining of /z/ and /j/ results in a soft /ʒ/, such as in the word *izjelica*. Again, this only happens when pronounced quickly, often among the poorly educated. It is interesting that the *izjelica* example is the only one given by proponents of a separate Montenegrin language, as well as the *brondža* example for the allophone /ǰ/.

The basis on which the claims for those sounds to be *phonemes* are almost entirely fictional, as those are but *allophones*, presenting the speaker with no semantic distinction whatsoever. Pronunciation with the three sounds presented above is furthermore encountered only in Montenegrin rural communities and mostly by not very educated people, or by Montenegrin nationalists who are trying to make a separate language out of Montenegrin. Essentially, the best parallel that I can make would be as if someone were to insist on Cockney becoming a language separate from English. It is, thus, a *sociolect*, not even a dialect, let alone a language of its own.

Second in the list of claims to support a separate Montenegrin language is the *ijekavica*. The proponents of Montenegrin are trying to force an extreme ‘ijekavization’ onto the newly forming language. I have personally been dumbfounded to hear the word *tema* (theme), pronounced as *tijema* on the Montenegro state television. We need to have in mind that whether the word is going to have the remnants of the Old Slavic ‘jat’ (ě) is entirely dependant on whether *jat* existed in the word in the first place; one cannot just push *jats* into every word where one deems it to fit in order to artificially create a language. The extreme radicalism that is present here is perhaps best seen in the efforts to pronounce the genitive singular of the adjective *beautiful* (*lep*, genitive *lepib*) with a *double* ijekavization, so that the final product is *lijepijeh*. Hyper-iotation is one of the other attempts to create Montenegrin. Words like *djed*, *djevojka* and so on are now represented as *ǎed* and *ǎevojka* respectively, insisting on an extreme version of iotation. The extremism in general goes as far as to place ‘Serbian’ as a ‘foreign language’ at the Institute for Foreign Languages in Podgorica (sic!).

The prime reasons behind the attempts to create a Montenegrin language, separate from Serbo-Croatian, are entirely political and have nothing to do with

linguistics, the same as the situation with Croatia and Croatian, Serbia and Serbian. What's more, the 'differences' between 'Serbian' and 'Montenegrin' are even fewer than those between 'Croatian' and 'Serbian'; they correspond to the differences in individual idiolects, that is, they are extremely small and utterly irrelevant. What is interesting is that even the Serbia-based opposition to the introduction of Montenegrin is political and nationalistic. Mihailo Šćepanović (from Serbia) calls the creation of Montenegrin 'genocide of the Serbian language'; he does not mention at all that there are no valid linguistic reasons to call Montenegrin a language different from Serbian.

Drago Ćupić explains why people would choose to desperately try to present their language as separate from Serbo-Croatian from a political/culturological standpoint:

Even though Austria had been the building stone of the great empire of Austria-Hungary, it never came to the idea to 'take away' a part of the German language from the Germans and proclaim it to be Austrian. It simply paid respect to linguistic laws: the language is structurally, typologically and genetically German and there is no reason to change its name and 'adapt' it to the name of the state and the people. The Austrians had much more right than the majority of the new European states and nations to proclaim an Austrian nation, but what do they need that for when they belong to the great German nation, what do they need 'Austrian' for when they have been calling it German for centuries. They are a great people (not in numbers), with a magnificent historical past, and both in a state-creating and a national way – they have lived their life to the fullest. There is no selfishness there in a national and linguistic sense, like that of the small nations, where it is not rare to ask the national question and the issue of the language as a fateful one, with the emphasizing its 'separateness' and 'self-importance', even if it is 'imported' via foreign influences¹²².

Even the Montenegrin population has a majority of people who call their language Serbian, according to recent polls:¹²³

Serbian	401.382
Montenegrin	144.838
Albanian	49.456
Bosniak	29.380
Croatian	3076
Gypsie	2857

¹²² Milutin Tijanić, 'Prevođenje srpskog jezika u montenigerse', *Ogledalo*, 20 December 2006.

¹²³ http://www.plav.net/zavicaj/popis_2003.htm

Other 3,26 %

All in all, the emerging of the Montenegrin language is as well but one instance of politics and nationalism taking over linguistics.

Croatian purism

The largest difference in the efforts of most Croatian linguists and in the policy of the Croatian government, after the breakup of Yugoslavia and the dominance of Vatroslav Jagić's policy of Serbo-Croatian, was to desperately try to present Croatian as a language that is, and has always been, separate from Serbian. In Croatia, it is not so important to impose Croatian as a language 'above' Serbian; the principal idea is to, by all the necessary means, present Croatian something that is, simply said, *not Serbian*. I do not even need to mention the fact that a native speaker of 'Croatian' can perfectly understand a native speaker of 'Serbian' the way two persons whose native 'languages' are American English and British English respectively can understand each other with no difficulties. When the differences found were small, they were *enhanced*, and when they did not exist, they were *invented*. This was done on a number of levels.

The first level was the *lexical* level. By use of purisms and artificially constructed words, most of the words of foreign origin were first labeled as 'Serbian' and afterwards expunged, so that newly formed, 'Croatian' words, could replace them. Similar efforts had already been done during World War II, when Croatia joined forces with the Axis as a puppet state. The recent efforts of Croatian linguistics are essentially the same. Ante Pavelić, who had been leading Croatia during World War II, had signed an official order in 1941 that forced 'foreign' words out of the language, replacing them with 'Croatian' neologisms. The most notable of those fascinating instances are 'zrakoplov' – airplane (literally: *air-swimmer*) and 'zrakomlat' – helicopter, the literal meaning being *air-puncher*¹²⁴ (*sic!*).

¹²⁴ This reminds me vividly of the language purism in Iceland where almost all foreign words have been, so to say, 'translated' (not even calqued), in order to be made 'more Icelandic'. Thus, a microscope became 'smásjá' (small-see), a surgeon became 'skurðleiknir' (cut-doctor) and the cello was made a 'hnefiðla' – a knee-fiddle.

There are other examples of real lexical differences (that is, not invented, such as the Croatian word *cesta* – road, which is in Serbian *put*. There are maybe several dozens of such instances, most of them stemming from the Czech language), but the speakers in both Serbia and Croatia know both words and are perfectly aware of their meaning.

/tʃ/ and /tʃ̣/

One of the actual, existing instances that separate a potential Croatian language from Serbian is on the phonetic level, represented by the difference between the pronunciation of /tʃ/ and /tʃ̣/, written respectively ‘č’ and ‘č̣’. While in Serbian, the two are still (in most cases) pronounced as separate sounds, in the Croatian variety they have merged into something in between, like the sound represented in Czech by ‘č’, or the Russian ‘ч’. Naturally, that is not even near enough to make Croatian a separate language. Even in the Serbian variant, the number of minimal pairs that represent /tʃ/ and /tʃ̣/ as phonemes is negligible, and it is reasonable to expect that the difference will disappear in Serbia as well in the next hundred or so years. The fact that even the IPA does not possess the means to distinguish the variant in between speaks for itself alone. Should this pose as a separating factor between the ‘two languages’, the very difference in British English and American English pronunciation of ‘can’t’ (/k^hɑ:nt/ and /k^hæ:nt/ respectively) would be more than enough to name those two as separate languages. All in all, linguistic nationalistic extremism in Croatia goes rather far as well. The *Pravopisni priručnik hrvatskoga ili srpskoga jezika* (1986, 1987, 1990) has in its latest edition changed its name to *Pravopisni priručnik hrvatskoga jezika*, while the content remained identical, an instance that speaks for itself.

Bosnian/Bosniak/Muslim?

What is most probably not widely known is that the Bosnian/Bosniak/Muslim nationality (yes, a Muslim *nationality*) is relatively new in origin. Before 1990s and the total breakup of Yugoslavia, Bosnia (and Herzegovina) was populated by Croats and Serbs; there were no ‘Bosnians’, ‘Bosniaks’ or ‘Muslims’. After the excessive insistence on the difference in nationalities from and after 1990s, it suddenly became important to know whose nationality was which¹²⁵. Those nationalities were reinforced by the difference in religion: Croats were mostly Catholic and Serbs were mostly Orthodox, meaning that the group of people in Bosnia who had Islam as their religion, whether Serb or Croat (or whatever else) by ethnic origin, found themselves suddenly dissimilar, out of phase with the rest of their world in which both nationality and religion abruptly became the prime defining factors of a person’s ‘identity’; consequently, they transferred their religion into a nationality. At first, they were calling themselves ‘Muslim’ by nationality and ‘muslim’ by religion, the only differentiating factor being in writing, namely the capital letter for the nationality and the small cap for the religion (according to the linguistic rules of the then common language, Serbo-Croatian). The first nationality in the world based entirely on religion has thus been formed. Shortly afterwards, the Muslims from Bosnia received the name ‘Bosniaks’. The difference between ‘Bosnian’ and ‘Bosniak’ was, presumably, the difference between a person *from* Bosnia (the former) and a Muslim (capital ‘M’, the latter). The phenomenon of a ‘Bosniak/Bosnian’ language was soon to follow, as the newly emerging Bosniak community needed something more to identify with.

The only real difference that makes ‘Bosnian’ different from the rest of the language variants I am discussing in this essay is almost entirely lexical and suprasegmental – one of the defining factors of a *dialect*. If Bosnian were to be proclaimed a language, German should be split in literally *dozens* of languages, from Beyrisch, Sleswickian, Westphalian and East Frisian to Thuringian, Upper Saxon and Alsatian. Both lexically, morphologically as well as grammatically, Bosnian stands between those variants of the Serbo-Croatian language known as Serbian and Croatian, the difference even between those two latter variants being rather diminutive. Similarly, the characteristically sounding Torlak dialect of Serbia has much more reasonable claims to make it a separate language, the only difference being that there is no Torlak state.

¹²⁵ Stef Jansen’s book ‘Antinationalism’ describes this phenomenon quite well. See: Jansen, Stef. *Antinacionalizam etnografija otpora u Beogradu i Zagrebu*. Biblioteka XX vek, 152. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 2005.

The attitude of the Serb linguists towards Bosnian/Bosniak is, as expected, a negative one. 99.9 per cent of the muslims/Muslims in the Prijepolje district of Bosnia has declared themselves as speakers of 'Bosnian' in the 2002 census¹²⁶. The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts found it necessary to change that name into 'Bosniak' with the explanation that such a name of the language is in accordance to the newly formed nation of Bosniaks, while some authors insisted that the Academy's acceptance of the Bosnian language was a 'betrayal' of Serbia and Serbian, as I have already mentioned.

Short comparative analysis

All politics put aside, I would like to make a short comparative analysis of the alleged 'separate' Croatian, Bosnian, Montenegrin and Serbian 'languages', in order to approach the matter from a clear linguistic point of view. I shall use the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, translated into all of the 'languages' above. The official translations can be found at the web address of the UNHCHR¹²⁷. The only language that could not be found on the website is Montenegrin.

English: Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood

Croatian: Članak 1. Sva ljudska bića raćaju se slobodna i jednaka u dostojanstvu i pravima. Ona su obdarena razumom i sviješću i treba da jedno prema drugome postupaju u duhu bratstva..

Bosnian: Član 1. Sva ljudska bića rađaju se slobodna i jednaka u dostojanstvu i pravima. Ona su obdarena razumom i sviješću i treba da jedno prema drugome postupaju u duhu bratstva.

Serbian: Član 1. Sva ljudska bića radjaju se slobodna i jednaka u dostojanstvu i pravima. Ona su obdarena razumom i svešću i treba jedni prema drugima da postupaju u duhu bratstva.

¹²⁶ D. Gagričić, 'Otkud bošnjački?', *Vječernje Novosti*, 31 March 2006.

¹²⁷ <http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/navigate/alpha.htm>

There is nothing more that essentially needs to be said. The ‘differences’ above speak for themselves. There is one slip-up, though, in the Croatian version, where the word ‘rađaju’ (are born) is written wrongly ‘raćaju’. The seemingly different versions of the same word in Bosnian and Serbian (*rađaju* and *rađaju*) actually do not differ at all, as the sound /**ɟ**/ can both be represented either by 'đ' or by 'dj'. Taking into consideration the translations above, statements such as those uttered, for instance, by the Croatian linguist Miro Kačić's, make extremely interesting material for analysis. In spite of all the facts, he claims that the idea of Serbian and Croatian are one language is a 'misconception':

(...) I have tried to present some of the fundamental delusions and distortions which have brought about the misconception, which is still present in world linguistics today, that Croatian and Serbian are one language. I have shown that Croatian and Serbian differ to a greater or lesser degree on all levels. These differences exist on the following ones:

The level of literary language. There are two traditions of writing which are temporally and spatially separated due to the different historical, cultural and literary development of the two nations.

The level of standard language. The two traditions of linguistic codification are completely disparate. The period of Croato-Serbian normative convergence, from the time of Croatian "Vukovians" to the imposed unification of these two languages in the former Yugoslavia, is only an interval in the development of the Croatian linguistic norm. As a turning point, this period was atypical with respect to three centuries of this development.

The level of genetic relatedness. Croatian is based on three macrodialects, while Serbian is dominated by a single macrodialect. The interference between three Croatian dialects which provided the basis for Croatian writing and literature has uninterruptedly existed for centuries as a formative force in the codification of standard Croatian.

The typological level. Differences exist on all levels of the linguistic system: phonetic/phonological, accentual, morphologic, word-formational, syntactic, semantic-pragmatic and lexical. Linguistic systems which differ on all these levels cannot be one language¹²⁸.

¹²⁸ Miro Kačić, 'Croatian and Serbian: Delusions and Distortions', Novi Most, Zagreb, 1997.

What is common for the largest number of linguists in both Serbia and Croatia is their obstinate insistence on the very idea of Serbo-Croatian being wrong and on Serbian and Croatian being indeed separate languages. The lengths to which these authors will go to try to represent the situation as such are great. Miro Kačić's text above shows how the author desperately tries to divide Croatian from Serbian. He goes so far as to try to represent nonexistent differences on a 'phonetic/phonological, accentual, morphologic, word-formational, syntactic, semantic-pragmatic and lexical' level. Let us take a brief look at the situation here, only at Kačić's 'typological' level.

- a) *The phonetic level.* The only actual difference is the already explained difference in pronunciation of /tʃ/ and /tʃ̣/, quite far from being a separating factor, especially having in mind that a similar merging of consonants is ever so slowly happening in Serbia as well.
- b) *Accent.* It is correct that there are numerous accentual differences in Serbo-Croatian, yet those differences exist between separate variants and dialects of Serbian as much as Croatian.
- c) *Morphology.* There is simply no difference between Serbian and Croatian morphology.
- d) *Word-formation.* Still no difference, except for the intentional creation of Croatian neologisms such as the absurd instance of the 'air-puncher'.
- e) *Syntax.* The only difference is the one in the construction of sentences such as 'I want to do it', which will in Serbian, in most but not all of the cases be 'želim to da uradim', while in Croatian it would be 'želim to uraditi'.
- f) *The semantic-pragmatic level.* No difference whatsoever.
- g) *The lexical level.* Still, the only notable differences are Croatian neologisms, with the addition of the fact that, in a language, that is, in a dialectal continuum, it is quite normal for some areas to use a slightly different choice of lexical material.

As seen, most of Kačić's statements are simply false. A similar situation exists in Serbia, where the only difference is in the Serbian nationalistic-oriented linguistic core insists not only on the separate existence of the two languages, but also on the 'fact' that Serbian is the 'best' language, the one-above-all-others. Miloš Kovačević (from Serbia) believes that 'serbo-croatistics came into existence first of all as a negation of Vuk's

serbistics¹²⁹. Mile Medić even claims that the idea of Serbo-Croatian was in essence a Croatian idea, so that ‘they could steal Serbian folk poetry from Serbs, (...) probably because in it, they could follow the Serb tradition of the Nemanjićs¹³⁰ [a Serb royal dynasty from the thirteenth century]’. Similar paranoid ideas can be found in the texts of Dragoljub Petrović, who even claims that

(...) the Serbs, as well as the Russians, have been designated for decimation in somebody’s murky plans and the best preparation for such an endeavor is the fragmentation of their language and the destruction of their ethnic spaces¹³¹.

Note the already mentioned russophilia. A ‘middle-positioned’ point of view is taken by the Serbian linguist Predrag Piper, who is of the opinion that the language should be called Serbian, but that there is no need for the extreme ‘serbization’ that is taking place.

Branko Franolić, a Croatian linguist, devises his own method of comparison between Serbian and Croatian, which he calls ‘national standard languages’:

- a) Croatian literary tradition with Zagreb as its centre vs. Serbian literary tradition with Belgrade as its centre
- b) Roman script vs. Cyrillic script
- c) *što-ije* dialect (e.g. *nijekati, prisjesti, presjesti, bijel*) vs. *što-ē* dialect (e.g. *presesti, beo*)
- d) Croatian orthography (e.g. *past ću* "I shall fall") vs. Serbian orthography (e.g. *pašću* "I shall fall")
- e) Croatian grammatical distinctive features: phonology, morphology, word formation vs. Serbian grammatical distinctive features: phonology, morphology, word formation
- f) Words which constitute Croatian basic vocabulary vs. Words which constitute Serbian basic vocabulary:
 - krub* bread *bleb*
 - otok* island *ostrvo*
 - zrak* air *vazdub*
 - cesta* road *drum*
 - žlica* spoon *kašika*

¹²⁹ *Politika*, 8 July 2006.

¹³⁰ Mile Medić, ‘Naši i njihovi jezici’, *Politika*, 22 July 2006.

¹³¹ Dragoljub Petrović, ‘Rasparcavanje jezika je bilo’, *Politika*, 2 December 2006.

mrkva carrot *šargarepa*

kut angle *ugao*

g) Czech, *kaj* and *ča* influences vs. Church Slavonic, Russian and Greek influences

h) German loan translations (calques) (e.g. *štednjak* ‘stove’) vs. German loan words (e.g. *šporet* ‘Sparherd’)

i) Grammatical gender differences:

zvijer f. beast zver m.

glad f. hunger glad m.

fronta f. front front m.

gripa f. flu grip m.

svezak m. volume sveska f.

j) Croatian technical and scientific terminology vs. Serbian technical and scientific terminology

k) Croatian abstract vocabulary for religious and philosophical concepts vs. Serbian abstract vocabulary for religious and philosophical concepts

l) Prosodic features, stress-pattern:

čitamo we read *čitámo*

ràdovi works *rádovi*

As with Kačić’s work, I shall proceed point by point:

Ad a) It is, naturally, true that almost every country has a literary tradition based at its capitol. Though much of the Australian literary tradition is based in Australia and the British literary tradition is based in Britain, there are no such languages such as ‘British’ and ‘Australian’.

Ad b) Incorrect. The Serbian language uses *both* Cyrillic and Roman (Latin) alphabets, the Roman even gaining majority recently.

Ad c) This is true, yet the author stated himself that those are *dialects* we are discussing.

Ad d) Entirely correct.

Ad e) Already analyzed on page 13.

Ad f) This is probably the *only* real difference between the two alleged languages. Though, as I have mentioned, such lexical differences are common to dialects; the other important matter is that both Croats and Serbs *understand* the ‘other words’.

Ad g) Historically accurate¹³².

Ad h) True, yet if a couple of foreign words differing in whether they have been calqued or translated constitute separate languages, we would have tens of thousands different languages in the world.

Ad i) Though there are some differences in gender (*gripa* vs *grip* etc), Franulić here gives some utterly false data. Both *zver* and *glad* are feminine in gender as well. The Croatian word *svezak* is by no means the translational equivalent of *sveska*, as it has a different meaning.

Ad j) This relates to the forced loanwords in Croatian, already discussed.

Ad k) Same as above¹³³.

Ad l) Though only some of those differences exist, they do not exist between Serbian and Croatian, but between overlapping dialects. For example, the alleged Serbian version *čítámo* is not encountered at all in northern Serbia, but only in the south and east.

Still, in order to be fair towards Franolić, I would add that he does not seem to try to represent Serbian and Croatian as different languages, but calls them two separate ‘national standards’, which is entirely well said. It is just the validity of the claims from a) to l) that I am questioning here – *zver* and *glad* are simply feminine in gender (*ta zver, ta glad*).

Other names

¹³² Wayles Brown and Theresa Alt have noticed that '[t]he nineteenth-century Illyrian movement Croatianized many words from Czech, which had had several decades of experience in finding equivalents for German and general European items: *okolnost* 'circumstance', *naslov* 'title', *pregled* 'survey' (from Czech *přehled* by "undoing" the Czech palatalization of r and the Czech change g > h). Some, including these three, then spread to Serbia and Bosnia.' Quoted from: Wayles Brown and Theresa Alt: *A Handbook of Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian* (SEELRC, 2004).

¹³³ 'Orthodox religious and abstract vocabulary, if not directly from Greek, is Church Slavonic, often translating a Greek word literally: *prorok* 'prophet' calquing Greek *prophētēs*, *učenik* 'disciple', later 'pupil', *sav(ij)est* 'conscience', *sveštenik* 'priest'. As Ivić (Brozović and Ivić 1988, 44) observes, Croatian vocabulary shares some of these religious Grecisms and Slavonicisms (*idol*, *prorok*, *učenik*), thanks to the Glagolitic writers' wide use of Church Slavonic, and also has many Latinisms (*brevijar* 'breviary') and domestic coinages (*svećenik*).' Quoted from: Wayles Brown and Theresa Alt: *A Handbook of Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian* (SEELRC, 2004).

Bokros/Bocros/BKS/BCS. The International Criminal Tribunal for the crimes in former Yugoslavia¹³⁴ has been rather pragmatic on the matter. Probably realizing that the bare costs for ‘translation’ between Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian would be immense – not to mention ridiculous – a practical solution was implemented and the language started to be called Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, or *Bocros* in the vernacular. One has to wonder why Montenegrin is not included.

Being a political institution of high power and influence, the Hague Tribunal is expected to be ‘politically correct’ which, I suspect, justifies the inclusion of Bosnian into the name. Yet this is just another example of non-linguistic influence on linguistic matters. As the European Parliament accepted ‘Bosnian’ as a separate language, so did the Tribunal give legitimacy to the crude blend of ‘Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian’. Neither the members of the Parliament nor of the Tribunal are experts in matters of linguistic nature, and thus, further confusion was brought to the matter.

Novoshtokavian. Sandor Pal, a linguist from Serbia, states that the best way to call the language at hand is *novoshtokavian*, based on the dialect of Serbo-Croatian with the largest number of people speaking it. This idea begs to be discussed, first of all, because of the very validity of the existence of the so-called *shtokavian dialect*. There are supposedly three major dialects in Serbo-Croatian, *štokavski*, *čakavski* and *kajkavski*, all named after the question word ‘why’ (*što*, *kaj* and *ča* respectively). I have two major complaints against this very categorization. First of all, nobody in the world classifies a dialect according to one word only, no matter how common the word is. The Czech and Polish languages are not *čokavian* languages, nor is German a *wasavian* language and Chinese a *shenmeavian* language. Second, in the whole of Serbia, there is almost no one who uses the word *što* in the meaning ‘what’ – it means ‘why’; the word ‘what’ translated to Serbo-Croatian is *šta*. By using the term *novoshtokavian* (*novoštokavski*), not only are the *ča*-dialect and the *kaj*-dialect (spoken only in Croatia) excluded by the use of the name *novoshtokavian*, but the whole country of Serbia as well remains excluded, as almost nobody uses the word *što* in the meaning of ‘why’. Whatever *shtokavian* is supposed to be, it does not even exist in Serbia. It has recently become popular in Italian slavistic circles.

Yugoslavian. When used, which is not very often, this name can be uttered mostly by people who do not know the name of the language spoken in Yugoslavia but thought that the language spoken by Yugoslavs was called Yugoslavian. This term is encountered mostly by non-Yugoslavs, that is, people who did not live in former

¹³⁴ <http://www.un.org/icty/>

Yugoslavia, yet knew about the existence of the country and thus presume that a language with the same name exists. A similar mistake would be one's idea that languages such as Belgian or Austrian exist, based on the knowledge of the existence of the state.

South-Slavic. Some linguists claim that the language at hand is South Slavic, as it was used by most of the South Slavs. Still, Slovenian, Macedonian and Bulgarian are South Slavic languages as well, so this option is not viable as a valid linguistic solution.

Mother tongue. This was the draconian solution of some high schools in Montenegro when they were confronted by two opposing sides, one insisting that the language should be called Serbian, and the other Montenegrin. Since some teachers had actually been fired because they taught the language called Serbian, some of them started stating that they were teaching the 'Mother tongue' – it was left to the students to interpret their 'Mother tongue' as they choose fit.

The criteria for defining a language. The dialect continuum.

There are numerous opinions and points of view on how to actually define a language, in this case, how to separate a dialect from a language. 'A language is a dialect with an army and a navy' was the immortal utterance attributed to Max Weinreich, and it seems that it is quite true in the cases of potential 'separate' languages such as Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian and Montenegrin, as the languages match the borders of the states using them. As a new state springs into existence, it is only a matter of time when it shall be 'awarded' the status of a separate language. The emergence of Montenegrin coincides with Montenegro's abandoning the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, while Bosnian came into existence exactly when the state of Bosnia did, during the wars in the 1990s. Still, I am of the view that linguistic matters are to be sorted out by linguists, and not politicians, let alone by linguistic laypeople. There is a strong lobby that asks the following though: if there are hundreds of thousands of people that are calling their mother tongue in a certain way, how can they be wrong? If there is some (approximately) hundred thousand of people in Montenegro insisting that their language should be called Montenegrin, who are we to tell them not to? This argument, still, suffers from the *ad populum* defect – if a vast number of people claims something, it simply does not mean

that the truth is on their side. The one and only criterion of separation between dialects and the differentiation between two languages, when all else fails, is ever so simple – it is the *level of mutual understanding*.

Every language exists within a so-called ‘dialect continuum’ (it can also be said that every language actually *is* a dialect continuum, if not simply a compilation of dialects), as described in the simplest way by David Crystal in his *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language* – no need even to go into heavy linguistics. Some of those continuums are better defined, some are not; it mostly depends on the geographical area and the political situation of the area in which the language/dialect continuum is spoken. That is where the criterion of mutual understanding comes in. Almost all the speakers of ‘Serbian’, ‘Croatian’, ‘Montenegrin’ and ‘Bosnian’ can understand one another without difficulties. When I say ‘without difficulties’, it is by no means an exaggeration. Speakers of Swedish and Norwegian can communicate with one another without larger problems, but a deeper-going philosophical discussion is out of the question between the citizens of Oslo and Stockholm¹³⁵, especially when *faux-amies*¹³⁶ come into play, not to mention a person from Malmö and a person from Tromsø in the same situation. A Serb and a Croat can communicate on a deep level without any problems. Of course, every now and then, some unknown lexical unit may come up, but that is common for inter-dialectal communication. There is, essentially, no linguistic basis for the claims for Serbian, Montenegrin, Croatian and Bosnian to be separate languages; those claims are entirely political and fueled by nationalism. Franulić argues that

[s]trictly speaking, both dialect and language are relative terms and it is difficult to use purely linguistic criteria to divide up varieties of a language into distinct languages or dialects. It is because certain linguistic varieties were spoken by a politically dominant ethnic group, that this variety had become the standard language. The administrative, economic and political centralisation of the great European states has considerably modified the process of linguistic evolution of these countries. In the majority of European countries, there emerged a state language, which all the citizens were supposed to know¹³⁷.

¹³⁵ Some linguists claim that even Swedish and Norwegian are essentially one language referred to as Scandinavian, but I would say that this would plainly be pushing the limits of language differentiation to their other extreme.

¹³⁶ A wonderful example would be the meaning of the word *samlag* in Norwegian in Swedish. While it is a *company, factory* in the former language, in the latter it means *sexual intercourse*. Such *faux amies* do not even exist between Serbian and Croatian.

¹³⁷<http://web.archive.org/web/20040606041856/http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/cro/crolang.htm>.

Thus, the only logical conclusion is that the majority language spoken in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro is to be called as it had been called in the last century by linguists and Slavists – *Serbo-Croatian*. One of the rare Croatian linguists to support such a view is Ivo Pranjković, who states that

[o]n the level of standardology, Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian and even the Montenegrin language are different varieties of the same language. So, on a purely linguistic level, that is, on a genetic level, a typological level, we are talking about one language, and it needs to be said clearly.¹³⁸

Needless to say, Pranjković stands alone amongst the rest of the Croatian linguist core that vainly tries to separate Croatian as an entirely different language. The ‘difference’ between Serbian and Croatian is maybe best represented with the ‘differences’ between Moravian Czech and Bohemian Czech; naturally, nobody is even trying to make ‘Moravian’ and ‘Bohemian’ two separate languages. In Serbia, it is Slobodan Remetić, Vlado Đukanović and Egon Fekete who believe that Serbo-Croatian is, in fact, one language. Fekete realizes that those involved in the actual state of affairs ‘criticize the Serb linguists, even authorities such as A. Belić, P. Ivić and others, for accepting ‘Serbo-Croatian language’, as an artificial and nonexistent and thus leading the Serbian language to a dismemberment¹³⁹. He, furthermore, explains that “Serbo-Croatian’ does not annul ‘Serbian’, nor does it favor ‘Croatian’¹⁴⁰”, a fact not accepted by Milosavljević, Medić, Petrović and others, who are seeing the whole situation as a serious attack on ‘Serbiness’.

Politics engulfing linguistics

Almost every ‘school of thought’ that I have presented here derives its idea primarily from political ideology. As Montenegro has recently become an independent state, Montenegrin as a language came into the foré; how can it be possible for a country

¹³⁸Taken from an interview with Pranjković published in *Slobodna Dalmacija*, February 7, 2006: <http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/20060207/kultura01.asp>.

¹³⁹ Egon Fekete, ‘Samobitnost srpskog nacionalnog jezika’. *Politika*, 17 June 2006.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

to exist without a corresponding language? The fact that Australia does not have an 'Australian' language and Canada any 'Canadian' language to pair with seems not to bother the proponents of 'Montenegrin'. With the recent forming of the so-called 'Bosniak' nationality, it seemed 'politically incorrect' not to give a new nationality and a newly emerged state a corresponding language. Whichever solution is used, it seems that somebody gets 'disrespected' – Montenegro seems to lose its 'integrity' without the Montenegrin language, 'Serbia' cannot survive without the great 'Serbian' language, Croatia will lose its 'national sovereignty' and so forth.

Sandor Pal, the professor of literary connections between Hungarian and Serbian, is aware that the problem at hand is essentially *political*:

The problem of Serbian/Croatian/Bosniak/Montenegrin...language, most accurately called novoshtokavian standard, is complicated and very inspiring. Several nations are using that, linguistically speaking, one language, and the speakers themselves belong to several religions. Regardless of all that, that language, named by each nation by their own name, has two equal alphabets (Cyrillic and Latin) and two equal pronunciations (ekavian, ijekavian). *The rest is politics¹⁴¹!*

Conclusion

As I have mentioned at the beginning of the essay, the situation at hand is fascinating to the point of disbelieving. That is one reason why it cannot be solved easily; the average linguist, if uninformed about it, will simply choose not to believe that the situation is as it is. I implore anybody with doubts, once again, to approach this matter with an extremely open mind, all the time keeping in mind the culturological and essentially anthropological instances of the issue.

Conclusively, speaking from a linguistic point of view, the Serbo-Croatian language should simply be called as it had been during the last century – Serbo-Croatian, based on *linguistic analysis*; lest we start impeaching Australian or Canadian 'sovereignty' and 'national interests', creating Australian and Canadian as languages separate from English. The fact is, though, that the political lobby is always more powerful than the

¹⁴¹ B. Radić, 'Ustav u svetlu nauke', *Dani*, 15 November 2006; my italics.

scientific (in this case, linguistic), and that the ones lobbying for the separate names for Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian and Montenegrin will most probably succeed in the end, so that after a couple of centuries have passed, we shall indeed have four separate languages (if yet another part of former Yugoslavia chooses to leave, we may even see five or more 'languages' spring into existence. Torlakian? Vojvodinian maybe? Kosovar?). Still, predictions aside, the language at hand is still Serbo-Croatian, but for the simple fact that both Serbs, Croats and the newly emerged nationalities of Bosnia and Montenegro can understand each other perfectly, except maybe in the cases of extreme dialects or unwillingness to communicate.

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REVIEWS

Trljanje, pseuodoliberalizam, feminizam i mentalitet žrtve (kritički prikaz članka Jasmine Lazić 'Trljanje, pipanje i ostalo')

Srdjan Jovanović

Pre neko vreme, tekst Jasmine Lazić 'Trljanje, pipanje i ostalo' (*Vreme* broj 890), privukao je moju pažnju. Sa stanovišta kulturologa, primetio sam odista zanimljivo, mada falično, rezonovanje. Predstavio bih nekoliko kulturoloških instanci (mema) koje su sve izrazitije u Srbiji u poslednje vreme, a koje su svoj izraz našle upravo u gorepomenutom tekstu. Čuđenje izazvano time što je ovaj tekst izašao u jednom odista kvalitetnom časopisu poput *Vremena* ipak ostaje.

Tekst o kome je reč govori takozvanim 'seksualnim napasnicima', 'predatorima' i sl. u gradskom prevozu. Potpomognuto istraživanjem studenata Račete i Tanasković, slika se stiče da je sve više tzv. seksualnih predatora u gradskom saobraćaju, gde su devojke sve češće 'napastvovane'. Međutim, bazična analiza teksta (ukoliko je valjano predstavio istraživanje) govori više no što se laiku čini. Pođimo od statistike. Izgleda da je najveći broj napasnika uzrasta od 20 do 35. Uznemiravanje o kojem se govori, između ostalog, jedva da spada pod kategoriju uznemiravanja – autor navodi nepristojne poglede, dobacivanje, trljanje. Imajući u vidu da su mladi muškarci, upravo doba od 20 do 35 godina najzainteresovaniji za seksualni kontakt, a stoga i na vizuelno ispitivanje suprotnog pola, ispostavlja se da je seksualni manijak svaki mladić koji čežnjivo pogleda devojku u autobusu. Dalje, autor objašnjava kako ti manijaci 'ne odaju ni utisak ludih, ni neuračunljivih osoba,' valjda zato što su *u potpunosti normalni*. No, ima tu još – 'žene imaju dodatnu poteškoću da prepoznaju taj čin' – budući da se u jedva humanom ambijentu autobusa gradskog saobraćaja svako *trlja* o svakog, kako to može biti seksualno uznemiravanje? Shodno tome, ko god se o devojku nasloni – sasvim nevoljno – ispada manijak. Ukoliko slučajno ima mobilni telefon u džepu, eto dokaza 'seksualnoj žrtvi' da je

manijak u blizini. Ukoliko se autobus zatrese – kao što se trese, klima i klata non-stop – eto i trljanja...Sve u svemu, seksualni manijak je, čini se, bilo koja mlada, normalna osoba koja u autobusu baci pogled na obližnju lepu ili na neki način privlačnu devojkicu. Ne desilo se da promrmlja svom drugaru 'vidi kako je slatka' ili 'vidi kako ima lepe noge', što su najnormalniji komentari za osobe tih godina. Ukoliko još u gužvi prođe pored nje – i naravno, obavezno se *protrlja* o nju jer *nije moguće* proći kroz vozilo GSB-a a ne *protrljati* se o barem tuce ljudi – jedno bezazleno, najprirodnije iskustvo se pretvara u seksualno uznemiravanje. I dalji momenti analize Račete i Tanasković veoma su, u najmanju ruku, neobični. Tekst navodi da je skoro *polovina* ispitanica iskusilo seksualno uznemiravanje na neki način '*više od dva puta*' (*sic!*), dok svega *četiri posto* nije *nikada* iskusilo nikakav oblik seksualnog uznemiravanja. Ukoliko bi to bilo tačno, Srbija bi bila zemlja u kojoj seksualnih predatora ima više nego igde na zemljinoj kugli, čak toliko mnogo (96% devojaka je iskusilo seksualno uznemiravanje? *Devedeset šest posto?*) da bi do sada sigurno privuklo neverovatnu pažnju kako domaće javnosti, tako i psihologa, sociologa i antropologa iz celog sveta. Postavlja se, stoga, i pitanje šta studente uče na katedri za psihologiju Filozofskog fakulteta ukoliko se ovakva pseudoistraživanja smatraju validnim. To je, ipak, druga priča.

Ovakvo rezonovanje, pak, sa kulturološke strane, nije začuđujuće. Nazovimo ga *pseudoliberalizam*. Pod uticajem odista liberalnog društva Evrope i Amerike, u kome je – za razliku od država poput Srbije – seksualno uznemiravanje ipak surova realnost i gde postoje i legalni mehanizmi (koji *funkcionišu*) i svest o problemu u društvu, jedna izopačena slika istog liberalizma, pod uticajem feminizma (koji je, nažalost, shvaćen kao jedno od glavnih oružja liberalnog razmišljanja), dolazi do izopačenja slike samog liberalizma. Jedna 'emancipovana' devojkica/žena, shodno tome, ne sme da dozvoli da je osoba suprotnog pola ni pogleda – to je sada seksualno uznemiravanje.

Pre neku nedelju, primetio sam još jednu instancu veoma zanimljivog kulturološkog entiteta koji je bilo lako povezati sa ovom temom. Devojkica, otprilike kasnih dvadesetih, vraćala se iz jutarnje kupovine. Lako je bilo primetiti je – bila je u šest do sedam santimetara visokim štiklama, izrazito uskom i kratkom mini suknjom, sa zapanjujuće dubokim dekolteom, punom artiljerijom šminke na licu i veoma sređenom, upadljivom frizuricom. Podestimo se – vraćala se iz kupovine, negde oko devet ujutro, sa kesama punim mleka, hleba, jogurta i jaja. Čovek se jedino može zapitati da, ukoliko je tako obučena za *Maxi diskont*, kako li izgleda kada izađe uveče u grad? Lako je primetiti jednu vrstu mentaliteta kojem sve više mladih devojaka pripadaju, mentaliteta koji

primorava na izrazito preterivanje u seksualno otvorenom i u suštini napadnom maniru, od noćnih klubova u kojima se slušaju pseudomuzički entiteti poput radova poznatih kvazimuzičara kao što su Ceca Ražnatović i *Dogani*, pa sve do enormne količine splavova od kojih se nikoji ne razlikuje od onog prethodnog, na kojima je moguće naći sve veći broj neverovatno doteranih devojaka, doteranih nažalost do granica opterećenosti, a i preko granica čistog kiča i bezumnog neukusa. Isto tako obučene devojke je moguće naći i u gradskom prevozu, gde, tokom vožnje od po pola sata i više, mlada muška osoba 'stara između 20 i 35 godina', koja 'izgleda i ponaša se normalno' praktično niti može lako da izdrži a da ne *blene* u preterani kič dekolte, a ni da preleti do vrata kako bi izašao, možda se nevoljno 'trljajući' o gomilu ljudi usput, ali nipošto o jednu devojku koju bi time 'uznemirio'. Tekst Jasmine Lazić odiše feminizmom, načinom razmišljanja koji se ne razlikuje mnogo od tzv. muškog šovinizma – i jedan i drugi način rezonovanja su u suštini *šovinistički*, to jest takvi da su u potpunosti opterećeni predrasudama koje, kao i svaka predrasuda, nisu zasnovane na činjeničnom stanju stvari.

Pragmatička strana situacije takođe je u potpunosti zaboravljena u članku o kome je reč. Ukoliko je 'trljanje', kako sudeći po članku izgleda, najčešći tip 'zlostavljanja', jasno je da do toga može doći (sada govorimo pod pretpostavkom da osoba koja 'trlja' stvarno ima seksualnih namera) jedino u ekstremno velikoj gužvi, u kojoj ni do kakvih 'zadnjih namera', kako se autor izrazio, u suštini *ne može* doći. Osoba koja bi u autobusu dupke punom ljudi pokušala da odista *siluje* devojku bi najverovatnije bila izrazito neinteligentna, ako ne i ozbiljan psihijatrijski slučaj, u čijem slučaju bi najverovatnije uveliko bila hospitalizovana. Naravno, takvih slučajeva u istraživanju Račete i Tanasković nema. Da rezimiramo – preterano sređena devojka u autobusu primeti da je mladić gleda, budući da najverovatnije ima dekolte do pupka, isti mladić nešto prokomentariše svom drugaru (najverovatnije ni nemajući veze sa devojkom), u pokušaju da se progmiže do izlaza, naravno, *protrlja se* o skoro svakoga na putu, i eto seksualnog predatora.

Feminizam *nije* odlika liberalizma. Feminizam je jedan jednostrani pogled na svet koji se ni po čemu ne razlikuje od muškog šovinizma ili seksizma. U Evropu nećemo ući sa lažnim liberalizmom i izopačenim slikama pravde. Izmišljanje seksualnog napada na osobu je čak *kriminalni čin* – optužiti nekog za seksualno uznemiravanje nije mala stvar – to je stvar koja može toj osobi, koja i ako je nepravredno optužena, upropastiti život. Nije žrtva dekolte-devojka koju je muškarac pogledao ili je dodirnuo na putu do izlaza. Žrtva je *muškarac* koji je *optužen* za nešto za šta *nije kriv*. I ovo je savršena slika mentaliteta Srbije, koji na engleskom čak ima i ime – *victim mentality* (mentalitet žrtve). U knjizi bivšeg

slovačkog ambasadora u Srbiji, Miroslava Mojžite (*Belehrad – poznámky*), kao i u mnogim drugim radovima raznih autora na sličnu temu, primećuje se da je u Srbiji sasvim normalno *osećati se kao žrtva*. Drugi stupanj mentaliteta žrtve je da se čak i *počinilac* počinje osećati kao žrtva, te su uloge *obrnute*. Dok su prave žrtve u tekstu 'Trljanje...' u suštini muškarci koji ništa nisu uradili protivzakonito ili amoralno, isti tekst očajnički pokušava da predstavi pravog počinioaca – osobu koja lažno identifikuje nepostojećeg napadača – kao žrtvu. Mentalitet žrtve nije, doduše, nađen jedino u Srbiji; austrijski pisac Karl Markus Gaus je našao instance istog i u Evropi. Ipak, u Srbiji je taj mentalitet zasigurno veoma jak. Slični slučaj imamo sa Srebrenicom, gde se nacionalistički orijentisani počinioци i oni koji ih podržavaju predstavljaju kao *žrtve*. Setimo se, nadalje, internacionalnog incidenta sa *Mental Disability Rights International*, kada su mentalno onesposobljene osobe u nekim srpskim institucijama pronađene vezane za krevet, u najgorim mogućim uslovima za život. Ministar zdravlja, Tomica Milosavljević, kao i Rasim Ljajić i Vojislav Koštunica, priču su okrenuli na 'napaćene Srbe' i pitanje Kosova. Žrtve – mentalno retardirane osobe – su zaboravljene, a mentalitet žrtve je priču okrenuo naglavačke i preneo je na Srbe, većito napaćene i tlačene Srbe. Čak je i filozof Radomir Konstantinović u svojoj fenomenalnoj 'Filosofiji palanke' opisao ovaj mentalitet, sada već davne 1969: '*...i ovo osporavanje sveta opet (je) svojevrsna metoda njegove eksteriorizacije, jedinstven način za izbegavanje suočavanja ovoga duha sa samim sobom, ali i način da se subjekt objektivira (...), da se prikaže kao objekt tuđe volje, kao žrtva, na njemu izvanredno svojstven način.*'

U doba (nadamo se) dolazećeg liberalizma, ne smemo pobrkati liberalizam sa feminizmom; ne smemo *izopačiti* taj liberalizam. U Srbiji je, nažalost, mnogo raznih kulturoloških instanci odavno izopaćeno. Veliki je trud potreban, prvenstveno na polju obrazovanja, da se to izopaćenje ne proširi još više.

THE STUDENT SECTION

KRATAK PREGLED TEORIJA KRIMINALA

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Kada se kriminal, kao društveni i psihopatija, kao psihološki problem ujedine u pojavu psihopatskog kriminala, tada dolazi i do ujedinjenja oba problema u jedan veliki socijalno-psihološki problem. Ovaj rad o teorijama kriminala zasnovanim na psihopatiji prvenstveno se bavi određenjima pojmova kriminala i psihopatije, a potom predstavlja osnovne postavke samo nekih od velikog broja teorija. Lykkenova teorija razlikuje genotipski i fenotipski psihopatski kriminal, odnosno kriminalno ponašanje predisponirano genotipom i ono nastalo pod uticajem neposrednog socijalnog okruženja, prvenstveno pod uticajem porodice. Teorija socijalnog učenja kriminala pretpostavlja faktore ličnosti (sposobnosti simboliziranja, promišljanja, samoregulacije, introspekcije i vikarijske sposobnosti) i podsticaje iz sredine (primarne, senzorne, novčane, socijalne i socijalnu moć) kao uslove za pojavu psihopatskog kriminalnog ponašanja. Treća i poslednja teorija, teorija racionalnog izbora kriminala postulira tezu o kriminalnom ponašanju kao plodu racionalne kalkulacije.

Uvod

Kriminal se može odrediti kao kršenje krivičnog zakona i zakona o prekršajima ili kao kršenje drugih društvenih normi (običajnih, moralnih, socijalnih). Međutim, jedinstvena i opšteprihvaćena definicija kriminala ne postoji. Ono što je sigurno i oko čega se svi slažu jeste da je kriminal izuzetno kompleksan fenomen koji privlači kako pažnju naučnika, koji pokušavaju da ga objasne, tako i pažnju javnosti, koja je zaprepašćena i potencijalno ugrožena svakodnevnim manifestacijama njegovih najrazličitijih formi. Kriminalna raznovrsnost se kreće 'od lakših krađa, saobraćajnih prestupa, prevara, falsifikovanja, lažnog predstavljanja, ucena, korupcije, preko krađa automobila, provala, razbojništava i razbojničkih krađa, pljački, do ubistava, trgovine belim robljem i ljudskim organima, kompjuterskih prevara, trgovine i rasturanja narkotika, cigareta i deficitarne robe, pedofilije, silovanja, proizvodnje, promocije i

prodaje po zdravlje opasnih proizvoda, terorizma, špijunaže, ubistava i navođenja na samoubistva u okviru sekti, zločinačkog udruživanja i širenja zločinačkog delovanja na globalni nivo' (str. 323).

Smatra se da su najčešći počinioci kriminalnih radnji osobe sa psihopatijom. Kriminalom se bave i nepsihopatske ličnosti, ali s obzirom na to da se ovaj rad bazira na psihopatskom kriminalu, o kriminalnom ponašanju nepsihopata neće biti posebnog izlaganja.

Psihopatija se često poistovećuje sa teškim duševnim oboljenjima. Razlog tome leži u neshvatljivosti da monstruozna ubistva i silovanja može počiniti neko ko nema težak mentalni poremećaj. Kako bi se pojam psihopatija pravilno razumeo, neophodno je napraviti distinkciju između normalnosti i psihopatije i duševnih oboljenja i psihopatije.

Humanističke nauke normalnost opisuju atributima kao što su: prilagodljivost, sposobnost uspostavljanja harmoničnih odnosa sa drugima, sposobnost usklađivanja vlastitih potreba i društvenih normi, istrajnost u radu, spremnost na ulaganje većeg napora zarad ostvarivanja postavljenih ciljeva, podnošenje neuspeha bez obeshrabrenja, tolerantnost, strpljivost i poštovanje etičkih principa.

'Psihičke funkcije psihopata nisu manifestno oštećene, niti se upadljivo razlikuju od normalnih, osim u tome što za razliku od normalnih osoba, psihopate sve psihičke funkcije, prvenstveno volju i razum, podređuju dejstvu nagona. Psihopata kao i normalan čovek, razume propise i norme ponašanja koje društvo nameće. On shvata i značaj njihovog poštovanja, ali se i pored toga, za razliku od normalnih, ne trudi da svoje ponašanje uskladi sa interesima društva' (str. 78).

Šta je to što psihopatiju razlikuje od duševnih poremećaja? Neurotičare karakterišu svest o tegobama koje imaju, anksioznost i umanjena sposobnost za doživljavanje ljubavi, dok su psihopate nesvesni svojih tegoba, nisu anksiozni i nemaju strah onda kada je normalno da se on pojavi, a sposobnost za doživljavanje ljubavi im je drastično umanjena. Psihotičari imaju ozbiljne poremećaje psihičkih funkcija mišljenja, pamćenja, pažnje, opažanja, volje, nagona, što se ne može dijagnostikovati kod psihopatskih poremećaja ličnosti. Narcističke osobe, suprotno psihopatskim, nisu sklone obmanjivanju, impulsivnosti i agresivnosti, imaju potrebu da ih drugi obožavaju i vole, nemaju poremećaj ponašanja manifestovan tokom detinjstva niti se kriminalno ponašaju u zrelim godinama. Osobe sa histrioničnim i graničnim poremećajem ličnosti jesu manipulativne, kao i one sa psihopatijom, ali motivi za manipulisanjem ih razlikuju.

Psihopate su manipulativne kako bi stekle novac, moć ili neku drugu korist, dok su ove druge manipulativne radi sticanja pažnje okoline.

Bitno je naglasiti da se kod psihopata sreću odlike koje postoje i kod normalnih osoba, ali su one drugačijeg stepena izraženosti. Stoga i razlike između psihopatskih i nepsihopatskih kriminalaca počivaju na različitom intenzitetu ispoljavanja pojedinih osobina ličnosti i intelektualnih sposobnosti, a ne na nekom idiosinkratičkom svojstvu koje je karakteristično samo za psihopatske ili samo za nepsihopatske kriminalce.

Psihopatski kriminal je veliki psihološki i društveni problem. Poznavanje karakteristika rasprostranjenog socijalno razornog uticaja antisocijalnog poremećaja ličnosti u međuljudskim odnosima je od izuzetnog značaja, između ostalog, i za socijalnu psihologiju.

1. Lykkenova teorija kriminala

Nedostatak normalne reakcije straha je, po Lykkenu, osnovna predispozicija za kriminal. Ta predispozicija je urođena, pa je treba uvrstiti u genotipsku psihopatiju. Međutim, mali deo populacije se rađa sa psihopatskim tendencijama. Stoga se nagli porast psihopatskog kriminala može objasniti na osnovu fenotipske psihopatije formirane u procesu socijalizacije¹⁴² koja se, za razliku od genotipske, odlikuje evidentnom anksioznošću.

Odsustvo oca i nekompetentno roditeljstvo su uzročnici fenotipske psihopatije. Muška deca odgajana bez oca, koji ima izuzetno relevantnu, takoreći nezamenljivu, ulogu u obezbeđivanju autoriteta i modela za identifikaciju, izložena su riziku da postanu fenotipski psihopatski kriminalci. Kriminalno ponašanje socijalizacijski formiranih psihopata može biti i posledica nekompetentnosti roditelja u obavljanju roditeljske uloge. 'Lykken veruje da se čak i genotipski predisponirana deca za vršenje krivičnih dela, uz veću roditeljsku praksu, mogu preusmeriti u socijalno poželjnom pravcu' (str. 275). U cilju sprečavanja psihopatskog kriminala neophodno je da društvo sistematski pristupi poboljšanju socijalnih i vaspitnih veština roditelja.

¹⁴² Lykken predlaže da se za fenotipsku psihopatiju koristi termin sociopatija, budući da je ona produkt negativne i neadekvatne socijalizacije' (str. 275).

Nepotpuna porodica i nekompetentno roditeljstvo nisu jedini izvori fenotipske psihopatije i kriminala. I vršnjaci sa psihopatskim ponašanjem (bilo genotipskim ili fenotipskim) mogu uticati na pojavu i razvoj antisocijalnog i kriminalnog ponašanja.

Lykken je izneo svoje gledište o povezanosti dva različita psihopatska sindroma sa genetičkim činiocima i sa roditeljstvom (str. 277). Kao što je već rečeno, manji je broj onih sa genotipskom psihopatijom, odnosno sa genotipom teškim za socijalizaciju, a malo je i onih sa genotipom lakim za socijalizaciju. Najbrojniji su oni sa prosečnim genotipom, tj. prosečnim potencijalom za socijalizaciju. Deca sa temperamentom teškim za socijalizaciju, koga karakterišu nedostatak normalne reakcije straha, impulsivnost, agresivnost, ne moraju postati psihopate ukoliko su njihovi roditelji izuzetno vešti u obavljanju svoje roditeljske funkcije. Neagresivna, pažljiva i promišljena deca, deca laka za socijalizaciju, mogu postati socijalizovana i uprkos nekompetentnosti njihovih roditelja. Prosečan potencijal za socijalizaciju može biti usmeren u pozitivnom ili negativnom pravcu isključivo u zavisnosti od roditeljske kompetencije. Ako su roditelji vešti u roditeljstvu, dete će se okrenuti socijalno prihvatljivom ponašanju, konformiraće se opšteprihvaćenim društvenim normama, a ako nisu, verovatno će postati fenotipski psihopata, što ne može sprečiti bilo koji drugi oblik neposrednog socijalnog okruženja, jer se roditeljska neadekvatnost ne može kompenzovati.

‘Učestalost fenotipske psihopatije u savremenom društvu mnogo je veća nego u prošlosti ili u tradicionalnim kulturama. Kako se okolnosti podizanja dece sve više udaljavaju od onih na koje je naša vrsta evoluciono adaptirana (a koje su išle u pravcu prihvatanja socijalno poželjnog ponašanja i konformiranja društvenim normama, saradnje, zajedništva, visokog vrednovanja rada, odgovornosti, saosećanja i sl), može se sa sve većom učestalošću očekivati da ubuduće bude sve više fenotipske psihopatije, a samim tim i kriminala’ (str. 278-279).

Pored psiholoških, Lykken naglašava i kulturne faktore koji utiču na pojavu psihopatskog kriminala. Suprotno Americi, koja umesto kolektivne neguje individualističku kulturu, u Japanu je uočena mala frekvencija psihopatije i niska stopa kriminala. To se objašnjava postojanjem očuvanih porodičnih veza, zanimanjem za dobrobit zajednice, stavljanjem individualnih potreba u drugi plan, što je antagonističko individualističkoj kulturi i psihopatskom životnom stilu (str. 237-241).

2. Teorija socijalnog učenja kriminala

Ova teorija pripisuje racionalnost kako kriminalnom ponašanju uopšte, tako i kriminalnom ponašanju psihopata. Kriminalno ponašanje psihopata je, prema Banduri, povezano sa kognitivnim i drugim faktorima njihove ličnosti i sa spoljašnjim stimulusima.

Ličnost psihopatskih kriminalaca se može sagledati kroz njihove sposobnosti simboliziranja, promišljanja, samoregulacije, introspekcije i vikarijske sposobnosti.

‘Psihopate nemaju u dovoljnoj meri razvijenu sposobnost korišćenja verbalnih simbola, a pored toga, odluke donose bazirajući svoja suđenja na pogrešno protumačenim događajima i pogrešnim koncepcijama’ (str. 289).¹⁴³

Ponašanje je uglavnom svrhovito i ne predstavlja neodložnu reakciju na podsticaje iz sredine, već je regulisano promišljanjem. Međutim, psihopate su sklone zadovoljavanju trenutnih impulsa, što određuje njihovo ponašanje kao neodložnu reakciju bez promišljanja. A i kada promišljaju, taj proces se svodi na planiranje krivičnih dela.

I sposobnost samoregulacije je slaba strana psihopatskih kriminalaca. Pojedinci internalizuju društveno prihvatljive norme i na toj osnovi vrše samoprocenu sopstvenog ponašanja. Kod psihopatskih kriminalaca ne dolazi do internalizacije konvencionalnih normi i vrednosti, što kao posledicu stvara vrednovanje negativnih standarda – kriminalne veštine, sposobnost da se ostane neotkriven, obmana organa gonjenja i pravosuđa i sl. ‘Psihopate doživljavaju satisfakciju od ‘efikasnog’ izvršenja teškog, rizičnog krivičnog dela, koje zahteva visok nivo veštine’ (str. 290).

Pod vikarijskom sposobnošću Bandura podrazumeva sposobnost učenja na osnovu posmatranja ponašanja drugih ljudi i posledica tog ponašanja. Kod psihopatskih kriminalaca je i ova sposobnost manifestovana drugačije nego kod normalnih, nekriminalnih osoba. Posmatranje negativnih posledica koje proističu iz nečijeg ponašanja ne proizvodi inhibitorno dejstvo na negativno ponašanje psihopatskih kriminalaca. Bandura je u jednom istraživanju došao do rezultata da će deca podražavati agresivno ponašanje onda kada uvide da se takvo ponašanje nagrađuje, a neće ga

¹⁴³ Postoji nalaz da psihopate postižu niže skorove na verbalnim testovima inteligencije, dok rezultati na neverbalnim testovima ne ukazuju na neku veću razliku između psihopatskih kriminalaca i normalnih osoba sa nekriminalnim ponašanjem (str. 233-236).

podražavati ukoliko se ono kažnjava.¹⁴⁴ Upravo taj strah od kazne razlikuje psihopatske od nepsihopatskih pojedinaca.¹⁴⁵

Da li će doći do kriminalnog ponašanja ne zavisi samo od karakteristika psihopatske ličnosti, već i od spoljašnjih podsticaja ka takvom ponašanju. Bandura navodi pet takvih podsticaja: primarni, senzorni, novčani, socijalni podsticaji i socijalna moć, a šesti je samo-evaluativni podsticaj koji ne spada u spoljašnje, već unutrašnje.

Primarni nagoni, odnosno fiziološke potrebe za hranom, seksom i sl. mogu biti dovoljan podsticaj za manifestaciju psihopatskog kriminalnog ponašanja. U prilog tome govore seksualni delikti. Neodložna reakcija na primarni podsticaj je posledica, gore navedene, nesposobnosti promišljanja.

Traganje za novim senzornim podsticajima je i jedan od dvadeset ajtema u Hareovoj skali psihopatije¹⁴⁶ koja se koristi u dijagnostici psihopatije. Potreba za stimulacijom, odnosno za izbegavanjem dosade kojoj su skloni, navodi psihopatske kriminalce na uzbudljive, riskantne i izazovne akcije koje su nužno povezane sa kršenjem zakona.

Novac je veoma jak podsticaj, jer psihopate veruju da im on može obezbediti sve što žele. Nisu u stanju da ga steknu na socijalno dozvoljen način, jer to zahteva rad, istrajnost, disciplinu, odlaganje želja.¹⁴⁷ Stoga im je imovinski kriminal izuzetno privlačan – brzo sticanje velike količine novca bez ikakvog zalaganja, napora i rada.

Što se socijalnih podsticaja tiče, psihopatskim kriminalcima je veoma bitno da imaju dobar status u kriminalnoj hijerarhiji. Dok su referentne grupe normalnih, nekriminalnih osoba uglavnom one grupe koje su uspeh dostigle na društveno propisan način, referentne grupe psihopatskih kriminalaca su kriminalci.

Samo-evaluativni podsticaji su vezani za samoprocenu. Uspešnost u bavljenju kriminalom podrazumeva ne samo sticanje novca i socijalne moći, već i neodgovaranje za izvršena krivična dela, što psihopatskom kriminalcu predstavlja jedini kriterijum na osnovu koga on procenjuje sopstvenu grandioznost i superiornost.

Ova kategorija ljudi teži i za socijalnom moći, jer im ona 'omogućava da nesmetano ... koriste prinudu, ucene, korupciju, zloupotrebu položaja, sve u cilju

¹⁴⁴ Rot, 2003, str. 89-92

¹⁴⁵ 'Kazna zatvorom na psihopate ne deluje stresogeno, za razliku od većine drugih ljudi koje ona dovodi u ozbiljnu životnu krizu i kojima je od 73 stresna životna događaja, kazna zatvorom na 6. odnosno 13. mestu po rangu' (Vlajković, 1998, prema Radulović, 2006, str. 319).

¹⁴⁶ Radulović, 2006, str. 107-119

¹⁴⁷ Deveti ajtem u Hareovoj skali psihopatije je parazitski životni stil. Psihopate izbegavaju zaposlenje i žive na teretu porodice, rodbine, prijatelja ili se okreću kriminalu. Rad se suprotstavlja njihovoj konstantnoj potrebi za novinama.

pribavljanja materijalne koristi, ostvarivanja ličnih ciljeva i ispunjenja vlastitih devijantnih impulsa' (str. 292).

3. Teorija racionalnog izbora kriminala

Teorija racionalnog izbora polazi od pretpostavke da je u većini slučajeva kriminalno ponašanje plod racionalne kalkulacije. Njeni predstavnici priznaju da postoje i oni kriminalci koji postupaju iracionalno, naročito oni koji su pod dejstvom alkohola i narkotika, oni koji su u stanju visoke emocionalne pobuđenosti i sl. Zato se ova teorija ponekad naziva i teorija ograničene racionalnosti.

Najpoznatiji predstavnici ove teorije, Cook, Clarke i Cornish, pretpostavljaju da psihopatski kriminalci vagaju moguće posledice svojih akcija, kako pozitivne tako i negativne. Krivično delo će izvršiti samo ako procene da je to u njihovom interesu.

Faktori koji utiču na odluku psihopatskog kriminalca da prekrši zakon su: natprosečna spremnost da se preuzme rizik, nepreferiranje poštenja i iskrenosti, evaluacija profita od kriminala, spremnost da se počine krivična dela koja ne donose materijalnu korist, opravdavanje kriminalnog ponašanja na osnovu objektivnih okolnosti. Ovi faktori ujedno upućuju i na razliku između psihopatskih i nepsihopatskih kriminalaca. Odluku o izvršenju krivičnog dela će lakše doneti onaj koji ne preza od opasnosti, na koga rizik ne deluje inhibitorno, već deluje kao podsticaj i izazov. O zakon će se oglušiti i oni koji žele da što pre dođu neradom do profita, a kojima tradicionalne humane vrednosti kao što su poštenje, čast i sl. ništa ne znače. Male posledice mogu odvratiti neke ljude od kriminala, dok psihopatske kriminalce od kriminala mogu odvratiti jedino ozbiljne posledice. Mada, to nije baš sasvim tačno – ozbiljne i teške kazne, zakonom propisane, ne sprečavaju psihopatske serijske ubice u počinjavanju serijskih ubistava, veoma precizno isplaniranih i pripremljenih unapred.

Postoje i činioци kognitivnog porekla, kao što su verovanja, kojima se psihopatski kriminalci služe u racionalizaciji izbora krivičnog dela: '1) 'Ljudi su tu da bi bili uzeti'; 2) 'Snaga ili varanje je najbolji način da se stvari urade'; 3) 'Živimo u džungli, gde samo snažne osobe preživljavaju'; 4) 'Nije važno održati obećanja niti je važno pošteno vratiti dugove'; 5) 'Laganje i varanje su ok, onoliko dugo koliko Vas ne uhvate'; 6) 'Bio sam

nefer tretiran i imam puno pravo da priuštim sebi ono što mislim da je moj deo, svim mogućim sredstvima'; 7) 'Ako ljudi ne mogu da brinu o sebi, to je njihov problem'" (str. 296).

Osnovna zamerka upućena ovoj teoriji jeste da mnogi psihopatski kriminalci ne postupaju uvek racionalno i da se njihovi motivi ne mogu uvek shvatiti. Prosuđivanje psihopatskih kriminalaca više počiva na nagradama, nego na kaznama, što znači da se racionalnim ne može definisati ono odlučivanje koje je motivisano samo pozitivnom posledicom koja kasnije može proisteći iz odabranog ponašanja, a da se pri tome ne obraća pažnja na negativne posledice.



Nesumnjivo je da je psihopatski kriminalni produkt dinamičke interakcije bioloških, psiholoških i sociokulturnih činilaca. Svako preneglašavanje jednih dovodi do zanemarivanja drugih činilaca, a teorija kriminala koja pretenduje da bude valjana i, što je najbitnije, upotrebljiva u praksi to sebi ne sme dopustiti.

Genetički činioci utiču na pojavu psihopatije i kriminala, ali taj uticaj nije dominantan, već samo predstavlja potencijal za razvoj kriminalnog ponašanja. Sredinski faktori mogu biti kočnica tom potencijalu, kao i možda intrapersonalni psihološki faktori ili ga sa druge strane mogu podstaći u ostvarenju.

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